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Chapter 1
Political Economy and Economic Growth
An Introductory Exposition"
October 11, 1999
Abstract
Public sector institutions constitute the structure whereby demands
for public policies are reflected in the supply of such policies. In this way,
as well as by structuring activity in the private sector, such institutions
contribute to determining the rate of economic growth. In the main part
of this introductory chapter, I review the theoretical and empirical liter-
ature on the links between economic policies, political and bureaucratic
institutions, and economic growth. Since economic growth seems a neces-
sary but not sufficient condition for economic development, it is essential
to develop an understanding of both how policies are shaped by specific
institutional structures and how these structures are formed. In the last
part of the chapter, I summarise how the substantive chapters of the thesis
contribute to this research project.
"What development economics lacks is an adequate theory of
government policy." (Fishlow 1991, p.1736)
1 Introductory Remarks
Public sector institutions constitute the structure whereby demands for pub-
lic policies are reflected in the supply of such policies. In this way, as well
as by structuring activity in the private sector, such institutions contribute to
determining the rate of economic growth. In the main part of this introduc-
tory chapter, I sketch the most important theoretical and empirical results on
the links between economic policies, political and bureaucratic institutions, and
growth. Presently, public policies and institutions are considered major deter-
minants of economic growth. Since in practice increasing average income seems
a necessary but not sufficient condition for economic development, it is essential
"l could not have written this chapter without the help of Afsaneh Bjorvatn, to whom l am
extremely grateful for providing me with the necessary material. l have also benefited from,
and thus appreciate, the penetrating criticisms and helpful suggestions of Kjetil Bjorvatn,
Hans Hvide, Hilde Selbervik, and Bertil Tungodden. Of course, none of these valuable aides
can be held responsible for what l have produced on the basis of their support.
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to develop an understanding of both how policies are shaped by specific insti-
tutional structures and how these structures are formed. The citation above,
taken from a review of Handbook of Development Economics, attests to the im-
portance of this research project. In the last part of the chapter, I summarise
how the substantive chapters of my thesis contribute to it. Readers familiar
with the subject of the next section might therefore want to proceed directly to
section 1.3.
I start by outlining the main features of the world distribution of income as
well as how different countries have fared in the four decades since the great
wave of decolonalisation and the onset of economic assistance to what was eu-
phemistically termed the developing countries. It appears that the great dis-
parities between rich and poor countries are rather persistent, and might even
be widening. Many countries have seen little or no progress since 1960. Worse
still, countries like Somalia, Liberia, and Sierra Leone seem to be moving in
the wrong direction. That is, they are not in the process of becoming the rich
modern societies that were envisaged at the time, but are rather spiralling into
greater poverty and social anarchy.
On the other hand, there are some examples of significant material improve-
ment, most notably in Eastern Asia. Modern theories of economic growth em-
phasise the important role of economic policies, and not incidentally the so-called
East Asian Tigers have been praised for their good economic policies (at least
until recently). However, answering the question "Why do some countries grow
faster than others?" with "superior economic policies" only begs the question
"Why do some countries adopt superior economic policies?" Conventional eco-
nomic theory cannot answer this question.' It has only a normative theory of
economic policy, probably because the study of economic policy choice has been
seen as beyond the borders of the discipline. However, there is now a rapidly
developing field of (new) political economy straddling the border of economics
and political science. Its tools are mathematics and game theory, allowing the
subject matter to be studied at the same level of rigour which has been applied
to "traditional" economic subjects.i
The substantive chapters of my thesis belong to this line of work. Three of
them deal with various stages of the economic policy process. As noted above,
economic policies are initiated, chosen, and implemented within an institutional
framework which guides the process. Thus, almost by definition one should ex-
pect countries with "superior" public sector institutions to adopt "superior"
economic policies. In the fourth substantive chapter, I ponder the question
lurking behind this answer to the question "Why do some countries adopt su-
perior economic policies?" That is, I make an effort at understanding the forces
shaping the institutional framework. As all of these chapters are of a theoretical
nature, it seems appropriate to devote some space here to the economic real-
ities and previous theoretical work which in combination have motivated my
choice of subject - the political economy of economic policies and public sector
l Of course, the public choice school has been developing such a theory for many decades.
2See Persson and Tabellini (1990) for a general account of the methodological approach of
political economy.
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institutions in developing countries.
2 Economic Growth, Economic Policies, and Pub-
lic Sector Inst it ut ions''
2.1 The State of OurDisunion
The greatest challenge facing economic theory is to explain why some countries
are poor while others are rich. The gap between rich and poor countries is
immense. In a sample of one hundred and four countries, the ratio of the per
capita income of the richest country to that of the poorest was never below
30 in 1960, 1970, and 1980, rising to as high as 45.24 in 1990.4 That is, in
1990, average income in the richest country (USA) was 4424% higher than in
the poorest country (Chad).5
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Figure 1: cross-country income shares 1960-90
This great inequality of income extends to the level of quartiles (figure 1). In
1990, the share of the fourth quartile of this sample in total income (the richest
twenty-six countries) was almost 65%, while the share of the first quartile was
well below 5%. In fact, during the thirty years since 1960, the upper half
of the sample arranged by income has increased its share at the expense of the
poorest half, the cumulative share of which declined from about 18.3% to 13.1 %.
Granted, the group of countries making up the lower tail of the cross-country
income distribution in 1960 was not identical to the corresponding group in 1990.
But the grouping was still remarkably stable, with nineteen out of twenty-six
3Some of the passages in this section are translations of material from Hagen and Pedersen
(1999) and Hagen (1999).
4The data are taken from Easterly (1997). The income measure is real GDP per capita in
constant 1985-dollars (the Penn World Tables Mark 5 is the primary source).
5In each of these years, the USA was the richest country. Chad shares the dubious status
of being the poorest country with the fellowAfrican states of Lesotho (1960), Burundi (1910),
and Burkina Faso (1980).
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members being the same. Moreover, this stability extends to the sample as a
whole. Table 1 contains Spearman's rank correlation coefficient between country
income rankings (poorest to richest country) in 1960, 1970, 1980, and 1980. A
value of the coefficient of unity means that the two rankings being compared
are identical. As the coefficients for consecutive years are in the region of 0.96-
0.98, it is evident from table 1 that there is very little change in the ranking of
countries from decade to decade. Even on a thirty year basis, the coefficient is
as high as 0.89.
Table l' Spearman's rank correlation coefficients across decades
1960 1970 1980 1990
1960 1.0000
1970 0.9793 1.0000
1980 0.9387 0.9641 1.0000
1990 0.8930 0.9314 0.9777 1.0000
In sum, there are great cross-country inequalities of income which seem to
be increasing rather than decreasing. One might argue that a persistent (in
ranks) or worsening (in levels) cross-country income distribution is nothing to
worry about if every country is experiencing growth in income. However, this
is not the case in the current sample. Even though the average income in the
sample more than doubled from 1960 to 1990, not only did countries not share
everily in this growth, twelve of them (more than 10% of the sample) actually
saw their per capita income decrease in this period (c.f. figure 2).
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Figure 2: frequencies of growth rates 1960-90
Note: the evere ge an nue l growth rates I have been calculated hy the author Ir om the data in Easterly (1997)
based on the Ior æ u le GDPPC1900=(1+g)30GDPPCI900. wbere GDPPC1960 (GDPPC1990) is GDP per r.al,ita ill
1960 (1990).
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2.2 Catching Up And Falling Behind: On Miracles and
Tragedies
The picture just painted is disappointing not only from an egalitarian perspec-
tive. About four decades have now passed since the hopeful term "developing
countries" was coined. The optimism of the early years was not unfounded. On
the contrary, both theory and facts seemed to indicate that rapid development
was possible. The experience of the European countries (as well as Japan) in the
aftermath of the Second World War, where the funding provided by the Mar-
shall plan had resurrected their economies in about a decade seemed to point
to the investment of capital as the decisive factor. This was corroborated by
the (in)famous Harrod-Domar model, which held that income was a function of
the capital stock only," Hence, poor countries were poor because they had little
capital. Moreover, being poor, there was little to save and invest. That is, there
was a gap between the savings these countries could generate on their own and
what was required for them to develop economically. Thus, foreign assistance
was required, and would translate into immediate gains in living standards. As
experience was gained, more gaps were added to the model, notably a foreign
exchange gap and a public revenue gap, both of which seemed to reinforce the
case for foreign aid to developing country governments.
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Figure 3: absence of absolute convergence
Note: The se urp le is the SAUle R8 ill figure 2. See the bote to that filure ror details.
However, even though the Harrod-Domar model is simplistic in the extreme,
more sophisticated models also seemed to give cause for optimism. For example,
another early model of economic growth, the Solow-model, predicts that if two
countries are identical in every respect except for their income level, the poorest
of these should grow faster than the richest on the way to their common steady-
state. That is, if the assumptions of the model hold true and other things are
6In fact, it is not much of a model, being based on the identity Y == cK, where c = Yl K,
output per unit of capital, is assumed to be constant. Thus, manipulating the level of capital
employedmakes it possible to generate any level of output. '
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equal, poor countries should eventually catch up with rich."
Though, by now the prediction of absolute convergence has been soundly
refuted by the evidence. Figure 3 demonstrates this based on the countries in the
current sample. If there was something to the notion of absolute convergence,
the pairs of data on initial income and subsequent growth should have been
scattered more or less along a line falling from the north-west to the south-east.
No such pattern can be detected. Moreover, eleven out of the twelve countries
with a negative average growth rate from 1960 to 1990 were countries with
income below the sample average in 1960.
Figure 3 also illustrates that countries with similar economic starting posi-
tions have fared rather differently over the period covered. This can be exem-
plified by comparing the recent economic histories of Ghana and South Korea.
Ghana was the first colony in Sub-Saharan Africa to become independent (in
1957). Under the leadership of the charismatic Kwame Nkrumah, the country
symbolised the bright future of the countries on the continent. In 1960, GDP
per capita stood at 894 1985-dollars. In the same year, the corresponding figure
for South Korea was about the same (at 904). Its economic prospects did not
seem as bright as Ghana's. On the contrary, suffering from a highly corrupt
and inefficient regime and facing the threat from the communistic North, the
country seemed destined for stagnation. That fate, however, befell Ghana in-
stead. Thirty years on, having experienced practically no growth at all, it was
still a low-income country. On the other hand, South Korea was approaching
status as a high-income country (something which it has later achieved, together
with membership of the OECD). This was the result of a phenomenal six-fold
increase in the level of income.
Table 2: Highest and lowest average annual growth rates 1960-90
Fastest growth Slowest growth
Country Growth rate (%) Country Growth rate (%)
South Korea 6.9 Chad -2.1
Singapore 6.7 Madagascar -1.9
Hong Kong 6.5 Mozambique -1.4
Taiwan 6.4 Guyana -1.3
Japan 5.4 Zambia -1.1
Cyprus 4.8 Nicaragua -0.7
Portugal 4.7 Central African Rep. -0.6
Thailand 4.5 Benin -0.6
Malaysia 4.4 Burundi -0.5
Greece 4.0 Uganda -0.3
As illustrated 10 table 2, the cases of Ghana and South Korea are actually
fairly representative of the difference between the growth record of countries in
East and Southeast Asia and those in Sub-Saharan Africa.8 Of the ten fastest
7Of course, other things - i.e., other parameters of the model such as the level of technology
and its growth rate and discount and savings rates - need not be (and are not) equal in poor
and rich countries.
Su. is easy to find other examples of countries in these two regions starting at about the
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growing countries in my sample, seven are old and new" tiger" economies (the
rest are from Southern Europe). This is the so-called East Asian "miracle". 9
Of the ten slowest growing economies, eight are from Sub-Saharan Africa. This
phenomenon has been dubbed "Africa's growth tragedy" (Easterly and Levine
1997).
2.3 Economic Policies and Economic Growth
So far we have seen that there are income differentials between countries that
seem rather persistent on average, but that some countries have managed to
bridge the gap and thus improve their lot. The latter is important because
at first sight the answer to the question "Why?" seems simple enough: rich
countries are rich because they are in possession of the prerequisites for creating
wealth, such as advanced technology, machines, and a highly educated labour
force. However, on closer inspection this answer is incomplete. The level of
technology, the number of machines, and the quality of a country's labour force
are not determined by nature. Moreover, being richly endowed with natural
resources is not a necessary condition for becoming a high-income country. ff
it were, Japan would never have achieved such a status. It is not sufficient
either, because then Nigeria would be one of the richest countries in the world
and not one of the poorest, which is in fact the case. lO The million dollar
question is therefore why some countries experience resource accumulation and
technological progress while others get stuck in technological backwaters without
getting more of neither human nor physical capital?
The intuition behind the convergence result of the Solow-model is the fol-
lowing. Poor countries have less physical capital than rich countries. Thus, if
the marginal product of capital is decreasing, the returns to investment should
be lower in rich countries than in poor. One reason why the marginal product
of capital might be decreasing in the aggregate is that it seems reasonable to
expect that the best investment opportunities are exploited first. Subsequent
investment will therefore be in projects with lower and lower returns. ff the set
of possible projects is the same in all countries, poor countries should therefore
same level of income in 1960 but finding themselves worlds apart by 1990. Zambians were
actually richer on average than the Thais in 1960 (965 versus 943). But while income per
capita declined by about 1.1% annually in the former during 1960-90, it grew at 4.5% in the
latter. Therefore, in 1990the average Thai had more than five times the income of the average
Zambian. The people of Madagascar fared even worse than the Zambians, losing almost half
of their per capita income from 1960 to 1990. The Taiwanese, on the other hand, who were
only about 5% richer on average in 1960, had a level of per capita income in 1990which was
a whopping 1095%above their fellow islanders.
9For general surveys of the recent economic history of the East Asian "miracle" countries,
see e.g. Campos and Root (1996) and World Bank (1993). The case studies of Amsden (1989)
and Wade (1990) provide less euphorial and more in-depth descriptions of South-Korea and
Taiwan.
10Another interesting (if depressing) example is Venezuela, also one of the most important
oil-producers in the world. However, out of the twelve countries in my sample with negative
average growth rates 1960-90, Venezuela is the only one which had a level of income above
the sample average in 1960.
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see more investment and thus higher growth than rich countries.P
Of course, being poor countries with small capital stocks will not be able
to save much (in absolute terms). One way in which the potential growth
differential between capital-rich and capital-poor economies might be realised is
then through capital flows from the former to the latter. Such flows might be
private or public and might come in the form of investments, loans, or grants.
While the conditions attached to the transfer will differ between the various
types of international capital flows, if invested efficiently (as assumed in the
Solow-medel) all of them can contribute to increased economic growth on the
way to the long-run "equilibrium" state of the economy.
The importance of the investment rate for economic growth has been cor-
roborated by empirical evidence.P It is therefore somewhat paradoxical that
in the steady-state of the Solow-medel, economic growth is constant and deter-
mined by the rate of technical progress, which is exogenous. In other words,
this is a theory of long-run growth which does not explain long-run growth!
Note in particular that this means that economic policies do not affect the
growth rate of the economy.P This feature would probably puzzle any layman,
and as the 1970s unfolded, many development economists became convinced
that policies do indeed matter for economic growth. In particular, the path of
state-led development that had been followed by many low-income countries in
Latin America, Africa, and Asia, came increasingly to be viewed as an obsta-
cle to progress. With the rallying cry of "get prices right", these economists
mounted an increasingly aggressive attack on quotas, multiple exchange rates,
state-owned enterprises, and other symbols of societies with a high degree of
state involvement in economic affairs. Eventually, these views came to dominate
the agenda of the development community, and the 1980s ushered in structural
adjustment programs supported by the multilateral financial institutions and
bilateral donors.
While the record of structural adjustment programmes is rather disappoint-
ing to date, the belief that economic policies matter for economic growth has
been bolstered by modern theories of growth in which the rate of resource ac-
cumulation is endogenous, that is, explained within the model.l'' The essence
of economic growth is accumulation of resources (broadly defined) across time.
Accumulation necessitates abstaining from consuming resources today so as to
be able to have greater consumption tomorrow. The returns to postponing
consumption are therefore crucial for savings and investment. Two major cate-
gories of determinants of the returns to accumulation arising from this literature
are 1) differences in institutions across countries and 2) differences in economic
policies.
11This if is of course just as brave as the ones noted in the last sub-section.
12For example, Levine and Renelt (1992) find that the share of investment inGDP is the only
robust (in a certain statistical sense) explanatory variable in cross-country growth regressions.
13Economic policies might affect the growth rate of the economy along the transition path
to the steady-state. Since the speed of transition might be low, policies could have an impact
for a long time even in the environment assumed in this model.
14Many of these theories focus 011 investment ill humall capital. For the issues expløred
here, though, it seems more relevant to concentrate on investment in physical capital.
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the author using tile Iucom e data in Easterly 1991) and the uaturallolarithm of one plus the black market premium
(taken frODI Easterly aud Levine 1997). Both numbers are decade averages. The figure i8 based on tile maximum
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Figure 5: regional decade averages of black market premia
all three decades. There are 32 countries houl Sub-Se a er eu AbieR, 23 OECD-eoUlltries (exel. Turkey), 20 froUl
Taiwan, and Thailand).
Lath" America and Ce r+bb ee n , 10 houl the Middle East and North Arrica {lue l, Turkey), 5 Ir om South Asia, 6 hODI
Eaøt Asia aud Pacific (exet. the Tigers), and 7 Tigers (Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Sfn gepe re , South-Korea,
Starting with the latter, it is common to point out the differences between
the policies pursued by the East Asian Tigers and most other developing coun-
tries. For example, a premium on foreign exchange in the black market (or
equivalently, the existence of such a market) can be regarded as a reflection of
distortionary macroeconomic policies. Indeed, as figure 4 demonstrates, aver~ge
9
annual growth rates of per capita income over decades are a negative function
of the average decade black market premium.P
Since policies differ markedly between regions (as exemplified in figure 5),
this might explain why some countries grow faster than others. In particu-
lar, since the East Asian Tigers seem to have followed much less distortionary
macroeconomic policies than other developing countries, this might explain how
miracles are made.
As economic policies are partly determined by political processes (they are
also shaped by bureaucratic processes), there is clearly a need for studying these
if one are to understand either cross-country variability in economic policies or
shifts within a country over time. In the last decade, there has been a lot
of research on the impact of political polarisation and political instability on
economic policies.
Political instability can take two different forms. First of all, governments
might change. Such changes can proceed according to pre-established rules,
e.g. after elections or votes of confidence in the legislature. However, they
can also occur by unconstitutional means such as coups and revolutions. The
second type of political instability is exemplified by socio-political events such
as strikes, demonstrations, riots, and political violence.I" .
Note well that it is potential instability which is important for economic
decisions with long-term consequences. In the process of making up their minds
about what to do, agents will try to forecast the development of decision-relevant
variables. For example, a private investor evaluating whether to establish a fac-
tory with a physicallife-span of twenty years will try to forecast what the prices
of the products produced in the factory and government policy on issues like
profit taxation and infrastructure development will be during that period. Once
the capital has been committed, the decision is normally not fully reversible,
i.e., it is not possible to recapture the full value of the investment if the investor
decides to close down the factory. Therefore, changes in government policies
affecting the profitability of the venture cannot change the investment decision
once it is made (it might of course change the profitability of continuing produc-
tion). However, the possibility of such changes might affect the original decision
on whether to build the factory.
Political polarisation is caused by differences between individuals or groups
in a society in terms of for example income, ethnicity, religion, culture, or ide-
ology. Since there are no societies which are completely homogenous in every
respect, polarisation (like instability) is a matter of degree. For our purposes,
what is important is that political polarisation implies that there is disagreement
over what economic policies should be pursued. It is to be expected that the
greater the degree of polarisation, the greater is the disagreement over policies.
This means that one should expect both the differences in the economic policies
of potential future governments and the opposition of those out of power to the
15A simple regression of growth rates on In (l+black market premium) yields GRWTH =
2,6-2,8BLCKMKT. The t-statistic of the slope coefficient is a healthy 6,9 and R2=O,13.
160f course, these two types of political instability might occur simultaneously, and this is
in fact common in practice.
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policies of the current government to be increasing in the degree of polarisation.
The societies of poor countries tend to be more polarised politically than
those of rich countries. One possible reason for this difference is that income
and wealth is distributed much more unequally in the former type of coun-
tries. Table 3 illustrates this. It is based on all the countries (thirty-nine) in
the dataset of Easterly (1997) for which decade averages of the Gini-coefficient
were available for the four decades shown. For each decade, I have ranked the
countries according to the degree of income inequality. It can be seen that no
developing country appear among the three countries with the most egalitarian
income distributions in any decade. On the other hand, the three countries with
the most unequal income distributions are always developing countries. In fact,
they are always from Latin America or Sub-Saharan Africa, with Kenya being
consistently among the top three.
Table 3' Highest and lowest values of Gini-coefficients
Most egalitarian Least egalitarian
1. Bulgaria 21.46 1. Jamaica 62.80
1960s 2. Czechoslovakia 22.15 2. Kenya 62.55
3. Hungary 24.25 3. Peru 61.83
1. Bulgaria 20.34 1. Ecuador 65.38
1970a 2. Czechoslovakia 20.88 2. Kenya 63.60
3. Hungary 22.17 3. Peru 57.14
1. Czechoslovakia 20.63 1. Kenya 57.30
1980s 2. Hungary 22.47 2. Chile 54.61
3. Bulgaria 23.20 3. Mexico 52.45
1. Finland 23.55 1. South Africa 62.30
1990s 2. Czechoslovakia 24.56 2. Kenya 54.39
3. Germany 26.00 3. Chile 52.35
Note. tbe primary source 18 Deæ tg er and Squire (1996).
Recent empirical studies have found initial inequality (i.e., at the start of
the period covered) to be negativelyassociated with subsequent rates of growth.
These econometric studies are supported by case-studies (e.g. Birdsall, Ross,
and Sabot 1995) claiming that one of the important reasons why East Asian
countries such as South Korea and Taiwan have been able to prosper is that
income and wealth have been much more equally distributed there than in many
Latin American and Sub-Saharan countries. There are of course many differ-
ent ways in which inequality might have a negative impact on accumulation,"?
However, it seems reasonable to assume that one of the most important chan-
nels is through increased polarisation with a concomitant increase in political
instability. This is what Alesina and Perotti (1996) find, for example. More
specifically, they find that income inequality tends to increase "socio-political
instability" (as measured by indicators of political violence and government in-
stability (coups)). In turn, this sort of instability reduces aggregate investment
17On theories and evidence 011 the various possible channels from inequality to growth, see
e.g. Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Clarke (1995), Deiniger and Squire (1998), Perotti (1996),
and Persson and Tabellini (1994). An excellent review is provided by Benabou (1996). '
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in their data set.
It is important to note that when speaking of the consequences of potential
instability, the degree of polarisation is crucial. First of all, there are several
models which predict that potential instability changes politicians' evaluation of
public finances over time. The reason is that when policy-motivated politicians
might be replaced by political opponents with different views on public spending,
the only sure thing is that they determine how public funds are spent today.
Since from their point of view their own stance on spending is superior to those
of their adversaries, the value of having resources available in the future changes,
the more so the greater the polarisation between the current and potential future
governments. The result might be highly inefficient policies.P Indeed, several
empirical studies show that political instability leads to higher public sector
deficits and debts and higher rates of infiation.i''
Secondly, if there is no polarisation, the uncertainty about future policies
engendered by the potential for instability is more apparent than real - if all
politicians are the same they will presumably pursue the same policies. Hence
the negative impact of instability on private investment is likely to be negligible.
On the other hand, the greater the political differences between potential future
governments, the greater the potential policy volatility. This is likely to reduce
irreversible investments in physical capital as investors postpone their decisions
to "wait and see" what the outcome will be or move capital abroad to countries
which are considered to be more stable. In fact, econometric analyses such
as those of Fischer (1993) and Brunetti (1998) demonstrate that indicators of
macroeconomic instability (e.g. high and variable inflation) tend to have a
negative impact on economic growth.
As noted above, one way in which the growth potential of poor countries
might be unleashed is through capital flows from the capital-rich economies.
However, private capital has often been flowing in the opposite direction, that is,
from the presumably high-returns-to-investment economies to those which pre-
sumably are low-returns-to-investment.i'' In addition, those developing coun-
tries which presently receive private foreign investment tend to be middle-income
countries, which by the logic behind the convergence result should have lower
returns to investment than low-income countries (once again, other things being
equal). Political risk - or, more generally, policy risk - is probably the single
most important reason why capital is not consistently flowing into poor countries
with untapped investment possibilities.U Moreover, it is also a major reason
why the funds that have been forthcoming in recent years have tended to be
portfolio investment and not investment in fixed capital. The latter, which is
necessarily of a long-term character, is much more vulnerable with respect to
sudden changes in policy than the former, which is "hot" money, i.e., can be
18Consult the survey in section 2 of chapter 3 for references.
19See the survey in chapter 4 of Hagen (1994).
20Lucas (1990) speculate on the reasons for this apparent paradox. Tomell and Velasco
(1992) provide a possible political economy explanation.
21It can also explain phenomena such as private outflows of capital occurring slmultaneously
with public borrowing abroad (c.f. Alesina and Tabellini 1989).
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withdrawn at the suspicion of adverse developments in the rate of return (or
indeed merely better prospects elsewhere). Capital-importing countries, on the
other hand, are much more vulnerable if they are overly dependent on short-
term capital flows, a point which the financial crises of this decade (Mexico,
East Asia) have driven home with a vengeance.
Thirdly, it seems reasonable to assume that socio-political instability is likely
to occur more often and be of a more serious character in highly polarised so-
cieties. Strikes clearly reduce the productivity of workers; riots and political
violence might cause harm to employees or damage equipment; and demonstra-
tions or blockades can prevent raw materials from being imported or finished
products from finding their way to the markets. Events such these can therefore
seriously erode the profitability of investment, and the uncertainty surrounding
their occurrence will contribute to making profits seem more variable ex ante.
This is likely to reduce private investment. The study by Alesina and Perotti
(1996) cited above seems to confirm this presumption.
As an illustration of the magnitude of the effects of polarisation and in-
stability on economic growth, consider table 4 which is adapted from table 2
of Alesina, Osler, Roubini, and Swagel (1997). Each cell contains the average
growth rate of GDP per capita in one of six different groups of countries in years
of specific types of government changes. First of all, it is noteworthy that the
average growth rate is lower in years of government change than in years with-
out such changes for all groups (compare columns one and two). On average,
the growth rate in years where the government does not change is almost twice
the rate in years where such changes take place.
Table 4: Government instability and economic growth 1960-82
No change Gov't Insignificant Significant Coups
in gov't changes gov't gov't
changes changes
All countries 2.8 1.5 2.3 0.2 -1.4
Latin Amer. 2.4 1.5 2.9 0.2 -0.6
Africa 2.0 -0.4 1.1 -1.9 -2.6
Asia 4.0 1.7 1.9 1.2 1.0
Ind. countr. 2.9 2.8 3.0 2.3 -
Others 5.3 2.0 2.5 1.4 -2.2. .Note. See the source for data defi e it ions , The country e laee lfi ee t ion of the IMF IS used. Others are nou
industrial Europeau countries, There are uo iustabces of COU))8 in industrialised countries in the aBDII,le period.
Secondly, significant government changes have a much greater negative im-
pact on growth than insignificant ones. A change is deemed to be significant
by the authors if i) it takes place by irregular procedures (such as coups) or
ii) if pre-established rules are followed but there is a considerable change in
the government's political affiliation. Hence this category is created to try to
capture the effects of polarisation, and demonstrate that the negative effects of
political instability are much stronger when coupled with polarisation. In fact,
in Africa per capita GDP declined by almost 2% on average in years of sig-
nificant changes in government while the corresponding numbers in years with
13
insignificant changes and no changes were increases of 1.1% and 2% respectively.
One reason why Africa does so poorly is that on several accounts polarisation
seems to be more severe in these countries, at least in Sub-Saharan Africa. In
connection with table 3, I noted that Kenya was among the three countries with
the most unequal income distributions in all decades. However, that table was
based solelyon countries for which data were available for all four periods were
included. This severely restricted the number of African countries covered. If
we look at the 1980s only, which is the period for which I have the most observa-
tions (eighty-three), four of the five countries with the highest decade averages
of the Gini-coefficient are from Sub-Saharan Africa.22
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Moreover, Sub-Saharan has one of the most fragmented population struc-
tures of all the regions of the world, c.f. figure 6. The horrifying human con-
sequences of ethnic strife have been all too clear in recent years as countries
such as Somalia, Liberia, and Sierra Leone have disintegrated into anarchy and
Rwanda has experienced genocide. But even in times and places less dramatic
than these, the artificial borders bequeathed by the colonial powers seem to
have contributed to making African politics a zero-sum game between various
redistributive coalitions based on ethnicity. The negative economic consequences
have been documented by Easterly and Levine (1997), who show that the ethno-
linguistic fragmentation of Sub-Saharan Africa contributes both directly and
indirectly (through e.g. more inefficient policies and more corruption) to the
well-known abysmal recent growth record of these countries. It might be added
that the ethnic homogeneity of some of the East Asian Tigers could well be a
factor that has contributed to their relative political stability and, thereby, to
their economic success.P
22Lesotho is on top (or bottom, depending on how you see it) with a Gini-coefficient of 60.
Malawi is in third place, Kenya is number four, and Botswana is in fifth place.
23It is noteworthy that fourteen of the fifteen most heterogeneous countries in my sample
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2.4 Public Sector Institutions and Economic Growth
Institutions are laws, rules, and norms that govern human behaviour or clusters
of such regulative features of society. They might be informal, such as customs,
or formal, examples of which are statutory laws. Many formal institutions are
established through political decision-making while informal institutions do not
come about through explicit action at a point in time. Formal and informal
institutions usually interplay. Such interplay is found in the market place, for
instance, where formal property rights, customs, and expectations based on
common norms of behaviour are all shaping the behaviour of individuals and
the consequerices of these.
There has been some interest recently in using cross-country differences in
informal institutions to explain differences in growth.24 Here I shall concentrate
on formal institutions, since these are amenable to purposive choice. Further-
more, formal institutions are not only shaping behaviour in the economic arena.
In particular, public sector institutions structure the process by which economic
policies are formed. Political institutions mediate pressures from various social
groups and turn them into policy choices. In turn, bureaucratic institutions
shape the manner in which policy choices are actually implemented. In sum,
the economic policies pursued in a country are determined in a multi-staged
process of initiation (or agenda-setting), choice, and implementation. At each
stage of the process, public sector institutions are crucial.
The genesis of this uplifting hypothesis - that all good things go together
- was of course the experience of the industrialised countries. However, the
conclusions of the modernisation school were soon challenged both theoretically
and empirically. Many African countries which had adopted democratic institu-
tions at independence switched to more autocratic political regimes even though
overall African economies were not doing too badly in the 1960s.25 Moreover,
autocracies such as South-Korea, Taiwan, and Brazil experienced rapid growth
based on manufacturing and were thus modernising their economies without ex-
periencing democratisation. Both economists and political scientists proposed
theories of why democracy was at odds with economic development. They held
that countries which sough rapid growth should postpone political development
in the form of democratic rights and adopt a more autocratic political regime"
The political regime of a country - the degree of democracy - is perceived by
are from Sub-Saharan Africa. South Korea, on the other hand, is the only country in the
sample which is completely homogenous, while Japan is the second most homogenous country
and Hong Kong is the fifth.
240ne example is Landes (1998), who sees culture as the main determinant of economic
progress. Culture can be viewed as a set of commonly held beliefs and expectations which
influence behaviour. Similarly, the literature on "social capital" (see e.g. Knack and Keefer
1997) purports to show that countries with more social capital grows faster.
25 For example, of the 33 countries from Sub-Saharan Africa for which I was able to calculate
the average yearly growth rate 1960-90,25 grew more rapidly than this on average in the 1960s.
26A classic example is the book by Huntington (1969). For an account of the ups and downs
in the standing of democracy in the development debate, see Sirowy and Inkeles (1991), who
also reviews early empirical studies of the relationship between democracy, economic growth,
and inequality. '
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many to be the most significant formal institutional characteristics of its society.
One reason is of course that many people view democracy as an end in and of
itself. However, the link between political regime and economic development is
a long-standing and controversial issue as well. The proponents of the so-called
modernisation school of political science, which had its heyday in the 1950s and
1960s, argued that the transformation of traditional societies involved more than
urbanisation, industrialisation, and higher income levels. Modern societies were
also democratic societies, they alleged, so the process of modernisation would
lead to the establishment of democratic rights for the inhabitants of developing
countries (who would acquire the attitudes and norms associated with life in a
modern democratic society).
~
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Note: the data are taken Iro ur Easterly (1997). Only countries for which data could be obtaiued for all three
ye e ra have been included. I heve calculated the average of the two eub-m ee su r es of Ilolitical aud etv l! rights arter
couveet in g t hem to ft 1-10 scale. The acronYnls stand for LaUn AUletiea and Carihbean (LAC, 33 countries). Sub-
Snharan AfricR (SSA, 46 countries), Middle East Rud Nortll Africa (MNA, 21 countries tue l. Turkey, Malta, an d
Cyprus), South Asia (SA, 9 countries), East Asia and the Peetfi e (EAP, 23 countries), and Eastern Europe and the
Ic rmer Soviet Union (EES, 9 countries). DC is the evere ge of the develop lug countries, i.e., all regions except EES
e ud the OECD (23 countries).
For some reason the view that democracy is a prerequisite for economic
growth seems to have become in vogue again. Perhaps it is due to the abysmal
record of countries ruled by dictators such as former President Mobutu of Zarre,
Indeed, "good governance" is often held to imply the rule of law, accountability
on the part of public officials, and participation in public affairs by citizens,
features which are more reliably present under democratic regimes. Moreover,
as shown in figure 7, the level of democracy varies widely between the regions
of the world.F If political regime has an impact on economic development,
27Even though the debate is often couched in terms of the dichotomy autocratic-democratic,
it should be clear that political regime is a continuous variable. Moreover, it is a multi-
dimensional concept and any real world regime is likely to score differently along the various
dimensions. Of course, measuring the degree of democracy involves a certain degree of-sub-
jectivity. Figure 7 is based on the most widely used measure of democratic rights, known as
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this institutional feature is thus a potential answer to the question "Why are
some countries rich and some poor?" But though democracy is currently even
heralded as a sine qua none by some observers, alas neither theory nor facts
support this optimistic conclusion. This is not the place to recount the numerous
arguments pro and con a positive effect of democracy on economic growth.28
Suffices to say that there are about as many cons as pros. Figure 8 neatly
summarises the main conclusion of the empirical literature: there is no robust
relationship between political regime and economic growth.293o
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Figure 8: democracy and economic growth
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(converted to a 1·10 scale) and the average 8DDualgrowtb rate of I,er capita iuccme 1980-g0. Both data series have
been computed by tile autbor b•• ed DU the raw data in Easterly (1997).
While the overall institutional characteristic political regime is not system-
atically related to growth performance, more disaggregate features of public
sector institutions are. Figure 9 shows a measure of "institutional quality".
This measure is the simple average of five measures. Two of these might be said
to reflect characteristics of political institutions (freedom from expropriation
and repudiation of contracts by the government), two concerns the quality of
administrative institutions (freedom from corruption and bureaucratic quality),
Gastil's index (see Gastil 1991). However,other measures tend to reasonably consistent with
this measure. That is, their ordinal properties tend to be the same, which is the most that
one can hope for given the subjective nature of the variable.
28 An account is given in Hagen (1999).
29See Brunetti (1997) for a recent summary of empirical studies of the impact of political
regime on growth.
30Even though the sources of political instability usually differsacross regimes - for instance,
in autocracies govemments rarely change due to elections while in more democratic regimes
this is rather common - no regime type is completely stable. This could be the reason why
political regime is not a robust explanatory variable ill growth regressions. The degree of
instability might vary as much between countries with the same political regime as between
regime types. This is not to say that political institutions do not have all impact on instability
(and polarisation). For the sake of brevity, I do not elaborate on this issue here. See Hagen
(1999) for an example of how electoral institutions might affect these political phenomena.
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and one attempts to measure state of a country's judicial institutions (rule of
law).31 Obviously, all of these are subjective measures. However, they have
been constructed by companies specialising in selling country risk assessments
to commercial firms considering trading or investing abroad. The willingness of
the latter to pay for the information indicates that it is perceived to be valu-
able, i.e., reflect important characteristics of the business environment in the
countries analysed.
Latia Sub-Saharan Middle East Soulh Asia BasI Asian
America and Africa and North Tigers
Caribbean Africa
Figure 9: average regional institutional quality in 1982 and 1990
Note: the fi g u r e is beeed on 6:i countries for wbich data (frODt Easterly 1997) were avail.ble for botb p c iu t.s
in tinte (1982 iø the first year for which tbese m eeau r es are available). or these, tbere were 22 couatries Crobl Latin
America and Caribbean, 15 (rODl Sub-Sabaran Africa, 14 (rODI the Middle East and North Africa, 7 Tigeu, and 5
South Asian countries.
As can be seen from figure 9, in terms of institutional quality the Tigers are
head and shoulders above other regions of what was formerly known as the Third
World.32 Many researchers have found that measures such as these are signif-
icant explanatory variables in growth regressions. For example, Knack (1996)
and Keefer and Knack (1997) demonstrate that the ability of poor countries to
catch up with the rich is affected by the quality of their public institutions. The
econometric analysis of Mauro (1995) shows that growth is slower in countries
with more corruption. Finally, Knack and Keefer (1995) find that investment
and growth is higher in countries where property and contract rights are better
protected.P
Table 5 illustrates the link between institutional quality and economic growth
based on the countries in my sample. It contains simple regressions of average
31Knack and Keefer (1995) and Mauro (1995) contain descriptions of the definition of these
measures.
32I have data for both years for only three DEeD-countries, one (Turkey) of which I include
in the Middle East and North Africa category, one Eastern European country, and two East
Asian countries which are not Tigers. Therefore, these regions are not included in the figure
6.
33In addition, Hall and Jones (1996) find that differences in institutional quality explain
some of the variation in production per worker between countries.
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decade growth rates 1980-90 on various measures of institutions dating from
the beginning of that decade. All of the coefficients are of the expected sign.
That is, the regressions confirm that in countries where the risks of government
expropriation of private property and repudiation of contracts are low, there is
little corruption, the quality of the bureaucracy is high, and the rule of law is
well established, the rate of economic growth is higher than in countries with the
opposite characteristics. Not surprisingly, the summary measure of institutional
quality tells the same story. Moreover, all of the coefficients are highly significant
at conventionallevels, and the R2s are quite satisfactory given the monocausal
nature of the regressions.
Table 5' Institutions and Economic Growth
II Independent variable
REPUD EXPROP CORRUPT BURQUAL RULELAW INQUAL
Const. -4.3407 -3.4522 -1.7209 -2.0166 -1.6258 -3.3268
t-stat. (3.7007) (3.4750) (2.4927) (3.4305) (2.7957) (3.8848)
Coeff. 0.8548 0.6918 0.7430 0.9449 0.8100 0.9896
t-stat. (4.0430) (3.9097) (3.2163) (4.4914) (3.8253) (4.4506)
R:l 0.23 0.22 0.16 0.27 0.21 0.26
Note. the table reports the results of ordinary least square reg rees rcus of average yearly growth rates (or the
19808 Oh each independent variable. The Dumher of ohservations is 57.
2.5 International Lending, Foreign Aid, and Conditional-
ity
If poor countries might grow faster if they adopt the right policies and institu-
tions but are unable to establish them on their own, why do not the international
community help them get their house in order? Well, it is certainly not for want
of trying. The role of external financing with economic and institutional reforms
in developing countries has been at the forefront of the policy debate for the last
15-20 years. While the IMF already had a long history of attaching conditions
to its short-term loans for balance-of-payments support in order to safeguard its
capital, it was in "the lost decade" of the 1980s that the international pressure
for change really started to get to the governments of poor countries. This was
the decade of the debt crisis, when many developing countries saw their ability
to borrow on the world market severely restricted, real interest rates rose, and
arrears on debt payments mounted.
Though, the economic difficulties were rarely of a purely external nature.
Many developing countries had clearly followed unsustainable macroeconomic
policies, while at the same time over-extending the role of the state. This was
only reluctantly conceded by some of these governments, and other governments
refused to mend their ways even in the face of external financing problems. The
resulting economic crises, though, forced even some of the hard-liners to turn to
the international financial institutions (IFIs) and bilateral donors as substitutes
for the private funds that were no longer forthcoming. These actors, however,
were generally of the opinion that reforming economic policies was necessary,
and this opinion was bolstered as the decade proceeded, resulting in increasingly
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insistent demands for reforms. Project-based funding was replaced by policy-
based funding. The reluctance to reform on the part of some governments
receiving public bilateral and multilateral funding resulted in a proliferation of
conditions attached to both grants and loans.
One of the reasons why international lenders have been trying to coax and
coerce borrowing countries into pursuing certain economic policies is that the
debt crisis underlined the fact that it is very difficult to enforce repayment of
foreign debts in general and sovereign debt in particular. Legal proceedings
against defaulting private borrowers in developing countries are likely to be
very costly, and there are no international courts in which one can seek redress
for breach of contract if a government defaults on its foreign debt. ff borrower
countries can be made to implement policies that promote economic growth
and sound public finances, the likelihood of both private and public debtors
repaying their foreign debt will presumably increase. Moreover, the inhabitants
of borrowing countries will also gain if these policies are successful+'
Recast in this perspective, the motives of the lender countries and the IFls
seem eminently defensible. When it comes to foreign aid though, it is easy to
point to various donor motives that are likely to reduce the effect of the funds
transferred. For example, commercial interests have lead to the widespread
practice of tying aid to purchases of goods and services from the donor country.
This reduces the value of the aid to the recipient since it is highly unlikely that
untied aid would have been spent in the same way. Furthermore, many donors
have been allocating their aid according to strategic interests." Although this
was perhaps an even greater problem during the cold war, the practice is still
evident in e.g. the French bias towards its former colonies. Clearly, if foreign
assistance is given to prop up friendly regimes, any positive effects on economic
growth would be merely coincidental.
However, even altruistic donors face problems in trying to promote economic
development in poor recipient countries. Though in principle their aid is given to
enable the recipients to fend for themselves one day, their focus on income levels
serves to undermine this goal. The reason is that aid conditioned on income
works like a tax on efforts made by the recipients to increase their income - the
richer they get the less aid they will receive. The result is aid dependency. This
is the so-called Samaritan's Dilemma.36
On the other side of the relationship it is clear that many countries do not
have well-meaning authorities or well-functioning political and bureaucratic sys-
tems. Phenomena such as corruption and elites which misappropriate aid by
diverting funds to their own overseas bank accounts while the majority of the
population lives in poverty attest to this. To counteract such shortcomings on
34This is not to say that these policies are entirely uncontroversial. However, even though
Williamson (1994) seems to be exaggerating a bit when using the word" consensus" to describe
the policies promoted by the IFls, there is a fairly broad agreement among economists on what
policies will foster economic growth.
35Alesina and Dollar (1998) provide an empirical analysis of the motives of various bilateral
donors.
36References to the literature on the "Samaritan's Dilemma" are given in chapter 4. ,
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the part of the recipient, one might think that donors could ear-mark their funds
for specific purposes. However, aid seems to be fungible to a large extent. That
is, recipients are often able to divert funds from ear-marked activities to other
projects and programs. Thus, ear-marked grants only substitute for money the
recipient would have spent on the activity anyway, and the donors end up financ-
ing something else. The fungibility of foreign economic assistance can explain
the so-called micro-macro paradox. The paradox is that whereas many projects
financed by aid have had high rates of return the income level in the recipient
countries has not been eignificantly affected by aid flows. More generally, on a
cross-country basis it is difficult to detect any significant positive effects of aid
in terms of higher rates of economic growth, improvements in income distribu-
tion, or reductions in poverty. Thus in the aggregate the optimism of the early
years of development economics has not been rewarded. As noted, over time
this has led many bilateral donors to endorse conditionality too, principally by
"insisting" that countries enter into agreements with the World Bank and the
IMF.
The merits of conditionality in inducing actual and lasting policy changes
are not too impressing." One of the main reasons for this is that the threat of
withholding funds which is the stick of the strategy is not credible. Both the
IFIs - in particular, the World Bank - and the bilateral donors have systemic
incentives to keep the money flowing. The World Bank needs to ensure that its
capital is recirculated and therefore rewards its employees for "pushing" loans;
and the bureaucrats of the donor agencies want to spend the funds they have
been allocated in order to justify the budgets which pay their salaries.
The lack of success of structural adjustment programs imposed from the out-
side has lead institutions such as the World Bank to emphasise the importance
of "ownership" of reform programmes (World Bank 1998), i.e., that developing
country governments are committed to reforms because they voluntarily choose
this set of policies. It remains to be seen whether the strategy of picking reform-
ers instead of creating them will make the future of foreign economic assistance
brighter than the past.
3 Summaries of Chapters 2-5
3.1 Chapter 2: Political Instability, Political Polarisation,
and Public Sector Institutional Reforms
Two noteworthy characteristics of institutions are "durability" and" lumpiness" .
The first feature is part of the definition of institutions. One of the reasons that
institutions are durable is, I believe, that it is not possible to make continuous
adjustments in them, i.e., that they are "lumpy". The lumpiness of institutions
contributes to making it costly to change them. This is why they can shape
policies - if institutions were as easy to change as policies, the former could not
restrict the latter and the distinction would be vacuous.
37For references, see chapters 3 and 4.
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There are no property rights attached to public sector institutions, only
control rights. Often, therefore, in order to reap the benefits of reforming the
institution(s) he controls, a politician must be able to stay in office. Assum-
ing that reforms do not change the probability of being replaced by political
opponents, I demonstrate that compared to a situation of no political uncer-
tainty a potential for losing office will reduce the likelihood of reforms being
adopted as long as potential opponents have different preferences (broadly de-
fined). That is, when coupled with political polarisation, exogenous political
uncertainty makes it less likely that an incumbent will incur the costs of imple-
menting reforms. Furthermore, the disincentives to reform are increasing in the
degree of polarisation.
In light of these findings, the durability of institutions might be recast as
inertia. That is, inefficient institutions might prevail because no-one has strong
enough incentives to change them on their own. Institutions that once served
their purpose well might also become inefficient as the environment changes
since the political impetus to adjust them to the new circumstances is small.
However, things might change if the probability of staying in office is af-
fected by the decision on reforms. More precisely, if reforming the institution(s)
he controls increases the probability of staying put sufficiently, potential politi-
cal instability will actually increase the incumbent's incentives to adopt reforms.
Moreover, the incentives are greater the higher the degree of political polarisa-
tion between him and possible successors.
Above, I demonstrated both that economic growth is increasing in the quality
of a country's public institutions and that political instability and polarisation
have been found to lower the rate of growth. The model presented in chapter 3
provides a possible link between these empirical results.3s It is obvious that the
efficiency with which the public sector is run will affect the private sector. Other
things being equal, lower public sector efficiency implies that more resources
have to be transferred from the private sector in order to generate a given
amount of activity in the public sector or that less can be done for a given level of
transfer. The first possibility is negative whatever the impact of the public sector
on the rest of the economy is. The second possibility will have a negative effect
on the private sector to the extent that the public sector contributes positively to
its productivity. I have already shown that the protection of property rights does
increase economic growth. Another example of such productive governmental
inputs to private production processes is infrastructure.s'' It might be concluded
that if such goods and services are not forthcoming because no politician finds
it in his interest to ensure their supply or output is lower than it needs to be
because the incentives for adopting productivity-enhancing reforms are weak or
non-existent in the public sector, private investment and growth will suffer.
As noted above, in a certain sense it is also possible for reform incentives to
be too strong. This might imply that the trade-off between current and future
381n addition, it provides an alternative channel through which political instability and
polarisation might effect economic growth.
39Easterly and Rebelo (1993) present. evidence on the positive growth effects of public
infrastructure investments.
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Ioutput is tilted too heavily towards the latter. In a dynamic model, this could
translate into an excessively high level of taxation in order to fund the budgetary
outlays for continuous reforms. Once again, the result would be that political
instability and polarisation have a negative impact on economic growth.
3.2 Chapter 3: Political Will versus Political Power. On
the Political Economy of Economic Reforms
A corollary of the proposition that ownership matters is that only those re-
forms that are wanted by these governments will be chosen and sustained. Non-
adoption of reforms is thus a consequence of the lack of political "will" and
this kind of will is all it takes to change economic policy-making in a country.
However, others have countered that at least in the short run, mainstream pol-
icy prescriptions impose hardships on large sectors of the populace. Because of
this, the social and political stability of poor countries adopting them will be
endangered. Moreover, any change in policies harms those who have benefited
from previous policies (particular with respect to trade and regulation). These
"vested interests" will not stand idly by when their privileges are threatened. In-
deed, in some case they will simply" veto" any change. Thus, even governments
who acknowledge the need for reform will not be able to pursue such policy
changes because of the negative political repercussions. In this view, "politi-
cal power" is the sole determinant of reform adoption by developing country
governments.
In chapter 3 I investigate the relative merits of these two stylised positions. I
assume that there are two types of governments. The reform government wants
to scale down the size of the public sector relative to the status quo, which
is supported by the other type of government. The relative size of the public
sector has been one of the most important issues in the debate on structural
adjustment in developing countries. The political constraint from which political
power emanates is the electoral constraint. Thus, a government is powerful if it
has an electoral advantage. This is in line with many case-studies of the political
economy of reform, which concludes that interest groups seems to have played
a minor role relative to electoral events in shaping the decisions on whether or
not to adopt reforms.i''
Somewhat surprisingly, I find that under a fairly wide range of circumstances,
it is only political will that matters. More specifically, I find that "reform"
governments will not emulate "status quo" governments even if this increases
the probability that they stay in power (and vice versa). This is so because the
gain from being in power in the next period, namely, that policies are determined
40See section 3 of the chapter for references. In addition, note that figure 7 reflects what has
been dubbed the "third wave" of democratisation (Huntington 1993). In particular, countries
ill Latin America and Southern and Eastern Europe have become more democratic during
the last few decades. Furthermore, on average the developing countries in my sample have
become more democratic in this period. This implies that democratic political institutions are
becoming a more important in shaping the public policies in these countries, and so supports
the use of this framework in chapters 3 and 4.
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according to your preferences, is the same as the loss from pretending to be the
other type of government in order to fool voters into supporting you. However,
the gain comes in the future and is uncertain. Thus, unless future outcomes
are given disproportionate weight, it does not pay to postpone reforms. The
result holds whether or not the government has access to international credit
markets or not. Hence, it supports the currently popular notion that domestic
ownership is important if reforms are to materialise.
3.3 Chapter 4: Aspects of the Political Economy of For-
eign Aid
In chapter 4 I elaborate on the interaction of reform choice and external financ-
ing by analysing what influence a bilateral aid donor seeking to promote reforms
might have over domestic policies in recipient countries. This is a highly perti-
nent issue, for after forty years of economic development assistance, it seems fair
to say that economic development has not been assisted. Furthermore, during
the second half of this period, donor have sought to impose their policies on
governments thought lacking in the will or ability to follow the right course. As
noted above, there is no evidence that these efforts have succeeded.t! One of
the major reasons for this is that aid is fungible. Another is that donors lack
credible mechanisms for committing themselves to conditional aid strategies.i''
Thus, a realistic assessment of the influence that donors can have in recipient
countries has to be based on these two observations.
Previous discussions of fungibility have not taken the strategic interaction
of donors and recipients into account. I provide a definition of the degree of
fungibility in a strategic context. In such a setting, it can be recast as the
degree of influence that a donor has over final outcomes.
Next, I show that influence can be bought, but onlyat a very high price.
This holds true even if the government in the recipient country is reform-minded.
Moreover, if the government is democratically elected, the donor might affect the
outcome of elections, but if it does it is to the disadvantage of the reformers!
Hence the conclusion is that it is probably neither realistic nor advisable for
donors to try to leverage their resources in order to buy influence. Instead,
they should try to find out which developing country governments are willing
to pursue policies that promote economic development (broadly defined).
3.4 Chapter 5: Local-LevelPolitics and Policy Implemen-
tation
Except for the obvious one that it is an exceedingly difficult task, there is proba-
bly only one caveat to the statement that donors of foreign economic assistance
418ee Burnside and Dollar (1997) for empirical evidence on the impact of aid on economic
policies in recipient countries.
42 Indeed, the incentives created by the institutions that allocated aid seem to worsen the
time-inconsistency problem of donors, namely, that their interest in assisting recipient coun-
tries (whether for strategic or altruistic reasons) render threats of withholding funds empty.
24
which aim at promoting growth, equality, and poverty reduction should seek to
select "good" recipients. The caveat is that politicians do not implement the
policies they choose. That is left to bureaucrats, which might have other goals.
Since politicians are unlikely to be able to fully resolve their differences with
the bureaucrats through contractual means (due to informational asymmetries
working in favour of the latter group), realistically one must expect there to be
a gap between the policies chosen by politicians and those that the government
actually pursues.
In chapter 5 I investigate how implementation gaps might arise by con-
structing a model with three players. There is a politician with a policy to be
implemented by a bureaucrat. However, the bureaucrat is also expected to be
"prudent" while executing the policy. The reason might be that the politician
fears that "controversy" might endanger his position. The third player is what
I call a "strongman". Strongmen are politically powerful figures at the local or
regional level. Large landowners, industrial magnates, and ethnic or religious
leaders are obvious examples. These have social and economic power over the
populace in their area, and might seek to use this power either directly to pres-
sure the bureaucrat into deviating in implementation or indirectly by "making a
fuss" which will harm the politician. In turn, the latter will respond by derailing
the bureaucrat's career.
Thus, all actors take potentially costly actions. Costs are imposed on bu-
reaucrats which are caught deviating in implementation and/or are unable to
stave off social unrest in response to their choices. The strongman incur costs
if he wants to protest the policy implemented by the bureaucrat. Finally, the
politician must expend resources if he is to find out what has transpired between
the first two players.
If these monitoring costs are not prohibitive, i.e., not so high that he will
never intervene whatever he may suspect about the interaction of the bureaucrat
and the strongman, I find that implementation gaps arise. This is because some
types of bureaucrats will collude with the strongman against the interests of
their superiors. Others, however, will heed the Principle of accommodation by
adapting to the credible threats of strongmen whose interests are aligned with
those of the politician. This reduces the maximum size of the implementation
gap that can arise. However, if the monitoring costs of the politician incurs
are prohibitive any bureaucrat is free to do as he pleases and the strongman is
powerless in trying to prevent him from doing so whether or not he wants to.
In sum, the model demonstrates that even committed reformers might come
up empty-handed against the complex web of social relations and local-level
politics that envelop the bureaucracies in developing countries.
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Chapter 2
Political Instability, Political Polarisation, and
Public Sector Institutional Reforrns*
October 8, 1999
Abstract
For politicians in office, reforming public sector institutions is an in-
vestment; they must spend resources now in order to achieve future gains.
There are no property rights attached to these institutions. Therefore,
politicians need to remain in control if they are to reap the benefits of re-
form. Political uncertainty changes the "returns" to investment compared
to a benchmark of no uncertainty. When political uncertainty is exoge-
nous, the non-appropriability of future benefits in case of political change
results in a lower critical value for the cost of investment if there is political
polarisation between incumbent and challenger(s). The reduction in the
cut-off rate is increasing in the degree of polarisation. However, if reforms
increase the probability of staying in office, the likelihood of investment
might increase, the more so the greater the polarisation in preferences.
1 Introduction
From the point of view of a politician holding office today, creating or reorgan-
ising public sector institutions is an investment; in order to realise future gains,
he must spend resources at his disposal now. These resources could have been
utilised for current purposes, thus creating an opportunity cost of institutional
change. One example of this is using budgetary funds to gather the requisite
information, design, and establish an organisation instead of spending them on
the political tasks of today. Another is a politician allocating his limited time
to achieve changes in formal procedures of operation. As institutions, I shall
define both rules and organisational structures.' Because informal institutions
*1wish to thank Alexander Cappelen, Lars Håkonsen, Kalle Moene, Karl Rolf Pedersen,
Bertil Tungodden, and seminar participants at the University of Bergen, the European Meet-
ing of the Econometric Society 1997, and the Annual Meeting of the Norwegian Economic
Association 1998 for helpful comments. Of course, none of the above are responsible for
any remaining errors or weaknesses. The research reported here has been financed by the
Norwegian Research Council.
lNorth (1990), for example, distinguishes between institutions and organisations. But
if "institutions include any form of constraint that human beings devise to shape human
interaction" (p.4), then organisastions can be viewed as sets of institutions, e.g. rules of
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such as customs are unlikely to be amenable to purposive design, the focus will
be on formal institutions. The returns to reforming the latter accrue in the
future in the form of cost savings, a more efficient allocation of resources, or the
production of new goods and services which are valuable either personally or
politically.
An important feature of public sector institutions is that there are no prop-
erty rights attached to them. Through his office, say as the leader of a ministry,
a politician might have control rights over public sector units. These rights
might include the liberty to determine what goods and services are to be pro-
duced and in what quantities and to decide on the distribution of the output of
the units controlled. Such rights are obviously useful for achieving a variety of
ends that a political officeholder might have. But he cannot sell these rights to
his successor, not even when he has created these units himself. Often, there-
fore, he can only reap the fruits of his efforts in building institutions as long as
he retains controlover them. It follows that his expected tenure is an impor-
tant determinant of the expected benefits from such activities. The expected
tenure of a politician in a democratic country is usually closely linked to elec-
tions. However, governments sometimes change between elections, prompting
changes in personnel, the extent of which depends on the number of positions
filled through political appointments. In autocracies, of course, political change
is ordinarily not institutionalised. Still, there is generallyapositive probabil-
ity of a change in government or regime, and not infrequently the "politics of
survival" dictate rotations or substitutions of personnel at the higher echelons
of the state.2 While the form changes, potential political instability is an ever-
present feature of politics regardless of regime. The claim made here is that the
degree of such instability is important for the institutional development of the
public sector because the higher the probability of retaining office, the greater
the share of the benefits appropriated by the person making the investment de-
cision. As political instability is more severe in low-income countries, this might
explain why public administrations generally seem to work less well there. For
example, this argument would lead one to expect that the political control of
the bureaucracy is weaker in these countries, and casual empiricism certainly
suggests that it is in fact so.
Notably, the polities of the former Third World also tends to be more po-
larised politically. As shown below, for politicians who are policy-motivated -
whether for ideological reasons or because they represent same constituency -
this strengthens the effect of political instability on reform incentives. While
political instability affects the likelihood of "good" or "bad" states occurring,
political polarisation determines how much better the" good" state is than the
"bad". If the current office-holder is purely motivated by policy concerns, he
would be indifferent between continuing in office and being replaced by another
politician with identical preferences. Conversely, the greater the differences
operation. While other features such as functional roles can also be used to characterise
organisations, these are of no importance to the argument made in this paper and I therefore
prefer the more inclusive definition adopted here.
2See Migdal (1988) for a discussion of the "politics of survival".
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between an incumbent and his challenger(s), the greater the consequences of
losing office. Consequently, the lower are the incentives to reform public sector
institutions for a given probability of remaining in office.
There might also be a third effect in operation: if investing in public sector
institutions affects the probability of retaining office, the calculus of the in-
cumbent is changed. Obviously, if sacrificing current resources for future gains
reduces this probability, he will be less likely to do so. But if investing in the
institutions he controls today improves his chances of staying put, there are ben-
efits from doing so over and above those relating to increases in future output
or the production of new goods and services. Therefore, the effect on the desir-
ability of reforms in the eyes on an incumbent politician can depend crucially
on whether such acts affect the probability of retaining office and if they do, in
what direction. And in sum, political polarisation combines with political in-
stability to determine the net incentives for changing the institutional structure
of the public sector.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In the next section I
first describe certain generic features of institutions and illustrate them with
examples from the public sector. I use this to relate the issue analysed here to
previous work in political economy. The formal analysis is presented in sections
3 and 4. In section 5, I argue that the quality of public sector institutions is
another avenue through which political instability and polarisation might retard
growth. Both of these effects, i.e., from instability and polarisation to growth
and from the quality of public sector institutions to growth, have independently
been established in recent empirical work. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Public Sector Institutional Reforms: Exam-
ples and Relation to Existing Literature
2.1 Generic Features of Institutions
The model developed below belongs to the rapidly growing literature on the po-
litical choice of state variables such as the public debt. Because state variables
affect the future, they allow incumbent politicians to influence tomorrow's poli-
cies and the outcomes generated by them. Hence the interest in studying the
effects of political uncertainty and polarisation on the choice of state variables.
By definition, institutions are "durable". In other words, they are state vari-
ables. Institutions tend to be "lumpy" as well, in the sense that they cannot be
continuously adjusted. The durability and lumpiness of institutions distinguish
the choice of them from the choice of policies, and combines to make it more
costly to change the former than the latter.
In the model analysed below, a rather abstract "productivity-enhancing"
reform is possible. However, it is easy to come up with real-world equivalents
of such an act. A literal interpretation is one example. That is, improving
organisational procedures in a ministryand buying a new computer system
for a bureau are measures that should increase the productivity of employees.
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Though, buying software and paying consultants to set up the new system
compel the head of the bureau to spend budgetary funds that could have been
used to increase supply today. For instance, more case-workers could have been
hired. The ensuing period of lower productivity while employees learn their way
in the new system also results in fewer cases being processed, fewer investigations
being undertaken, or less or whatever the organisation is producing. Thus, there
is a trade-off between current and future output.
Likewise, improving monitoring and control of personnel might deter shirk-
ing, moonlighting, corruption, and theft. These effects contribute towards rais-
ing output once the improvement has taken place, either directly (less shirking
and moonlighting) or indirectly (because what has been stolen has to be re-
placed in order to keep productivity constant). Preventing corruption might
even result in a better "real" output mix from the view-point of the politician
in charge; at the very least, his ability to control the output mix is increased.
All of these effects are real gains to him. However, devising the optimal changes
in organisational procedures necessitates the spending of resources such as time
(either his own or that of his sub-ordinates) or money (as when outside con-
sultants are used). These resources could have been spent on the production
of more goods and services now. Moreover, if the probability of losing office is
positive, some other politician might reap part of the benefits from improved
organisational efficiency. The institution could also be geared to other tasks
which today's incumbent values less, in which case greater future efficiency will
be of even smaller benefit to him.
Note that institutional reforms differ from policy reforms. An example which
illustrates the distinction is changes in tax rates versus changes in tax bases.
The direct costs of the former are very small and the change can be implemented
by "a stroke of the pen". The latter requires not only empirical investigation
to establish optimal reforms; usually quite extensive changes in administrative
procedures have to be made and the political process might consume both valu-
able time and political capital in the form of sacrifices on other issues to pull
reforms through.P On the other hand, it is clear that major policy reforms often
necessitate institutional changes in order to become durable (and thus credible).
For instance, implementing a less expansionary monetary policy might not be
credible unless the central bank is made more independent of politics. Normally,
such a change will demand both administrative and political resources in more
than marginal quantities before the new policy is operative. In other words,
there are fixed costs of constituting a new regime.
The creation of organisations to perform new tasks is perhaps the kind of
reform that most directly demonstrates the lumpy nature of such undertakings.
Examples include state-owned enterprises, agencies, ministries, and sub-units
of such organisations. The resources spent on designing them, screening new
30f course, there might also be political costs of changing tax rates. But the durability
of institutions implies that changes in them have much greater long-term consequences than
policy changes have. This tends to make the former more important politically than the latter.
Furthermore, political institutions might increase the political costs of changing administrative
structures and processes, say, because supermajorities are required. '
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employees, and buying the equipment needed clearly represent a fixed cost of
getting the production of goods and services up and running. Whether the out-
put is to be sold in markets, distributed for free to eligible citizens, or consumed
by the politicians themselves (e.g. staff services produced by bureaucrats), a
share of the resources available for productive purposes today is in this case de-
voted to making an expanded range of products available in the future. ABwe
shall see, political uncertainty then might prevent this kind of investment from
materialising because politicians cannot be certain that they or their political
allies will share in the benefits when they arrive.
2.2 Relation to Existing Literature on the Political Choice
of State Variables
The political economy of public debt is the issue that has received the most
attention in the literature on the strategic manipulation of public sector state
variables; a number of authors have studied this subject in various guises." The
general conclusion that follows from this line of work is that (potential) political
instability changes the optimal choices of politicians by changing their evaluation
of expenditures over time. That is, a government will spend differently when
there is a positive probability of being replaced than it would if it had been
certain to continue in office.5 Changes in the stock of debt alter the constraints
facing other actors, like voters (influencing election results) or future govern-
ments (influencing their spending patterns or the level of public expenditures).
In most models, manipulating the level of the debt bequeathed to the future
affects only the latter. That is, election outcomes are not influenced by the
optimal policies of future governments and hence not by variations in the size
of the public debt. Two important exceptions are Milesi-Ferretti (1995) and a
recent paper by de Wolff (1996), where such a link exists."
A related result is derived by Cukierman, Edwards, and Tabellini (1992):
governments fearing that they will be replaced by others with different prefer-
ences over public expenditures will keep the efficiency of the tax system low so
as to constrain the revenue-generating capacity of their adversaries (or increase
the dead-weight costs of collecting revenues)." The tax system is a public in-
stitution as defined here. However, they assume that the efficiency of the tax
4Examples include Aghion and Bolton (1990), Alesina and Tabellini (1990), Milesi-Ferretti
(1995), Persson and Svensson (1989), Tabellini and Alesina (1990), and de Wolff (1996).
5Note that it is the possibility of being replaced that matters here. Whether a change
occurs is detennined after the fact, i.e., after the setting of policy today has been completed.
6Of the six papers mentioned in footnote 4, two (Persson and Svensson 1989 and Tabellini
and Alesina 1990) contain analyses of the outcome when the median voter might change
between periods and another (Alesina and Tabellini 1990) describes a two-party model with
exogenous probabilities of winning the election (which can be interpreted as a probabilistic
voting model under policy-maker discretion). In the model of Aghion and Bolton (1990),
policy influences election outcomes under some conditions only, leaving Milesi-Ferretti (1995)
and de Wolff (1996) as the only "pure" studies of how today's debt policies might affect
election results when voters are rational.
7Also see Milesi-Ferretti and Spolaore (1994). In that paper, the probability of getting
re-elected is affected by the incumbent government's actions in some conditions.
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system is a state variable that can be costlessly changed. As argued above, I
think that there are costs associated with making these changes, and it seems
reasonable to expect this to be a general feature of reforms. Therefore, in the
model developed below I study costly institutional reforms.
Glazer (1989) discusses how political instability might distort the politi-
cal choice between projects of different duration. He demonstrates that the
commitment-power of durable (two-period) projects might lead to their adop-
tion in situations where no project or a short-lived (one-period) one would be
preferred if current policy-makers were certain to continue in office. For ex-
ample, if a durable project precludes the adoption of a short-lived one in the
future, it can make the preferences of today's policy-makers prevail tomorrow
even if the hands of future policy-makers, who might evaluate project benefits
differently, cannot be tied directly. The preferences of possible successors are
not modelled by Glazer (1989), however. This precludes a discussion of how
political instability and political polarisation interact. As the policies and out-
comes under a succession of identical decision-makers would be the same as
those produced by having one of them in charge all of the time, it is clearly
necessary to analyse explicitly differences in preferences between current and
(potential) future policy-makers. The model presented below allows me to do
so in a context where the choice is between adopting a "project" or not.
In this paper, I develop two variants of a model of public sector institutional
development. In the first, the probability of losing office is not affected by the
actions of the current policy-maker. When the probability of being replaced
is exogenous, political uncertainty always reduces the likelihood of investment
being made, the more so the less certain of retaining his position the current
office-holder is and the greater the difference between his and the challenger's
optimal policies in period 2. The intuition for the results can be better under-
stood by exploring the analogy with public debt. We get "under-investment" in
public sector institutions in the context of exogenous political uncertainty be-
cause of the non-appropriability of future benefits in the case of political change,
just like partisan governments in these conditions tend to borrow" excessively"
because this is the only way of being certain that they will in fact decide the
way future funds are spent." Either way, more resources are consumed today
relative to tomorrow than would have been the case had the politicians cur-
rently in office been convinced that their positions were secure. And the extent
of "over-consumption" is positively correlated with differences in preferences
between incumbent and challenger.
In section 4, I make the extension to the case where there is a link between
reform choice and the probability of losing power. It is shown that this extension
might significantly affect the results. Of course, the results just reported are
strengthened if investing in public sector institutions lowers the probability of
8The excessive borrowing result is not general, but intuitively, it seems the most plausible
one. It is a possible outcome in the models of Alesina and Tabellini (1999) and Tabellini and
Alesina (1990), for example. Naturally, the predictions about government behaviour described
here reflect the incentives created by potential political instability and ideological polarisation
which are but a sub-set of the determinants of the public debt. '
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staying put. Though, if such an action produces a "significant" increase in
this probability, the results might be reversed. That is, the incentives to invest
might actually be spurred by political uncertainty, and political polarisation
will then tend to work towards increasing the likelihood of investment.l' Similar
contingent results are derived in de Wolff (1996) where the production of public
goods today affects the election results because it determines the level of the
public debt which in turn has an effect on next period's optimal policies.l"
3 Exogenous Probability of Replacement
3.1 Model Structure
There are two political alternatives, an incumbent (I) and a challenger (C). The
incumbent occupies an office in period 1, but might be replaced by C in period
2. I and C can be collectives like parties or individual politicians. For simplicity,
I will only speak of the latter. The political office conveys the power to decide
on the quantity produced of each of two "goods", X and Y, and to determine
whether productivity-enhancing measures should be undertaken. I follow the
literature on the strategic use of public debt in assuming that politicians are
ideologically motivated. That is, they have preferences over the policies that
are to be set.'! The per-period objective function of politician i is
(I)Ui (Qt;it) = [6Xi (it) Xtr; [6Yi (it) Ytr-a; ,i = I, C, t = 1,2;
where ai E (0,1) and Qt = {Xt, Yt}.12 it E {I, C} denotes the identity of
the politician holding office in period t. The functions 6hi (it) satisfy
(2)1 = 6hm (m) ~ 6hm (n) ~ O;h = X, Y;m,n = I,C,m =1= n;
with at least one of the inequalities being strict. These functions are meant to
capture disagreement between the politicians about how to distribute the goods
or services produced within the institution in question. More specifically, 6hi (k)
is the share of units of good h that are distributed according to i's wishes when
k is in office at time t. Thus, I allow for both ideological differences between
incumbent and challenger over the total amount of each good or service to be
produced, and for the possibility that they have different" constituencies" which
9That is, we might get "over-investment" compared to a situation with no potential for
political instability.
10Also see Milesi-Ferretti (1995).
11Purely office-motivated politicians of the standard variety (i.e., coveting some exogenous
"gain from holding office") would be meaningless in the present context where it is assumed
that the probability of staying in office is exogenous. When it is endogenous, as in the next
section, the behaviour of office-motivated politicians is trivial: they choose the action that
results in the highest value of this probability,
12 In this paper, parantheses are reserved for functional arguments.
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they would like to supply.P ABwe shall see, the Cobb-Douglas specification used
in (1) yields an attractive measure of political polarisation.I!
The technology for producing the goods has the following simple form:
(3a)Xt = f (Kf) bfj ·t -1 2
(3b)Yt=g(Kr)bfj , - , .
bf is the amount of budgetary funds spent on the production of good h in
period t. f (Kf) (g (Kr)) is the marginal (and average) productivity offunds,
Kf (KT) being the "capital stock" vested in the production of X (Y) at the
beginning of period t. The latter can be interpreted as the level of resources
that has been invested in productivity-enhancing measures in earlier periods.
For simplicity, I will assume that it is not possible to improve the technology
for producing good X, whereas there is room for increasing the productivity of
budgetary funds in the production of good Y in period 2. This can be done by
paying a fixed cost F > O in period 1. Denoting the investment variable by K,
these assumptions can be formally summarised in the following manner:15
(4a)f (Kr)
(4b)g (Kr)
(4c)g (Kr)
= f (Kf) = X > o,
!L> o,
(KY ) _ { !L if K = O,9 1 + K - v> !L if K = F.
=
=
In each period, the total budget available is fixed and normalised to 1. Of
course, no productivity-enhancing measures will be undertaken in period 2, so
there is ane unit of resources available for production. If I does not pay F
in period 1, the total budget will be spent on production in period 1 as well.
However, if I does decide to pay the fixed cost, there will be only 1- F left for
producing the goods in the fust period:
13A more thorough discussion of these issues follows in sub-section 3.4.
l40ther specifications of the politicians' objective functions would lead to similar results
without having this desirable property. Some of these would allow the incumbent to influence
next period's choices (budget shares) whereas the functional form utilised here only allows him
to influence next period's outcomes (production levels). However, as the strategic incentive
for policy-motivated to manipulate state variables is well known, I prefer the sharper focus on
the effects of polarisation and instability on the quality of the public sector institutions that
I get by using the Cobb-Douglas form.
l5The investment choice is made discrete because it seems realistic to assume that institu-
tional reforms are "lumpy", at least in the sense that infinitesmal changes are not possible.
More generally, the specification of the technology presented in (4) is not as restrictive as it
might seem. It can be shown that the nature of the results is not affected by making output
of good h a strictly concave function of Kl: and/or b~ or a continuous function of Kl: (i.e.,
making K. a continuous varaible). Likewise, studying reforms that improve the productiv-
ity of funds in the production of both goods does not alter the qualitative properties of the
conclusions. For proofs of these and subsequent claims and results, see the appendices.
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(5a)b?+br+1\: = 1;
(5b)bf +br = 1.
By maximising (1) subject to (5) in each period, it can be deduced that the
optimal allocation of budgetary funds to the production of each good is equal
to its weight in the objective function of the politician holding office times the
resources available for production. Using these results and (2), we can succinctly
state the expected maximal value of the sum of 1's per-period objective functions
as a function of I\: as follows (for simplicity, discounting is ignored):
(6)VI (I\:) = Ul (Ql; l) +E [Ul (Q2;jt)]
ai 1 ai{Xa/ [1- 1\:1} {1l [1- 0/]11 - 1\:1} -
ai 1 ai
+p (I\:){xci} {g (Kr + 1\:) [1 - ei]} -
~ 1 ~
+[1-p(I\:)1{8XI(C)xaP} {8YI(C)g(Kr +1\:) [l-aP]} -
Because the decision on whether to undertake productivity-enhancing mea-
sures is discrete, we must compare two distinct values of VI (1\:), VI (O) and
VI (F). As can be seen from (6), the value of the objective function in period
2 is uncertain, with P (I\:) denoting the probability that l retains his position.
Hence, the potential for losing office might influence 1's first-period decision on
whether to pay F or not. I will now ga on to discuss how this effect varies with
different assumptions about the politicians' objective functions. Throughout
this section, it will be assumed that the probability of retaining office is exoge-
nous, i.e., not affected by l's actions. That is, p (O)= p (F) == p. Since there is
only a single challenger, C decides on the production of X and Y in period 2
with probability 1 - p.16
3.2 A Benchmark: no political uncertainty
It is useful to have a benchmark against which we can compare the effects of
political uncertainty. The natural benchmark is the case where there is no such
uncertainty so that l is ensured a two-period stay in office. Thus, here p == 1.
Denote the two-period pay-off to l in this case by VI .. (1\:). If v> (O) >
VI .. (F), l should not invest in higher productivity in the production of good
y in period 2. If on the other hand the inequality is reversed, that is exactly
what he ought to do. If the two expressions are equal, both actions result in
16This is for ease of exposition only. In appendix B, I prove that the results generalise to
an arbitrary number of challengers. The only new feature is that due to differences in the
attractiveness of various challengers in the eyes of the incumbent, changes in the probability
of one challenger winning might affect the cut-off rates derived below even if the probability
of I retaining his position remains constant.
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the same pay-off. Clearly, an important determinant of the relative value of the
pay-offs from these two actions is the size of the fixed cost. We can find a value
of F such that if F actually exceeds this value, I should set Ii = OJ if F equals
this value, I is indifferent; whereas if F is lower than the cut-off level, investing
is the optimal thing to do. The cut-off level F is of course found by solving
VI* (O) = VI* (F*). Carrying out this exercise, we get
_* (ti) 1-0/ 1-0,1
(7)F = u-l == w - l.
Observe that since ti> 1! and al < 1, F* > oP Hence, for sufficiently low
values of F, I will find it worthwhile to invest. Also note that the preferences
of C do not appear in (7). That is, when there is no potential for instability,
polarisation is of no consequence.
In the following, I will investigate how political uncertainty affects the level
of fixed costs which makes I indifferent between investing and not. If potential
political instability is found to lower (increase) the cut-off level, the conclusion
that can be drawn is that such instability weakens the incentives to undertake
productivity-enhancing measures because the hurdle that has to be surpassed
in order to make it optimal to invest is higher (lower}; for some values of F for
which I will choose Ii = F (Ii = O) when he is certain to carryon at the helm,
he will reach the opposite conclusion when he is not.
3.3 The Pure Caseof Political Instability and Polarisation
To generate a potential for political instability, I set P < l. Furthermore, it is
assumed that 6hI (C) == 1, h = X, Y. In other words, I first look at the case
where the only potential source of discrepancies between the situation in which
I retains his office in period 2 and that in which C takes over are differences
in the weighting of the two goods in the objective functions leading to unequal
optimal budget shares.
The investment hurdle in this situation is calculated using the same proce-
dure as above, yielding
where
17 If w > 2 1_
1
,,1 , the cut-off rate exceeds one. Because the total budget equals one in
both periods, this implies that the cut-off rate ceases to be binding in the sense that for any
fixed cost less than or equal to the total budget, investing is the optimal thing to do. In the
following, I ignore this corner solution. Furthermore, note that the cut-off rate depends on
the preferences of the incumbent: the more he values good Y, the higher the cut-off rate. This
feature does not affect the qualitative properties of the results derived below and so will not
be discussed.
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is a measure of the degree of similarity of preferences between I and C (thus
its inverse is a measure of polarisation). The degree of convergence between
the weights on the two goods is weighted by the importance of the good in 1's
objective function. Since it is assumed that ai E (0,1), i = I, C, a (aC) is well
defined. Its properties are given by the following lemma:
Lemma
l)a (al) =
2)a (aC) =
3) lim a (aC) =
a°--+O
l',
1 aC"'/" al. and, -r ,
lim a (aC) = O.
a°--+1
That is, if I and C have identical preferences, the measure takes on a value
of unity. If C's preferences differ from 1's, however, the value of the measure
is less than one, and in the limit, when the "distance" between the politicians'
weighting of the goods becomes maximal (in either direction), the value of the
measure is zero.18
Comparing (7) and (8), we get
Proposition 1 1) The absence of polarisation means that potential instability
has no effect on reform incentives; \;fp: a (aC) = 1 ~ F** = F*. 2) A
positive degree of polarisation means that instability reduces reform incentives;
v» < 1: a (aC) < 1 ~ F** < F*. 3) When there is political uncertainty,
reform incentives are a decreasing function of the degree of polarisation; \;fp< 1:8~r;:!)> o. 4) when there is polarisation, reform incentives are a decreasing
function of the probability of losing office; \;fa(aC) < 1: 8:;· > O.
Not surprisingly, political instability is of no importance in the current case
if I and C have identical preferences. For a (aC) = 1 ~ aC = al, (8) reduces
to (7).19 However, inspection of (8) informs us that the slightest divergence
between incumbent and challenger in the weights attached to the goods implies
F** < F*. In other words, even a minimal degree of ideological disagreement
results in the incentives for undertaking productivity-enhancing reforms being
weaker when there is political uncertainty. And the greater the divergence in
18For 0/ #- 0,5, (1 (aP) is not symmetric around 0/. This is due to the fact that the degree
of preference-similarity is weighted by the importance of the two goods to I so that divergence
in the weighting of a good becomes less important the less weight I puts on it. However, the
lack of symmetry is not particularly interesting for our purposes and so is ignored.
19The equivalence of no polarisation and no potential instability would be broken if political
officeholders are partly office-motivated, i.e., if there are some benefits from being in office
which are independent of being able to determine policies.
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views, the weaker the incentives become: F** is increasing in (1 (aP). Thus,
as the preferences of I and C becomes less similar ((1 (aP) goes down), F**
is reduced, i.e., there are fewer levels of F for which it is optimal to invest.
Furthermore, as long as aP =I- aJ, the less secure I feels about his prospects of
retaining office, the greater the hurdle that has to be surpassed for investment to
become optimal (as p goes down, so does F**).20 The proposition that potential
political instability is antithetical to reforming public sector institutions in the
environment assumed here is thus proved.P
3.4 Disagreement between Incumbent and Challenger over
Distribution
Being in office might be important not only because it confers the power to
decide on how much should be produced. In addition to such a "pure" ideological
effect, a politician will usually derive some benefit from being able to determine
the distribution of the output from the organisation he controls among members
of society. Even for a pure public good in the Samuelsonian sense, it matters
politically where it is produced or located, and since most publicly produced
goods and services are not public goods in the strict sense, it matters even
more.22 In politics, a national museum located in one city is not the same as an
identical national museum located in another; placing it within or outside of his
constituency is likely to mean a great deal to a politician's chances of being re-
elected, and so is the number of contracts given to firms who have contributed
to his election campaign when the museum is to be built.23 More generally,
distributing goods and services to electoral constituency, campaign contributors,
local political leaders, or any other individual, group, or organisation that is
important to a politician personally or politically is greatly facilitated by holding
the reins of power.
While many of the reasons why distribution matters pertain to office-related
motivations for a politician, it is obvious that a politician might also have an
intrinsic concern for these issues because of ideology or altruism (towards family,
friends, ethnic group, etc.). In any case, as one has to be in office to be able
to set public policies, in practice partisan concerns often mix with incentives
generated by the process by which one achieves political power. The objective
functions assumed here are general enough to allow one to interpret the benefit
derived from the distribution of the two goods in terms of corruption, nepotism,
or ideology. Furthermore, even though some of the reasons why it could be
important for a politician to be in office pertain to the impact he can make
on the likelihood of continuing there - and thus sits a little uneasy with the
20In passing, note that only in the extreme case where p = a (aP) = O is p** = O. In all
other case, I retains an incentive to invest even if productivity increases are not free.
210bserve that adding more goods for which productivity increases cannot be achieved
would add more weighted preference ratios to the measure of preference compatibility. It is
easily seen that this would not affect the conclusions.
22Aranson and Ordeshook (1981).
23For an elaboration on this subject, consult e.g. Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen (1981).
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assumption that p is exogenous - it should be clear from the discussion above
that there are also distributional factors which are important in their own right.
lo this section, I shall investigate the consequences of this fact for a politi-
cian's willingness to reform an institution he controls. Formally, this means that
I will be looking at the case where Dh!(C) < 1 for at least ane h. To minimise
notation, I will use Dh! instead of Dh! (C) from now on.24 The interpretation
of this variable is that it measures the share of units of good h which are dis-
tributed according to 1's wishes when C is in office. It is thus a measure of the
degree to which the two politicians concur in the optimal distribution of the
goods and services produced by the organisation for which they compete for
control (have the same constituency broadly defined). For the sake of simplic-
ity, distributional issues are not analysed explicitly. They would in any case be
separable from the decision problem studies here.
The cut-off level for the fixed cost of reform now becomes
Comparing (10) with (7) and (8), we have
Proposition 2 1) Distributional conflict reduces reform incentives as long as
there is potential instability; "Ip < 1: Dhl < 1 <==} F*** < F*, h = X, Y.
2) Distributional conflict magnifies the negative effect of polarisation on reform
incentives as long as there is potential instability; "I{p, (J'} such that p < 1 and
0< (J' < 1: Dh!< 1 <==} F*** < F**, h = X, Y. <==} F** < F*. 3) As long as
there is potential instability and polarisation over production and distribution
is not extreme, the greater the distributional conflict, the weaker the reform
incentives; "I{P,(J',Dnl} such that p < 1, (J' > O and Dnl> O: ~f.:;> O,
m,n=X,Y, m#n.
>From (10), it is readily apparent that it is still the case that the lower
p is, the less inclined to pay F will I be. Furthermore, it can be seen that
when holding office takes on the added importance emphasised here, the disin-
centives generated by potential political instability are magnified. Except when
differences in preferences are extreme, F*** < F**. Moreover, even when I
and C weigh the goods in exactly the same way F*** < F", as could be the
case when two politicians from the same party compete for the job as head of a
particular ministry. When they cater to different agents in society, say because
they represent different ethnic groups, I would still worry about losing power.
These worries might keep him from spending funds which are valuable today
for purposes that yield benefits only tomorrow. The greater the disagreement
over distributional issues, the greater the discouragement to reform: ~r;;and
~r;;are both greater than zero as long as (J' > O, DXI, and DYI are all positive;
24Likewise, I will replace u (aP) by u.
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and lim F** = P [wi-a] -1] = limP** = O, h = X, y.25 This points to the
6hI -o (7-+ i
importance of rules governing distribution, say eligibility rules. If uniformity
is imposed from the outside, a potential source of contention between incum-
bent and challenger is removed. Thus, if such rules can be made binding, a
disincentive to reform is removed.
4 Endogenous Probability of Replacement
4.1 IntroductoryRemarks
So far we have not paid much attention to what the probability of continuing
in office is derived from. Most of the models of the effects of political instabil-
ity on economic policy choice are set in the context of democratic elections of
government. In fact, as they depict two-party systems they are all even more
specific than that. In my opinion, the mechanism discussed in this paper is
more general than national-level democratic elections. My claim is that it is
important whenever a politician holding an office which allows him to make
decisions about whether to sacrifice resources with valuable current uses faces
an uncertain prospect of retaining his position. Hence, the mechanism is at
work with dictators, democratically elected presidents, prime ministers leading
minority coalitions risking defeat at the hands of the parliamentary opposition,
and ministers facing would-be ministers be they from the same party or from
another clique within a dictator's entourage. It even applies to high-ranking bu-
reaucrats having the same kind of decisional powers in an agency or bureau, at
least if they are appointed politically. However, with the exception of electoral
competition (and possibly collective action models of revolutions), we do not
(yet) have an apparatus that allows us to derive political uncertainty from first
principles. Hence, the sort of general approach applied here will have to do.
Still, it is of interest to consider the case where the incumbent's actions
affects his probability of staying in power. In section 2, I observed that while
many of the models of political instability and economic policy do not allow for
such an influence, the conclusions often depend on this assumption. And it is
easy to point to reasons why the probability of continuing in office might be
endogenous in the present model. For instance, the investment decisions made
by I in period 1 affects the level of output of both goods in period 1 and of Y in
period 2. When I and C differ in their preferences and so choose different budget
shares for the two goods, the difference in the level of production of Y between
their regimes is influenced by the marginal product of budgetary funds for Y.
If their expected performance in office affects their chances of capturing power,
25A dictator fearing that he will be replaced by a rival could be an example of the extreme
case where {jXI = {jYI = O. Whether the objective function is interpreted literallyas the
dictator's utlity from consuming goods produced by his employeesor as including the benefits
he derives from distributing a share of the production to his entourage, it seems reasonable
to venture that neither he nor them will derive any benefits if he loses power.
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1's choice of Ii will have an impact on p.26 Alternatively, p might be influenced
by today's performance in office. This could happen if agents taking actions
which affect p do not know everything about I. For example, his preferences
might not be common knowledge. Similarly, the marginal product of budgetary
funds in the production of either or both goods might be individual-specific
because the competency of the leadership in running the organisation matters
for efficiency and only I knows how productive he is. The incumbent's choice
of might then reveal information of importance to the decisions of these other
agents. Subsequently, their actions willaffect p.27 A concrete example would be
a minister whose competency in running his ministry is not known by the prime
minister. By observing the minister's first-period actions, the prime minister
might be able to infer whether he would be better off replacing him. In either
case, prospectively or retrospectively, the probability of retaining office will be
some kind of function of «.
In this section, therefore, let p = p (Q{ (Ii) ,Q~ (Ii) ,Qf (Ii)) == P (Ii), where
Q~(Ii) = {Xi (Ii) , Yti (li)} are the optimallevels of production of the two goods
for politician i for a given value of Ii.28 The benchmark of no political uncer-
tainty can now be seen to be the special case where p (O)= p (F) = 1. It is
therefore unchanged, and in the remainder of this section I discuss cases where
p(Ii) < 1 for at least ane value of Ii.29
4.2 The Pure ease of Political Instability and Polarisation
Revisited
As above, I start with the case where the only possible source of contention
between I and C concerns the aggregate amount of the goods to be produced.
Accordingly, the cut-off rate for the fixed cost is30
26This sort of link is embedded in the models developed by Milesi-Ferretti and Spolaore
(1994) and de Wolff (1996), for example.
27In technical terms, the model would then be a signalling game. In the context of elections,
Rogoff (1990) and Alesina and Cukierman (1990) have developed models where voters are
backward-looking instead of forward-looking because they would like to learn something about
the incumbent 's characteristics.
28p (It) might very well be I's subjective estimate of how his chances of continuing vary
with his first-period choices or his relative expected performance in the second period. Note
that the exact nature of this relation might depend on distributioual issues. As this is not my
main concern here, I take the optimal distribution of production for the two politicians to be
implicit in p (It).
29The extension to more than one challenger is not as straightforward when p is endogenous,
c.f. Appendix B. The reason is that any differences in p (O)and p (F) will then affect the cut-
off rate not only through differences ill outcomes between the case where I retains officeand
each of the challengers' regimes. Since the likelihood of these alternative regimes occurring
might vary with l's decision, disparities in his pay-off across these must be considered too.
30Note that due to the nature of the technology, this is not an implicit definition of the
cut-off level evne though F also enters on the right-hand side.
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Once more, if there are no ideological rifts between incumbent and chal-
lenger, political uncertainty does not matter. For a = 1, (11) is equal to (7).
What is more interesting is the fact that for a < 1, we cannot rule out the
possibility that F;* > F*! That is, it is now possible for political uncertainty
to generate stronger incentives for reform than certain "re-appointment", e.f.
Proposition 3:
Proposition 3 For a < 1, 3p E (p (O) , 1) such that 1) for p (F) < p, F;* < F*
BF"" _ -** -* BP""
and T > O; 2) for p (F) > p, r; > F and T < O.
Since wI-a,! > 1, we can have P;* > F* if and only if p(F) » p(O).
In other words, there must be a strictly positive increase in the probability of
continuing in office for 1's investment incentives to be stronger under political
uncertainty than in the benchmark case. This is why we observed in sub-
section 3.2 that political uncertainty worked against spending on productivity-
enhancement in the production of Y. That situation can be seen to be equivalent
to a special case of the one considered here, namely p (O) = p (F) < 1. Both
when the probability of retaining office is exogenous and when it is the same
regardless of the value of K, investment has only one distinct effect, which is to
increase the second-period productivity of funds spent on Y. On the other hand,
when p (K) is a strictly increasing function of K, investment has a second positive
effect. Increases in the probability of retaining office works to the incumbent's
advantage whenever the challenger has preferences which are different from his
own. The more they differ, the greater is the beneficial effect of an increase in
p and thus of investing.
Naturally, the required gap between p(P) and p (O) is not independent of
the other parameters of the model. It can be seen that as v (and thus w) or a/
goes up, the increase in the probability of retaining office that is necessary to
make investment-incentives stronger under political uncertainty goes down.31
The intuition is best grasped by observing that in the limit, as v tends to 1L
or a/ tends to 1, there either are no productivity gains to be had or I does
not care about them. Hence, the only remaining incentive to invest stems from
increases in p because such increases improve the likelihood of 1's optimal input
mix prevailing in period 2.
Depending on the same condition that determines whether or not F;* ex-
ceeds P*, greater ideological distance between I and C strenghtens or weakens
the incentive to invest. As long as p (P) > p, the spur to invest is greater for
large differences in preferences between I and C. On the other hand, if p (F) < P
the result of sub-section 3.2 is replicated here: the cut-off rate is lower the lower
a is. If someone wanted to increase the likelihood of investment but was unable
to do anything about the technology (e.g. lower F), he would be better off if
he could make the incumbent's prospects of staying on uncertain as long as the
31An equivalent way of demonstrating these effects .is to differentiate p with respect to
these parameters. In Appendix A, I show that the signs of these derivatives are @. > Oand
r - .~<O.
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bonus from paying F in the form of a higher probability of keeping his position
could be made large enough.
Insituations where it is expected performance in office in the next period that
is crucial to the incumbent's possibilities for staying put, one might speculate
that investment would increase (decrease) p if 0/ is lower (higher) than aP. The
increase in the period 2 production of Y caused by investment is (1- ai) (v-1l.)
for politician i. Hence, it is higher the greater the weight i attaches to the level
of output of Y. As the production of X is invariant across K. = O and K. = F for
both politicians, the one with a "comparative advantage" in the production of
y should be the one that gains the most from investment. Conversely, if perfor-
mance in period 1 determines p, this is likely to make p (O) - p (F) positive, at
least if signalling concerns the innate productivity of the incumbent. The more
productive he is, the weaker the need for investing in productivity-enhancing
measures other things being equal. Upon seeing K. = O, observers might then
rationally be able to infer that the incumbent is likely to be highly productive.
This should strenghten his chances of staying in office. On the other hand, if
what is unknown to outsiders are the preferences of the incumbent, the same
signal could imply that he does not care much about good Y. Whether this
would increase or decrease p would of course depend on how well his preferences
are aligned with those of individuals who have an influence on p.
4.3 Distributional Conflict Revisited
If being in office benefits the incumbent over and above the gain from controlling
aggregate levels of production - OhI < 1 for at least one h - the cut-off level is
(12)F;** = a [OX!]"I [oy!r-cl [wl-aI -1]
+ [1- a [OX!]"I [oy!r-aI] [p(F)WI-aI - p (O)] .
It is immediate that, as in the last sub-section, political uncertainty might
actually boost reform incentives if undertaking the investment creates a large
enough increase in the probability of surviving in office. In fact, the condition is
identical. Therefore, changes in the ideological "distance" between incumbent
and challenger work in the same way here (assuming both OX! and oy! are
positive). As the effect of changes in each OhI is similar to the effect of changes
in a, the comparative statics are similar if a, OX!, and oy! are all positive. If
the increase in p from paying F is large enough to overcome the adverse effect
of political uncertainty, a greater divergence of preferences over distribution or
aggregate production works towards making it more likely that the reform is
carried out. On the other hand, if p ~F) - p (O) is negative or positive but
"small", lower values of a, OX!, and oy all imply a lower cut-off rate.
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5 Public Sector Institutions and Economic Growth
The model presented here can also be viewed as contributing to the theoret-
ical micro-foundations for the negative empirical effect of political instability
on savings, investment, and growth.32 There are several existing theories (not
mutually exclusive) about these links. They have in common a focus on the
behaviour of private sector agents. That is, they seek to explain why potential
political instability might reduce for example private investment and thereby
lower growth. A a lower probability of continuing in office works like a reduc-
tion in the discount factor, a potential for political upheaval could weaken the
incentives for the government to build or keep a reputation for not expropriating
private wealth. Or, as implied by the models discussed in section 2, instability
could result in policies that generate inefficiencies: excessive borrowing induces
expectations of higher future taxes, an inefficient tax system creates distortions
that lowers the returns to investment, and so on. In a dynamic perspective,
such inefficiencies could be harmful to economic growth.
A second type of link stems from the simple fact that potential political
instability generally implies uncertainty about future policies (it is almost, but
not quite, a tautology). When investment is irreversible, this will induce private
investors to postpone investment and instead channel their resources abroad or
into" unproductive" assets such as foreign currency or precious metals or simply
consume them. Thirdly, potential political upheaval at the level of government
often goes together with social unrest such as demonstrations, riots, or political
violence, which could detrimentally affect the productivity of labour and capital
or reduce the supply of these inputs. One consequence of lower productivity is
lower returns to investment.
However, while the multifaceted impact of instability in the political sphere
on the incentives for private accumulation is indeed important, one should not
overlook the fact that so might be the impact on the behaviour of public sector
decision-makers. As has been demonstrated above, political instability might
weaken the incentives to take actions that will increase public sector productiv-
ity in the future and to invest resources today so as to be able to produce new
kinds of goods and services in the public sector tomorrow. It is obvious that
the efficiency with which the government is run will affect the private sector.
Other things being equal, lower public sector efficiency implies that more re-
sources will have to be transferred from the private sector in order to generate a
given level of activity or that less can be done with a given amount of resources.
The first is bad no matter the impact of governmental activity on the private
sector. The second outcome has a negative effect on the private sector to the
extent that public sector output contributes positively to the productivity of
the private sector.33 Infrastructure is one example of such productive govern-
32See e.g. Alesina and Perotti (1996) and Alesina et.al. (1996).
330n the effects of public expenditures and taxation in endogenous growth models, see e.g.
Barre and Sala-i-Martin (1992) and Corsetti and Roubini (1996). In the traditional neo-
classical model of growth, (changes in) governmental output will only affect growth along the
transition path from one steady-state to another. Still, this effect might be quantitatieely
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mental output.34 Another is protection of property rights.35 If these goods
and services are not forthcoming because no politician finds it in his interest to
ensure their supply or output is lower than it needs to be because incentives for
productivity-enhancing measures are weak or non-existent in the public sector,
private investment and growth will suffer.
These effects can be sizeable. For example, Mauro (1995) finds that an in-
crease in his index of "bureaucratic efficiency" by one standard-deviation (i.e.,
and improvement in efficiency) would increase the average share of private in-
vestment in GDP for the period 1970-85 by about 4.3%.36 That is, a country
in his cross-section which had an index value one standard-deviation higher
than the sample mean should have had a 4.3% higher average share of private
investment in GDP over this period than a country with average bureaucratic ef-
ficiency. Such an efficiency differential would produce large differences in growth
rates. This is reflected in Mauro's growth regressions: the same exercise yields
a 0.6% increase in average annual growth in per capita GDP over the period
1960-85.37 Two countries having the same GDP per capita at the start of the
period but differing in bureaucratic efficiency to this extent would thus find that
the most efficient country would have a level of income per capita 16% higher
than the other country at the end of the period.38 However, as shown above, re-
form incentives might be too strong as well, implying that the trade-off between
current and future output will be tilted too heavily towards the latter; or, in
a dynamic model with endogenous total budgets, that the tax level will be too
high because of the need to finance a continuous process of reform. Clearly, it
is important to understand how potential political instability and polarisation
affect the political calculus of public sector institutional development. I plan to
pursue the implications of these issues for economic growth in future work.39
important if the speed of transition is slow. And fiscal policy is a determinant of the steady-
state level of income, which is not exactly unimportant either.
34Evidence on the positive effect of public infrastructure investment is presented in Easterly
and Rebelo (1993).
35See the work of North (1981, 1990) for theoretical arguments and historical examples
of how variations in the protection of property rights and enforcement of contracts affect
economic development.
36Table V, page 697. This table contains simple regressions of various measures of invest-
ment on his indices of corruption, bureaucratic efficiency,and institutional efficiency.
37Table VII, pages 702-703. The number referred to stems from a simple regression of the
independent variable on his bureaucratic efficiencyindex. The effect is larger for some of the
other regressions (where more variables are included). The reason why I refer to numbers that
pertain to two different time periods is that the author only produces regression results for
private investment for the shorter period and for growth for the longer period.
38Similarly, as demonstrated by Knack (1996) and Keefer and Knack (1997), the ability
of poor countries to catch up with richer ones in terms of income is significantly affected by
the quality of their public sector institutions. Also see Knack and Keefer (1995) for more
econometric evidence on the importance of efficient political and administrative institutions
for economic growth.
39After the first versions of this paper were completed, a paper by Svensson (1998) was
brough to my attention. He endogenises the political decision on the degree of protection
of private property rights in a two-period model with private investment. The choice of the
fraction of the returns to investment in the formal sector that private investors will be able to
keep is continuous and possibly costly. The two potential governments derive benefits from
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6 Final Remarks and Conclusions
6.1 Individual versus CollectivePolitical Decision-Making
The logic outlined above applies not only to the bureaucracy or the executive
branch more generally. Reforms of the judiciary, say to speed up the process-
ing of cases or root out corruption, is another important class of institutional
changes that is likely to suffer the effects of potential political instability and
political polarisation. The same goes for changes in political institutions, e.g.
budget institutions. Such institutions regulate the relationship between spend-
ing ministries and the Treasury and between the government and the legislature,
and include both laws and procedural rules. Devising optimal changes neces-
sitates spending on planning and implementation, but potential gains will not
materialise until these stages have been completed.
Changes in institutions such as these will usually involve many actors. While
the process by which a conclusion is drawn will of course be different, there is
no reason to believe that this will change the nature of the benefits and costs
of reforms in a manner which will make their undertaking more likely. It is
of course immediate that if collectives are treated as single units as in models
of competition between single-party governments, the situation is completely
analogous to the situation modelled here.4o
If anything, modelling collective decision-making explicitly should strengthen
the main conclusion of this paper about the disincentives to reform created by
potential political instability. The reason is that the benefits are likely to be
diluted in the process of reform or that the consequences of political instability
might be more dramatic than in the formal model presented above. For example,
in majoritarian parliamentary systems, a government investing in the creation
of organisations which are to produce goods and services which its supporters
value highly might find that a change of government willlead to the dissolution
of these organisations or that a new government will have them produce output
the supporters of the former government do not value as much. In the context
of considerable political polarisation such changes in mandates might approach
equivalence with dissolution. In proportional representation systems, which
often produce coalition or minority governments, and separation-of-powers sys-
tems gathering the requisite support for a reform might require compromises
both private consumption and public goods. The form of the utility of public goods function
is less general than the one employed here (it is linear with inversely symmetric weights), and
there is disagreement between the two government types over the spending pattern in period 2
only (the representative private agent only cares about total public sector output). Finally, the
probability of losing office is exogenous. Svensson tests the implications of his model using
the same institutional variables as in the Knack and Keefer papers cited above, and finds
negative effects of political instability and polarisation 011 public sector institutional quality
and total investment in his sample. I think his theoretical and empirical results support the
idea of developing the framework used in this paper into a full-fledged political economy of
growth model.
40 Other examples are median legislator models or legislative committee member models
where the preferences of some legislator situated strategically in the decision-making process
are decisive for the outcome produced. '
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with other politicians. It should be readily apparent that such compromises
cannot increase the benefits that the supporters of the reform receive and that
in most cases they will be reduced. There is no reason to believe that a corre-
sponding reduction results on the cost side of the balance sheet.41
Of course, this does not mean that there are no mechanisms that work
towards increasing political reform incentives. One obvious example is the ma-
joritarian impetus towards collectivising the costs of public programmes while
concetrating their benefits.v' Thus, if groups that are not important to incum-
bents politically or personally can be made to pay for reforms to some extent,
their adoption becomes more likely.43 The point I am trying to make is sim-
ply that collective political decision-making should be as likely to be influenced
by political instability and polarisation as the calculus of individual politicians
empowered with the right to decide on reforming some public sector institu-
tion. To determine whether net reform incentives are too strong or too weak in
any specific instance, one would require both an explicit model of the relevant
institutions and a normative benchmark.
6.2 Conclusions
In this paper, I have demonstrated the potentially adverse effects of political
instability and polarisation on public sector institutional development. If the
probability of staying in office is unaffected by the incumbent's investment de-
cision, political instability increases the hurdle that has to be surpassed for
such resource-use to be optimal. The adverse effects are aggravated by political
polarisation in various forms, and the disincentive generated by polarisation is
larger the greater the disagreement between incumbent and challenger. Only if
the relationship between political uncertainty and reforms is such that invest-
ment significantly raises the probability of staying in power will such uncertainty
be conducive to reforms. The reason is that the gain from an increase in the
probability of retaining office then outweighs the direct negative effect of the
presence of political uncertainty. If this is the case, political polarisation will
actually spur investment.
It should be possible to test these predictions econometrically at the gov-
ernment level using the indices of institutional efficiency employed by Mauro
(1995), Keefer and Knack (1997), and others and estimating political instability
along the lines of Alesina et.al. (1996). The latter paper uses a simultaneous
equation approach to test whether growth is affected by instability and whether
growth feeds back to instability. This is how one ideally would go about testing
the model presented here given the potential for two-way causation. On the
41On some differences between separation-of-powers and parliamentary systems with respect
to the political choice of administrative structures and processes, see Moe (1990) and Moe
and Caldwell (1994).
42See e.g. Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen (1981), Shepsle and Weingast (1984), and Baron
(1991).
43A crude way of capturing this in the present model would be to let the incumbent pay a
share of the costs of reform 1T E [0,1). It is easy to demonstrate that this will inflate all cut-off
rates by ~.
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other hand, if one is interested in investigating the consequences of micro-level
political uncertainty on specific public sector institutions, one would probably
have to contend oneself with case studies.
That risk-averse investors respond negatively to uncertainty about the re-
turns to investment is well-known.v' In this paper I have pointed out that such
effects are present in the public sector as well even though politicians do not
enjoy property rights over those institutions. Uncertainty about control rights
generates the same kind of consequences. Moreover, it interacts with politi-
cal disagreement between ·politicians who compete for the same office, a factor
not present in the calculus of private investors. The model presented here also
demonstrates the possibility of reversing the impact of insecure returns to in-
vestment, a less obvious result. This can happen when investment influences the
probability distribution of its "returns". It is difficult to come up with examples
of a similar effect in the context of private investment decisions.t"
While the model is simple, I believe that the issue discussed here is impor-
tant because uncertainty is an integral part of every political environment no
matter its formal characteristics. Furthermore, there is no reason to expect
that constructing more elaborate models would change the main conclusions
drawn here. That is, when viewed in isolation, political instability and polari-
sation should generate predictions about reform efforts similar to those derived
above even if for instance the probability of retaining office is endogenised. Of
course, other features of political and administrative institutions might work to
counteract these effects. And my results do indicate that the details of politi-
cal institutions could be important as potential political change and ideological
disagreement can have quite different effects depending on how responsive the
likelihood of continuing in office is with respect to reform. Thus, more specific
models are worth pursuing.
The word reform has positive connotations. Furthermore, in this paper I
have spoken about the disincentives to reform generated by political uncertainty
while noting that in some cases we might see" over-investment" compared to
the benchmark of no potential for upheaval. Therefore, by way of conclusion,
let me emphasise that the results obtained here should not be interpreted in a
normative manner. For instance, while my model predicts that in conditions
of political uncertainty, when combined with political polarisation of various
forms, there might be comparatively fewer reforms of public sector institutions
relative to more stable environments, in and of itself this need not be a bad
thing. Reforms do not have to constitute an improvement compared to some
status quo when evaluated according to a normative theory such as welfare
economics. For example, when reforms are sought for purely partisan purposes,
44For a good discussion of how variations in property rights - both in degree and kind - can
affect private incentives to invest in land, see Besley (1995).
45However, the analogy to private sector firms in which ownership and control are separated,
i.e., some control rights are delegated to managers, is rather straightforward with respect to
the effect of uncertainty about control rights. For example, such uncertainty might deter
managers from making relation-specific investments in their own human capital for which the
return depends on them continuing in charge of the company.
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say to benefit some constituency of the politicians in power, overall welfare
need not improve. Polarisation of preferences might then result in public sector
institutions serving purposes which are at odds with the goals of a large part
of the citizenry. If power does change hands rapidly, a sizeable share of the
resources commanded by the public sector might be wasted on undoing the
administrative reforms of the previous governments and putting up structures
and procedures to serve the current office-holders. By reducing the gains from
reforms and thus the incentives to engage in the restructuring of institutions
created by past decision-makers, political uncertainty might actually be welfare-
improving. It goes without saying that the conclusion would be the opposite if
inefficient institutions prevail because would-be reformers are not certain that
the benefits they see will be realised in the future.46 Hence, the merits of (non-
)reform must be judged in the context of concrete cases.
7 Appendices
7.1 Appendix A: Proofs ofClaims and Results in the Main
Text
I first prove that the optimal budget shares for the two goods are indeed equal
to their weights in the objective function of a politician. Incorporating the
budget constraint in the objective function and utilising the definitions bXi (i) =
bYi (i) == 1, the choice problem of the politician in office in period t becomes
(AI)Af:f'xcr (Qtji) = {xbfr-' {g (Kr) [Rt - bf]} l_ai j
t
where Rt is the share of resources left for production in period t after any
fixed cost of reform has been paid. Hence, R2 = 1 and RI = 1 - K.. The
first-order condition for a maximum is thus
= (i {xbfi} ai_l {Xg (Kr) [Rt _ bfiJ} l_ai
- {Xbfi} ai [1- (i] {g (Kr) [Rt _ bfi]} _ai 9 (Kr)
O.
The solution to (A2) is bfi = aiRt, from which it follows that bfi =
[1 - ai] Rt. Hence the claim is substantiated.
46 Even if we see the normative issue as being the maximisation of some function defined
over the objective functions of I and C, ignoring the potential for political instability, the
benchmark we have used for comparison would not be the right one because it is based on
the arbitrary identity of the incumbent (except in the degenerate case where the "welfare"
function is identical to I's objective function). '
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We now turn to the properties of u (aG). As property 1) (u (al) = 1)
and property 3) ( lim u (aG) = lim u (aG) = O) are immediate from (9)
etC-+O etC-+l
in the main text, I will only prove property 2), i.e., u (aG) < l,aG #- al.
Differentiating (9), we get
Accordingly,
Thus, aG = al is an extremum of this function. The second derivative of
u (aG) is
Because al E (0,1), this expression is strictly negative for all aG. In par-
ticular, it is negative at aG = aI, proving that it is indeed the maximum of
u (aG). As u (aG) = 1, the proof-has been completed.
As for the proof of Proposition 1, Parts 1 and 2 are clear from inspection of
(7) and (8) in the main text. Parts 3 and 4 are obtained by differentiating (8)
with respect to u (aG) and p:
8F**
(A6a)8u (aG) = [1- pl [W1-etI -1] >O'Vp < 1;
(A6a)8:;* = [1-u(aG)] [W1-etI -1] >O'Vu(aG) <1.
Q.E.D.
Turning to Proposition 2, parts 1 and 2 can be derived by comparing (10) in
the main text with (7) and (8) respectively. To complete the proof, I thus only
have to demonstrate that Part 3) is correct. Differentiating (10) with respect
to bhI (C), one gets
24
Each of these are greater than zero as long as p < 1 and a (aP) and the
other bhI (C) are both greater than zero. Q.E.D.
To prove Proposition 3, first note that from (7) and (11) in the main text
(A8)F;* - F* = [1- a (aP)] {[l - p (0)]- [1- p(F)] WI-aI} ,
Thus, for a (aP) < 1we have sign [F;* - F*] = sign {[l - p (0)]- [1 - p (F)] WI-aI}.
It follows that in order to get F;* > F*, we must have ;~:(W)> wI-aI. Hence,
for p(F) > 1- [~:~~~]== p, the first result in part 2) of Proposition 3 is ob-
tained. From (11) in the main text a~~a:;i)= - {[l - p (0)]- [1- p (F)] WI-aI},
which means that sign a!~i;i)= -sign {[l - p (0)]- [1 - p (F)] WI-aI}, prov-
ing the second result. Part 1) is the reverse case. Because 1 < wI-c,I < 00,
P (O)< P < 1. Q.E.D.
The effects of changes in TIand a/ on p can be found by differentiating the
definition. After cancelling terms one gets
(A9a): =
(A9b) ap =
aa.I
[1- al] [1- p (O)]
I I > OJVW -a
[l-p(O)]lnw O
I I -c uW -a
1.2 Appendix B: Generalisations
(x x
Ifwe allow for a more general specification of the technology, i.e., X; = [.f (Kf)] [br] Q>
(y ",y
and Yt = [g (K[)] [br] ,where c", q} E (0,1], h = X, Y, the results
d h alitati l nr h -;-Xi f3iRt f3i aipx dO not c ange qu tative y. YVe ave vt- = , = aipx+[I-aiIW' an
b[i = [1 - f3i] Rt for politician i. The model used in the main text is simply
the special case (,h = q} = 1, h = X, Y. As technological differences between
the transformation processes for the two goods are not particular interesting for
our purposes, let (,X = (,Y == (. and </>x = </>Y == </>. Then f3i = ai. The most
general expression for the cut-off rate is then
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is the measure of preference similarity between incumbent and challenger in
this case. As J.L (aP) = [a (aP)]cf>,it should be readily apparent that the quali-
tative properties of these measures are identical.f" Furthermore, inspection of
(Bl) reveals that even though the form of the cut-off rate is more complicated
than in the special case discussed in the main text, the comparative statics re-
main similar (compare (14) in the main text). One only has to be a little more
careful in specifying parameter values in order to ensure that the cut-off rate is
non-negative and not greater than 1so that corner solutions where it is never
or always optimal to invest are ruled out.
If f (Kt) = Kt and 9 (Kr) = Kr, productivity is a continuous function of
the" capital stock". It is possible to demonstrate that in the case of exogenous
political uncertainty the optimal investment in production of Y has the same
qualitative properties as the cut-off rates. After some simplifications, the first-
order condition becomes
(B3)S (K) _ ø [Ki]cf>[l-aI] [1- K]cf>-l
= [1- cl] ({p+ [1- p] J.L (aP) [OX! (C)r
I
[oY! (C)r-
aI
} [Kr + K]<[l-a
I
]
_ T (K,P, J.L (aP) ,OX! (C), oy! (C))
(assuming it is not possible to invest in the productivity of budgetary funds
allocated to good X production). Applying the implicit function theorem, the
derivatives of optimal investment with respect to the parameter z can be seen
to be
(B4)dK =
dz
aTaz
471n the more general case where possibly cpx =F cpY, it can be shown that aC = al is an
extremum of the measure. However, it is more difficult to establish whether the second-order
condition for a maximum holds at this point.
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The numerator on the right-hand side is negative (this is the second-order
condition for an optimum, which can be shown to be fulfilled). It follows that
sign ~~ = sign ~;. Inspection of (B3) then reveals that the comparative statics
with respect to p, J.L (aP), 8X1 (C), and 8Y1 (C) are qualitatively indistinguish-
able from the comparative statics of the cut-off rates in the main text with
respect to the same parameters. Thus political polarisation and uncertainty
have the same kind of effects on investment incentives in this case. When p
is endogenous, one has to make assumptions about the functional relationship
between p and Ii in order to establish the characteristics of optimal investment.
If the assumption that the investment choice is discrete is retained while
making the productivity of budgetary funds allocated to good h a function of
the overall" capital stock" so that investment increases the productivity of funds
in the production of both goods, i.e.,
(B5a)f (Kl) = .K>O
(B5b)f (K2) ( ) { X if Ii = O,= f Kl + li = - :;: 'j - FX .Kz Ii- .
(B5c)g (Kl) = .!L> O;
(B5d)g (K2) (K ) { .!L if li = O,= g 1+ Ii = - >'f Fv .!LZ Ii= .
the resulting cut-off rates have the same qualitative properties as in the main
. I I - Itext, the only change bemg that ~ wI-a, X = ~,WI-a replaces everywhere.
It can be seen that this substitution leaves the conclusions unchanged. Thus,
studying "comprehensive" institutional reforms yields the same type of results
as do the analysis of "partial" reforms.
The remainder of this appendix is devoted to proving that the results gen-
eralise to the case where the incumbent faces more than one challenger. For
this exercise, I stick to the formulation of the technology utilised in the main
text. Let there be L 2: 3 politicians (indexed by l) competing for the office in
question. That is, there are L-l challengers and one incumbent (politician
L). All politicians have Cobb-Douglas preferences over the two goods identified
by a_l E (0,1). Hence, their optimal period 2 choices are of the form shown
above. Towards demonstrating the result, it is useful to rewrite equation (6) in
the main text in its most general form:
aL 1 aL{xaL [1- lil} {.!L [1- aL](1 - lil} -
I=L L 1 L
+ I>l (li) {8XL(C)Xcir {8YL (C)g (Ki +Ii) [l-all} -a
1=1
I=L
Of course, I:pl (Ii) = 1 for each value of «. Byequating VL (O) and VL (F),
1=1
the following general expression for the cut-off level can be derived:
27
Norges Handelshøyskole
Biblioteket
(B7)F= ~[8XL(l)rL [8YL(l)r-
aL
a ((i) [pl (F)wl-aL _pl (O)] .
1=1
a (an is defined in exactly the same manner as a (aP) in the main text:
[ Ij"L[ IJl-aL
a ((i) =a LI-a L. These measures of preference similarity between the
[aLla [l_aLjl-a
incumbent and each of his challengers therefore have exactly the same properties
as a (aP). Trivially, a (aL) = 1. By definition, 8XL (L) = 8YL (L) == 1.
The benchmark is derived by setting pL (F) = pL (O) = 1. It is the same as
in the case of a single challenger. "Pure" political polarisation results when
8XL (l) = 8YL (l) = 1 '<Il,pl (F) = pl (O)== pl '<Il, and pL < 1. If the incumbent's
constituency broadly defined differs from that of any of his challengers, 8hL (l) <
1 for at least one h and one l < L. Endogenous political uncertainty is studied
by letting pl (F) =f. pl (O)for at least two ls (as the probabilities must sum to one
for each value of K, whenever rJ (F) =f. pl (O)for one politician, pl (F) =f. pl (O)for
at least one other too). It is easily seen that when the probabilities of winning
office in period 2 are exogenous, the case L-l > 1 adds only one really new
featured compared to the case L-l = 1. (B7) then becomes
In this case, increased polarisation of preferences between the incumbent
and one of the challengers always reduces the cut-off level as do greater dif-
ferences in the way in which they distribute the goods. a;(!I)' a6~r(I)' and
a6~f(l) are all weakly positive for l < L (strictly positive as long as 8XL (l),
8YL (l), a (al), and pl are all strictly positive). To see the effect of changes
in the probabilities of winning office, let us rank all ls in descending order
aL l_aL
according to the value of [8XL (l)] [8YL (l)] a (al). As this expres-
sion by definition equals 1 for the incumbent, he ranks first. Then ~ =
{ ]
aL [ ] 1 aL [ ] aL [ 1 aL }[8XL(l) 8YL(l) - lY(al)- 8XL(m) 8YL(m)] - a (am) [wl-aL_1]
is non-negative for l > m and non-positive for l < m (l =f. m). If no two ls are
identical, l > m (l < m) implies that this derivative is strictly positive (nega-
tive) . Hence, an increase in pL is bound to increase the cut-off rate no matter
which challenger's probability of winning is negatively affected. If the probabil-
ity of a challenger winning changes, the cut-off rate increases if this challenger
has preferences (widely defined) closer to the incumbent's preferences than the
one whose chances are diminished. Conversely, if the challenger who gains has
preferences that deviate more from the incumbent's preferences than the 0RPO-
nent whose probability of winning is reduced, the cut-off rate goes down. Thus,
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the only new feature is that the ranking of the challengers in terms of prefer-
ences might matter for the comparative statics of changes in the probabilities of
winning. It can be seen that if any two challengers are identical, the cut-off level
is not affected by changes in their probabilities of winning as long as the sum of
these remains constant. If challengers are heterogenous, investment incentives
are strengthened (weakened) by changes in probabilities of winning that result
in challengers whose preferences are more in line with the incumbent's prefer-
ences gaining (losing) at the expense of those whose preferences diverge more
from his.
Things are slightly more complicated when p is endogenous. The reason is
that as long as the first-period investment choice makes a difference to some
pis, the effect discussed in connection with the comparative statics of changes
in exogenous pis is incorporated into the definition of the cut-off level. For
example, when L-l = 2, i.e., L= 3, we have
(B9a)F;* = [p3 (F) wl-",3 _ p3 (O)] + O' (o?) [p2 (F) wl-",3 _ p2 (O)]
+0' (al) {[l- p3 (F) _ p2 (F)] wl-",3 _ [1- p3 (O)_ p2 (F)]};
(B9b)F;** = [p3 (F) wl-",3 _ p3 (O)]
",3 l ",3
+ [8X3(2)] [8Y3(2)] - 0'(02) [p2(F)wl-",3 _p2(0)]
",3 l ",3
+ [8X3 (1)] [8Y3 (1)] - O' (al) {[l- p3 (F) _ p2 (F)] wl-",3
- [1 - p3 (O) _ p2 (F)]} .
Rewriting (B9a), we get
(BlO)F;* = 0'(01) [wl-",3 -1] + [1-0'(01)] [p3(F)wl-",3 _p3(O)]
+ [O' (02) - O' (al)] [p2 (F)wl-",3 _ p2 (O)] .
As in section 4, political instability does not affect the cut-off rate when
the challengers' preferences are identical to the incumbent's. Moreover, the
analysis is also unchanged when they differ from him as long as the challengers
are identical. Then the last term vanishes and (BlO) becomes indistinguishable
from (11) in the main text. However, when they do differ, the cut-off rate
will be affected in a direction which depends on whether investment increases
the probability that challenger 1 wins office, which ceteris paribus reduces the
probability that 2 wins office, and whether such a change is desirable to 3. That
is, an increase in pl holding p3 constant makes investment more desirable for 3 if
l's preferences are closer to his than 2's are. Thus, the relationship between F;*
and F* will be determined by both the effect on the incumbent's own chances
relative to those of each rival and his political differences with them and on the
likelihood of more or less palatable challengers winning, c.f. (BU): '
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(Bll)sign[F;*-F*] = sign{[l-O"(al)] [[1-p3(0)] - [1_p3(F)]wl-a3]
+ [O"(a2) -O" (al)] [p2 (F)wl-a3 - p2 (O)]}.
Clearly, we cannot really say much more as p (.) long as is not made explicit.
The last case, where incumbent and challenger might also differ in the way in
which they distribute X and Y, yields similar conclusions.
References
[1] Aghion, P. and P. Bolton (1990). "Government Domestic Debt and the
Role of Default: a Politico-Economic Model of the Strategic Role of Debt" .
Chapter 11 in RDornbusch and M.Draghi (eds.): "Public Debt Manage-
ment: Theory and History". Cambridge University Press.
[2] Alesina, A. and A. Cukierman (1990). "The Politics of Ambiguity". Quar-
terly Journal of Economics 105: 829-850.
[3] Alesina, A. and R Perotti (1996). "Income Distribution, Political Instabil-
ity, and Investment". European Economic Review 40: 1203-1228.
[4] Alesina, A. and G. Tabellini (1990). "A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits
and Government Debt". Review of Economic Studies 57: 403-414.
[5] Alesina, A., S. Ozler, N. Roubini, and P. Swagel (1996). "Political Insta-
bility and Economic Growth". Journal of Economic Growth 1: 189-211.
[6] Aranson, P.H. and P.C. Ordeshook (1981). "Regulation, Redistribution,
and Public Choice". Public Choice 37: 69-100.
[7] Baron, D.P. (1991). "Majoritarian Incentives, Pork Barrel Programs, and
Procedural Control". American Journal of Political Science 35: 57-90.
[8] Barro, RJ. and X. Sala-i-Martin (1992). "Public Finance in Models of
Economic Growth". Review of Economic Studies 59: 645-661.
[9] Besley, T. (1995). "Property Rights and Investment Incentives: Theoryand
Evidence from Ghana". Journal of Political Economy 103: 903-937.
[10] Corsetti, G. and N. Roubini (1996). "Optimal Government Spending and
Taxation in Endogenous Growth Models". Working Paper 5851, National
Bureau of Economic Research.
[11] Cukierman, A., S. Edwards, and G. Tabellini (1992). "Seigniorage and
Political Instability". American Economic Review 82: 537-555.
[12] Easterly, W. and S. Rebelo (1993). "Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth:
an Empirical Investigation". Journal of Monetary Economics 32: 417-458.
30
[13] Glazer, A. (1989). "Politics and the Choice of Durability". American Eco-
nomic Review 79: 1207-1213.
[14] Keefer, P. and S. Knack (1997). "Why Don't Poor Countries Catch up?
A Cross-National Test of an Institutional Explanation". Economic Inquiry
35: 590-602.
[15] Knack, S. (1996). "Institutions and the Convergence Hypothesis: The
Cross-National Evidence". Public Choice 87: 207-228.
[16] Knack, S. and P. Keefer (1995). "Institutions and Economic Performance:
Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures". Economics
and Politics 7: 207-227.
[17] Mauro, P. (1995). "Corruption and Growth". Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 110: 681-712.
[18] Milesi-Ferretti, G.M. (1995). "Do Good or Do Well? Public Debt Manage-
ment in a Two-Party Economy". Economics and Politics 7: 59-78.
[19] Milesi-Ferretti, G.M. and E. Spolaore (1994). "How Cynical Can an Incum-
bent Be? Strategic Policy in a Model of Government Spending". Journal
of Public Economics 55: 121-140.
[20] Moe, T.M. (1990). "Political Institutions: the Neglected Side of the Story".
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 6: 213-253.
[21] Moe, T.M. and M. Caldwell (1994). "The Institutional Foundations of
Democratic Government: A Comparison of Presidential and Parliamen-
tary Systems". Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 150:
171-195.
[22] North, D.C. (1981). "Structure and Change in Economic History".
W. W.Norton.
[23] North, D.C. (1990). "Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Per-
formance". Cambridge University Press.
[24] Persson, T. and L.E.O. Svensson (1989). "Why a Stubborn Conservative
Would Run a Deficit: Policy with Time-Inconsistent Preferences". Quar-
terly Journal of Economics 104: 325-345.
[25] Rogoff, K. (1990). "Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles". American Eco-
nomic Review 80: 21-36.
[26] Shepsle, K.A. and B.R. Weingast (1984). "Political Solutions to Market
Problems". American Political Science Review 78: 417-434.
[27] Svensson, J. (1998). "Investment, Property Rights and Political Instability:
Theory and Evidence". European Economic Review 42: 1317-1341.
31
[28) Tabellini, G. and A. Alesina (1990). "Voting onthe Budget Deficit". Amer-
ican Economic Review 80: 37-49.
[29) Weingast, B.R., K.A. Shepsle, and C. Johnsen (1981). "The Political Econ-
omy of Benefits and Costs: a Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Poli-
tics". Journal of Political Economy 89: 642-664.
[30) de Wolff, J. (1996). "Strategic Use of Fiscal Policy in a Model where Vot-
ers Differ in Income and Tastes". Diskussionspapier 1996/22, Technische
Universitiit Berlin.
32
IChapter 3
Political Will versus Political Power
On the Political Economy of Economic Reforms*
August, 1999
Abstract
Issues of policy reform have been at the forefront of the devel-
opment debate in the last couple of decades. It is increasingly ac-
knowledged that the politics and economics of reform are inextricably
intertwined. In this paper, the merits of two common but conflicting
views of the political prerequisites for economic reform are analysed.
According to the first view, political will is what matters. The second
view holds that political power is decisive. I show that it is the first
view that is correct under a fairly wide set of circumstances. Specif-
ically, I demonstrate that governments which want to reform will do
so regardless of the electoral consequences and that the result is inde-
pendent of whether or not the government has unconstrained access
to international credit markets.
1 Introduction
The political economy of economic policy reform has attracted a lot of at-
tention from academics, bureaucrats, and politicians in the last decade or
SO.l The origin of this interest lies in the enormous reform challenges that
the countries of what used to be called the Second and Third Worlds, that
is, the former communist countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union
"Many helpful discussions with Gaute Torsvik are gratefully acknowledged. I would
also like to thank seminar participants at the Norwegian School of Economics and Business
Administration, in particular my discussant Bertil Tungodden, for useful comments.
1A good review of the scholarly debate is provided by Tommasi and Velasco (1995).
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and the developing countries of Latin America, Africa, and Asia, have faced.
With the onset of the debt crisis, the latter group of countries suddenly
faced not only the policy prescriptions of the IMF with respect to short-term
macroeconomic management, which have always been politically contentious,
but also increasingly insistent recommendations from the Fund, the World
Bank, and bilateral aid donors about what set of policies would facilitate
long-term economic development. Increasingly, such recommendations had
to be at least nominally heeded if external funding (whether concessional or
commercial) was to be provided. The debate on conditionality and struc-
tural adjustment in the developing countries was heated from the start, and
still reverberating when the end of the Cold War suddenly threw the former
communist countries into a reform process of even more far-reaching conse-
quence than the one facing developing countries in their efforts to open up
their economies and tilt the balance between state and market towards the
latter.
The merits of policy conditionality in inducing actual and lasting policy
changes are not too impressing.' This has lead some observers to emphasise
the importance of "ownership" of reform programmes, i.e., that develop-
ing country governments are committed to reforms because they voluntarily
choose this set of policies. A corollary of this view is that only reforms that
are wanted by these governments will be chosen and sustained. Non-adoption
of reforms is thus a consequence of the lack of political "will" and this kind
of will is all it takes to change economic policy-making in a country.
Another common observation on economic policy reforms in developing
countries is that governments of countries in seemingly identical economic po-
sitions often choose rather different policies. Economic" crisis" is frequently
seen as an agent of policy change, but what constitutes a "crisis" seem to
vary widely from country to country," That is, some governments choose
to reform while others hang on to their old ways even though the economic
impetus for change looks roughly the same. While it is perhaps debatable
whether there is a consensus regarding economic policies as some have ar-
gued (Williamson 1994), many economists at least broadly agree upon a
number of macroeconomic, fiscal, trade, and industrial policy issues. It is
then tempting - especially for economists - to argue that the procrastinators
2For a review of the experience with conditionality in World Bank programmes, see
Mosley, Harrigan, and Toye (1991). Killick (1995) performs the same type of analysis
with respect to the IMF.
3Krueger (1993) is among those who have commented on this phenomenon.
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for some reason - whether ignorance or self-interest - lack the will to "do
the right thing". However, others have countered that at least in the short
run, mainstream policy prescriptions impose hardships on large sectors of the
populace. Because of this, the social and political stability of poor countries
adopting them will be endangered. Moreover, any change in policies harms
those who have benefited from previous policies (particular with respect to
trade and regulation). These "vested interests" will not stand idly by when
their privileges are threatened. Indeed, in some case they will simply "veto"
any change. Thus, even governments who acknowledge the need for reform
will not be able to pursue such policy changes because of the negative polit-
ical repercussions. In this view, "political power" is the sole determinant of
reform adoption by developing country governments. And this explains why
similar economic conditions do not yield similar political responses: differ-
ences in political power. Those who have it do reform, those who do not do
not.
Clearly, which of these views are correct has important implications for
conditionality and external financing of reform efforts." As argued next, one
would also expect them to make a major difference to the way in which private
economic agents evaluate announcements of reforms (or the lack thereof), and
thus for the successfulness of incipient reforms in inducing investment and
growth. In turn, this will feed back on the political fate of the reforms.
2 Commitment and Credibility in Economic
Reforms
While economic reforms are initiated, adopted, and implemented by politi-
cians and bureaucrats, it is the response of private sector agents that deter-
mines their success in inducing economic growth. Particularly important in
this regard are the reactions of investors, whether domestic or foreign. These
reactions will to a large extent be determined by the credibility of the re-
forms. If reforms are not credible, the response of investors will be hesitant,
totally lacking, or even destabilising. Investment will not be forthcoming
and capital will not flow in from abroad to take opportunity of the new poli-
cies. Uncertainty about the durability of the new policy regime might even
40f course, these views are not always made explicit in the literature, and for the sake
of argument I have stylised them into to polarised positions.
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engender macroeconomic instability. An example is speculation in durable
goods imports in connection with a less than fully credible trade liberalisa-
tion. When the economy does not pick up or even deteriorates after reforms
have been adopted, the short-term sacrifices that usually are required of (at
least parts of) the populace will not seem worthwhile. This will jeopardise
the reforms politically, and backtracking or reversals of policies might en-
sue. Thus, politico-economic reform circles might be vicious: if credibility is
wanting, investment and growth will be disappointing, leading to a political
backlash that fulfils the expectations of investors. On the other hand, the
same kind of logic can also lead to virtuous circles if private sector agents
initially find reforms credible. When the economic response is positive, the
population at large is more likely to find that the reforms benefit them too,
something which creates political support for the reforms. Therefore, they
are likely to be sustained, once again fulfilling initial expectations of policy
durability.
The debate over the role of political will and political power in economic
reform naturally has implications for the credibility of reforms. If will is all
that matters for the decision on adopting reforms, private agents will be busy
trying to estimate the "will" to sustain reforms possessed by governments
announcing such policies. If the will is estimated to be "weak", credibility
will be low. However, if political power is the sole determinant of reform
sustainability, the important data for potential investors is the sources and
strength of reform resistance in the economy. Then reform announcements
will scarcely be credible if powerful vested interests or the population at large
is believed to prefer the status quo.
The problem with both of these views is that they border on the tanto-
logical. If reforms are not implemented, it is because the government lacked
the requisite will. Implementation is thus a result of willingness to reform.
Likewise, the contrarian position holds that the observation of non-adoption
of reforms implies that the government did not have the political power nec-
essary to carry them out. But these simplistic positions will not do. If
we equate non-adoption and powerlessness, it becomes impossible to dis-
tinguish would-be reformers constrained by circumstance from governments
who are wedded to the status quo. And this distinction is clearly important.
While the latter type of government never would instigate change, the former
would if given more political room to manoeuvre. Hence, if for instance the
electorate became more pro-reform, we could observe that a set of reforms
previously stalled suddenly became public policy if the government favoured
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it, but not if it really sought to perpetuate the original policy stance.
One might then wish to conclude that political will is a necessary but not
sufficient condition for reforms. It would follow that observing the adoption
of reforms would allow us to conclude that the government consisted of true
reformers. Even this might be too simplistic, though. It could be that either
political or economic inducements could tempt the wolves of the status quo
into posing as the lambs of reforms. An example of the former would be the
reverse of the re-election constraint pictured above: a strongly pro-reform
electorate could force anti-reform politicians into hiding to stay in office. Or,
as in Rodrik (1989), external financing conditioned on reforms could induce a
government lacking in true will to adopt new policies with an eye to cashing
in before reversing the reforms.
What I want to argue therefore is that it is important to distinguish
between the preferences of politicians, i.e., will, and the constraints they
face in choosing policies. One type of constraints, which will be the focus
of this paper, are political. It seems plausible that sometimes these could be
so tight that true reformers have to settle for less. If persisting in adopting
reforms leads to the fall of the government with the reform opposition taking
its place, the act seems rather futile. Likewise, if serious social unrest will
result from starting the reform process, the purpose of the reforms could
easily be defeated. Both these types of political resistance to reform could
lead investors to conclude that the policies are doomed or at least lower the
credibility of them as their expected longevity becomes shorter or less certain.
ABargued above, such a lack of credibility will often be enough to jeopardise
the intended effects of the change in policies.
Another type of constraints facing policy-makers are economic. An ex-
ample of such constraints are world market conditions. ABthe governments
of many developing countries rely heavily on taxation of international trade,
these could severely constrain the fiscal position of the government. Or they
could be highly volatile, which in an open economy could transplant into
great uncertainty about the outcomes produced by economic policies. How-
ever, I will analyse more closely one economic constraint that we have already
touched upon, namely external financing. External financing can be either
on concessional or commercial terms. I will concern myself with the latter.
A third category of constraints is administrative. Consideration of them
forces a distinction between the adoption and implementation of economic
policies. For the most part policies are adopted by politicians and imple-
mented by bureaucrats. These two types of.actors might have different goals,
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and asymmetries in expertise and information are likely to prevent a com-
plete reconciliation of these through contractual means. Therefore, ignoring
the distinction between policy adoption and implementation might lead to
serious errors for observers trying to predict or estimate the link between
policies and economic outcomes. AB argued by Grindle and Thomas (1991),
there is reason to believe that the discrepancies between the policies chosen
by the politicians and the actual policy stance of the government are par-
ticularly large in low-income countries because the implementation stage of
the policy process is more politicised there." A lack of technical capacity
might add to this problem. Still, I shall stick to the traditional ways of the
literature on economic policy and equate adoption and implementation. This
will allow me to focus on the distinction between political will and political
power, which is my main concern here.
The separation of preferences and the external environment outlined here
of course resembles any other game-theoretic approach to economic policy-
making." Substantively, it mirrors the distinction made by Drazen and Mas-
son (1994) between the credibility of a policy-maker and the credibility of the
policies chosen. The first notion of credibility relates to perceptions about
his preferences, the second to consequences of the policies given the economic
environment in which they are adopted. Their model is a variant of the Barra-
Gordon monetary policy game set in an open economy. Politicians trade off
inflation and unemployment, but they feel differently about this trade-off:
some of them value reductions in inflation (which through the Phillips-curve
come at the cost of an increase in unemployment) more strongly than others.
Exactly what the preferences of the current policy-makers are is not known
ex ante by private agents though. In their setting, inflation equals currency
depreciation. The policy issue is whether to stick with a fixed exchange rate
regime or undertake a devaluation of a given size. A credible defender of the
exchange rate is one who is perceived by wage setters to be strongly con-
cerned about inflation. One would expect not devaluing in the first period
to increase the policy-maker's credibility, i.e., wage setters' estimate of the
probability that the policy-maker is "tough" on inflation. However, there is
persistence in unemployment. This means that the trade-off between unem-
ployment and inflation becomes more severe in the next period if there is
no devaluation in the first. Therefore, a policy of not devaluing in period
5See Hagen (1999a) for an attempt at explaining "implementation gaps".
6See Persson and Tabellini (1990) for a general discussion of this approach.
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Ione could actually lower the credibility of the fixed exchange rate in period
two even though private economic agents believe the policy-maker is putting
a relatively high weight on the costs of inflation compared to the costs of
unemployment. If wage setters believe that there is a high probability of
devaluation in period two, wage increases would be correspondingly higher
and this would make devaluation a more tempting option for any type of
policy-maker. Hence, by not devaluing in period one, even the staunchest
defender of fixed exchange rates might end up choosing to devalue later on
because he faces a less favourable economic trade-off. The analogy to the
reformer who risks losing power to the defenders of the status quo should be
clear.
In this paper, thence, the aim is to investigate the conditions under which
types of policy-makers who are differentially committed to reform pick similar
or separate policies. In particular, I would like to derive the impact of more or
less tightly binding political constraints on the decision on whether to adopt
reforms or not. Towards that end, I build a signalling game of policy-making
in a small, open economy in which governments are democratically elected. In
a separating equilibrium of this game - in which" reform" governments choose
policies different from those picked by governments favouring the status quo
- political will is the main determinant of reform efforts because governments
of different types pursue policies that correspond to their preferences. On the
other hand, in a pooling equilibrium, governments choose the same economic
policies even though their underlying stance on reform differs. Thus, in this
case the degree of political power affects governmental policy; a "binding"
political constraint forcing governments with contrarian positions on reform
to pool on the same policies. An important question is therefore under what
conditions (if any) these kinds of equilibria exist.
In the next section of this paper I spell out the economic and political
details of the model. Section 4 is spent on deriving optimal policies for a
given probability of re-election. This is a necessary precursor for the analysis
of the game proper. Various extensions are pursued in section 5, which is
followed by a discussion of what generalisations and extensions of the model
one ideally would like to make.
7
3 The Model
3.1 The Economics
In the economy, which is small and open, a single good is produced combining
land and labour in a constant returns to scale technology. Thus, we can write
production per worker in period t, Yt, as
where et is the land-labour ratio. I assume that labour is inelastically
supplied, each worker supplying one unit of labour per period, and that the
size of the labour force is constant. It is convenient to normalise the labour
force (which is also the total population and the electorate) to one. Thus,
per-capita and aggregate magnitudes are identical.
Because both factors are in fixed supply, output is constant. Therefore,
I omit time subscripts on Y from now on. All citizens are assumed to be
identical economically, so that we can restrict our attention to the behaviour
of a representative individual when it comes to the economics.
The macro good can be spent on private consumption, Ct and public
consumption, gt. The rates of transformation of output into these goods are
fixed at one.
The role of the public sector is to provide a collective good, or a publicly
provided private good which is supplied in equal amounts to every citizen,
through the funds raised by a proportional tax on private domestic income.
Private after-tax disposable income is used for private consumption. The
private sector budget constraint is thus
(2) (1 - Tt) Y = Ct,
where Tt is the tax rate. The public sector use the tax revenues and funds
raised through bond sales to foreigners to pay for public consumption and
the interest and principal due on debt inherited from the past: 7
(3)TtY + bt+1 = gt + (1+ r) bt.
7In sub-section 5.2, I analyse what happens if the government is credit-constrained
in international financial markets, as this was a reality facing many developing country
governments in the 1980s.
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bt is the public sector debt at the beginning of period t. r is the rate of
interest prevailing in the world capital market.
There are two periods. At the start of the first, the inhabitants of this
society inherits a stock of public debt. They are not allowed to leave any
debt at the end of the second period." Below, it will be convenient to have
expressions for the amount of resources which is available for spending on
private and public consumption. They are found by combining the private
and public budget constraints. Let eI>t denote this magnitude in period ti and
let eI> be the discounted value over the two periods. By (2) and (3) we have
(4a)eI>1 (b2) -
(4b )eI>2 (b2) -
(4c)eI> -
y + b2 - (1+ r) bl i
Y - (1+ r) b2i
eI>2 (b2) yeI>1 (b2) + = -1- + Y - (1+ r) bl.1+r +r
3.2 The Politics
All individuals h in this economy evaluate private versus public consumption
at time t according to a utility function of the following form:
Potential governments i (first period) and j (second period) have simi-
larly structured preferences." In other words, they are policy-motivated.l"
SEven though the time-inconsistency problem of public debt is likely to be the source
of the credit constraint, I assume it away because it is not my concern here.
9This specification is chosen because it eliminates the incentives policy-motivated gov-
ernments have to manipulate the level of debt (or any other state variable controlled) in
order to affect second-period policies. These incentives are well known - see e.g. Milesi-
Ferretti (1995), Persson and Svensson (1989), or Tabellini and Alesina (1990) - and are
also not particularly interesting in connection with the issue at hand. However, the results
can also be extended to the case where there are strategic incentives to manipulate the
public debt (see Appendix D). In addition, the homotheticity of preferences ensures that
the probability of an incumbent government being re-elected does not depend on first-
period policies other than through the voter beliefs these policies induce (see below). This
greatly simplifies the discussion.
10This can easily be extended to the case where they also put some weight purelyon
being in office, as long as the "gain from being in office" is not too high. For proof of this
claim, see Appendix E.
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For simplicity, we shall assume that there are only two potential types of gov-
ernments, pro-reform (R) and pro-status quo (8). The reform that we will
study below is a stylised depiction of "privatisation" or a scaling down of the
size of the public sector relative to the private sector.'! To some extent this
captures an important part of many structural adjustment programmes in
developing countries during the last decade and a half where the aim has been
to allow the market a greater role in the allocation of resources. This means
that a pro-reform government is taken to be one that puts greater relative
weight on private consumption than an anti-reform government: aR > as.
Needless to say, this approach glosses over a host of both economic and polit-
ical problems in connection with privatisation or deregulation. I also ignore
issues of economic stabilisation, which policy-makers in many cases have had
to deal with simultaneously with structural problems. Nevertheless, it allows
me to focus on the impact of political will versus political power in economic
reforms in a simple way while retaining an empirically relevant policy issue.
The political constraint on policy choice that we will investigate below
is the re-election constraint, i.e., voters' preferences over the trade-off be-
tween private and public consumption. The reason for this choice is that
empirically, it seems to have been the most important one in democracies.
Several studies of stabilisation and structural adjustment in developing coun-
tries during the 1980s conclude that "vested interests" have not played an
important part in determining whether reforms have been adopted or not.
This conclusion holds for both democracies and autocracies. For example,
Bates and Krueger (1993; page 455) conclude that" [o]ne of the most sur-
prising findings of our case studies is the degree to which the intervention
of interest groups fail to account for the initiation, or lack of initiation, of
policy reform." According to Haggard and Kaufman (1992; page 30): "[T]he
most important political influence on the willingness of state elites to ini-
tiate new adjustment policies was connected with changes of government
or political regime. Governments facing upcoming electoral challenges, not
surprisingly, have generally been reluctant to impose unpopular programs.
Incoming governments, by contrast, have capitalised on honeymoon periods
and the disorganization or discrediting of the opposition to launch ambitious
new reform initiatives." Hence, for our purposes, the restriction of attention
to the electoral constraint seems eminently defensible.P
11Hence, it can also be interpreted as a fiscal reform.
120f course, this restriction does not allow us to generalise the results to autocratic
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3.3 The Strategic Structure: Information and the Tim-
ing of Moves
The timing of events in this two-period world is the following:
Period 1:
1. "Nature" selects government type. Only government knows its type.
2. The government detennines the tax rate, public consumption and
public debt. The policies are observed by everyone.
3. Private consumption takes place.
~L
I Elections I
Period 2:
1. If a challenger has been elected, "nature" detennines its type.
2. The government decides on the tax rate and public consumption. Its
actions are publicly observable.
3. Private consumption takes place.
Figure 1: timing of moves
In each period, the government makes its policy decisions, and the private
sector's economic role is simply to consume after-tax disposable income.
While I assume that governments are policy-oriented, I shall not assume
that they are formed by political parties which are ideologically rigid. In
many developing countries, particularly in newly established democracies,
parties are not much more than labels on bottles with a fairly rapidly chang-
ing content. Therefore, voters cannot really be sure that they get what the
labels read before the elections. Also, there have been quite a few exam-
ples of surprise reformers, i.e., reformers representing parties or having a
regimes. And pressure groups could conceivably influence other aspects of reforms, e.g.
content or scope, which are not at issue here. It could also be that the temporal con-
junction of macroeconomic instability requiring stabilisation - a collective good - and
structural problems which invariably create the need for reforms with a concentrated im-
pact, allowed governments more leeway than they would otherwise have had. For example,
Rodrik (1994) believes that bundling macroeconomic stabilisation policies together with
trade liberalisation allowed governments to adopt the latter without much resistance from
the beneficiaries of protectionist policies. More generally, when macroeconomic crisis go
together with a host of structural problems, the net benefits to anyone group in society
of extensive reforms are difficult to determine. This point is emphasised by Nelson (1990),
who does not reach as strong conclusions about pressure group influence as the .authors
cited above.
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track-record suggesting that they would be anti-reform.P A prominent one
is president Carlos Menem of Argentina who belongs to the Peronist Party,
a party known for its statist proclivities. Still, Menem has embarked on a
far-reaching programme of privatisation.l"
The upshot of all this is that voters - and other agents - are assumed to
believe that any government might be a reform government. The probabil-
ity they attach to this happening ex ante is denoted by Il E (0,1). After
observing what a government does in office in period 1, this probability is
updated to p. The challenger facing the government in the election at the
end of this period is still valued according to ex ante estimates as no new
information about it has been revealed.P Thus, with respect to voters, the
government in office in period 1 has a first-mover advantage. It might choose
to reveal its identity or to hide it depending upon among other things which
of these strategies contribute the most to its re-election prospects. Voters use
first-period policies as data when reconsidering their beliefs about the govern-
ment's type. They then vote for the incumbent or the challenger according
to which one will give them the highest expected second-period utility.
A generic feature of large-scale elections is uncertainty about the outcome
because nobody knows for sure the way in which voters evaluate their options.
Here, we take this to imply that no-one knows the exact distribution of the
preference parameter in the electorate. In particular, the median of this
distribution - aM - is considered a random variable distributed according to
A (z). That is, A (z) = prob (aM :::;z). This cumulative distribution function
constitutes the common estimate used by all politicians to infer the likelihood
of the government staying put.
13Such changes in positions need not always signify opportunism as new information
about the "right" model of the economy is likely to change the merits of various policies
for all but the most extremist politician. See Cukierman and Tommasi (1998a,b) for a
theoretical explanation of surprise reformers.
14Another example which comes readily to mind is former president Perez of Venezuela,
who had been a traditional Latin American leftist politician before returning to office
in the late 1980s in a reformist mood. More examples can be found in Cukierman and
Tommasi (1998a,b).
15Actually, the number of challengers does not matter because they are all identical ex
ante in the eyes of both the electorate and the incumbent government. For convenience, I
will talk about the electoral opposition in the singular.
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4 Optimal Policies for a Given Probability of
Re-Election
4.1 Period 2 Policies
There are two constraints on the choice of period 2 policies, the private
budget constraint C2 = (1 - 72) y, and the appropriate specification of (3),
the government's budget constraint (notably, no outgoing stock of public
debt). There are therefore only two policy instruments in period 2, and
through the budget constraint the level of one of them is determined by
the level chosen for the other. We can combine the private and the public
budget constraints into the aggregate resource constraint <1>2 (b2) = C2 + 92,
and let the government choose public consumption. This determines private
consumption as well.
AB there are no more elections, there is nothing to hide. A government
of type j thus chooses public consumption to maximise its second period
utility (the appropriate version of (5)) given available resources. As shown
in Appendix A, the optimal levels of public and private consumption in period
2 are'"
(6a)~* (b2) - 0/<1>2 (b2) ;
(6b)9~* (b2) - (1- ai) <1>2 (b2) .
Naturally, the optimal levels of consumption depend on the debt inher-
ited from period 1. Note, though, that the optimal distribution of resources
between private and public consumption does not depend on the amount of
resources available. This is due to the homotheticity of the objective func-
tion.
4.2 Voter Behaviour
We are now in a position to derive voter h's indirect utility contingent on a
government of type j being in office in period 2; write this as V2h (b2; j) =
U (~* (b2) ,rA* (b2)). On the basis of this, we can find the set of voters H who
are indifferent between re-electing the incumbent government and electing the
16For the sake of completeness, note that this implies that 1{* (b2) = 1- ai [<I>2~b2)].
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challenger. These voters have a weight on the utility of private consumption
satisfying
Rewriting this, we get
We see that if p = /-L, this identity is satisfied no matter what the indirect
utilities under the different government types are. In other words, all voters
are indifferent between incumbent and challenger in this case because the
probability of a reform policy is the same regardless of which government is
elected. In a pooling equilibrium, where both types of governments choose
the same policy in period 1, voters get no new information on the incumbent's
type and so p = /-L. With all voters being indifferent, we can without loss of
generality assume that they toss a fair coin to decide their ballot decision.
Therefore, the probability of the incumbent being re-elected is 1/2 in this
case.
If on the other hand p =f:. /-L, (7)' is satisfied if and only if the term in
brackets is equal to zero. Straightforward algebra then reveals the indifferent
voter's weight on private consumption to be
It is possible to show that aH lies between aR and as (see Appendix A).
All individuals with an a smaller than aH prefers an S-government to
an R-government. Those whose weight on the utility of private consumption
exceeds that of the indifferent voter have the reverse preference ordering over
governments. Voters vote for their most preferred alternative. A government
of type j will be re-elected if at least half the voters prefer it to the alterna-
tive. The crux of the matter is that no-one knows for certain which type of
government the majority of the voters prefer. This means that in separating
equilibria, where the government reveals its type, the probability of being
re-elected is perceived to be (once again abusing notation slightly)
(9) isep = { prob (aH < aMl = 1- A (aH) ,i = Riq - prob (aH ~ aM = A (aH) ,i = S.
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Of course, these probabilities must sum to one: qRsep + qSsep = 1. The
behaviour of voters as a function of their preferences and beliefs about the
incumbent's type is depicted in figure 2.
All voters for which ah E (o,a" ) vote
for the incumbent if p = O and for the
challenger if p = 1.That is, they rank
governments in the following order: i) S-
type; ii) Ex ante average; iii) R-type.
All voters for which ah E (aH ,1)
vote for the challenger if p = O and
for the incumbent if p = 1.That is,
they rank governments in the
following order: i) R-type; ii) Ex
ante average; iii) S-type.
o
Figure 2: voter behaviour given preferences and beliefs
It follows that the probability of retaining power does not depend on
first-period policies in other ways than through which type of equilibrium is
played. As noted above, the probability is 1/2 in a pooling equilibrium; it
can be more or less than that in a separating equilibrium, but that depends
only on which type you are. Either the populace is perceived to be pro-reform
(qRsep > 1/2 > qSsep ), possibly giving the proponents of the status quo an
incentive to mimic the reformers, or it is the other way around, giving them
the upper hand.
4.3 Period 1 Policies When the Government Is Not
Credit-Constrained
Let 'Tri (q, p,) be the probability that the preferences of a type i incumbent is
decisive for the choice of period 2 policies when the probability of re-election
is estimated to be q. This is the probability that the government is re-elected
plus the probability that it is not times the probability that a challenger is
of the same type:
(10) i ( ) {q + (1 - q) p" i = R;
'Tr q, P, = q + (1 - q)(l - p,) ,i = S. .
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First I derive optimal policies for a given probability of re-election. Using
(4a) and (6a - b), the expected discounted utility of a type i first-period
government as a function of its choice of period 1policies and the probabilities
q and J.l can be written as
(l1)ni (Cb gb b2; q, J.l) = ei In [CPI (b2) - gl] + (1- li) lngl + 8Wi (b2; q, J.l)
where Wi (b2; q, J.l) = 7("i (q, J.l) Vd (b2; i) + [1 - 7("i (q, J.l)] Vd (b2; m) , i, m =
R, S, i =f m is i's expected indirect period 2 utility and 8 ~ "8 is the discount
factor .17 The optimal levels of gl and b2 for a type i incumbent given q and
J.l are then found by maximising (11). Substituting these results into the
private and public budget constraints gives us the optimal levels of private
consumption and the tax rate respectively (see Appendix A):
(12a)b2 - \lIcp - [y - (1+ r) bl] ;
(12b)gi* - (1- 0/) \lICP;
(12c)T~* [ ai \licP l.- 1- -- ,
Y
(12d)c~* - ai \licP .
\li = I!O can be interpreted as the optimal share of total consumable
resources that is spent in period 1. This fraction is the same for both types.
In the following, I will speak of the these policies as the "first-best" policies
of type i. Note that these are the choices that i would have made if its
type were known by voters since q = qisep is obviously a special case of an
environment in which the probability of being re-elected is fixed. Also note
that the optimal solutions do not depend on the probability of i's preferences
determining period 2 policies.l" However, the expected two-period indirect
utility will of course depend on q. This maximum-value function is defined
as Wi (q, J.l) = ni (cl*, g1*, b2; q, J.l). This function plays an important role
in determining what policies will emerge in equilibrium of the policy game
between pro- and anti-reform governments because it is always possible for
type i to choose its first-best policies as given by (12), accept the probability
17The restriction on the discount factor is to a numberno less than one (see below).
18InAppendix D, it is shown that all of the results derived in the main text extend to
the case Wi = Wi (q, J-L), when in general wR (q, J-L) =P WS (q, J-L).
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of re-election induced by this choice, and get the corresponding level of utility
Wi (q, IL). This is Lemma 1:
Lemma 1:
No type can do worse than in the case where choosing its first-best policies
lead voters to believe that it is the type with an electoral disadvantage.
4.4 Period 1 Policies When the Government Is Credit-
Constrained
Suppose that the government is credit-constrained; its end-of-period debt
cannot exceed B < b2. It should be fairly obvious that for a given prob-
ability of re-election, the optimal policies for a type i first-period govern-
ment are {ai4ll (B) , (1 - ai) 4ll (B) ,B}. That is, being credit-constrained,
i will borrow as much as possible. It will then distribute available. resources
between private and public consumption (by way of the tax rate) in the
"first-best" manner. The maximum-value function is now r;yi (q, IL,B) =
ni (c{*, gi* , B; q, IL). Since ni (Cl, gl, b2;q, IL) is a strictly concave function of
bz, r;yi (q, IL, B) ~ Wi (q, IL), with equality only at B = b2. We are now fully
equipped to study the signalling game between different types of governments
and voters.
5 Reforming the Economy in Dire Straits and
in Times of Plenty
5.1 In Times of Plenty: To Reform OrNot To Reform?
For the sake of illustration, suppose that the incumbent government wants
reforms, but voters are favourably disposed towards the status quo: qSsep >
1/2 > qRsep.19 Would the reformers be willing to forego the opportunity to
pursue their optimal policies in period 1 in order to increase the probability
that they are in power in period 2 and thus can implement reforms then?
More precisely, would a type R government be willing to choose the optimal
policies of S-government in order to hide its identity from voters and thereby
get the higher probability of re-election that S has?
19All the results in this and the next section generalise to the case where an S-
government is in power in period 1 and/or voters are pro-reform (see the Appendix).
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Suppose that voters hold the followingbeliefs: If they observe {cr*, gr*, b2}
in the first period, p = O;otherwise p = 1. That is, unless the government
pursues the first-best policies of a status quo government, voters believe it is
a reform government.
If it chooses the optimal policies of S, an R-government gets a utility
of nR kcf*,9r*, b2; qSsep, fl). If it stubbornly sticks to its reform policies, it
gets w (qRsep, fl), and given the beliefs of voters, this is the best it can do
if it chooses not to mimic S. Equating these, we find a critical value of the
discount factor such that for all discount factors lower than this, it is not
worthwhile for R to hide its true type from voters by posing as S:
Proposition 1
There exists a critical value of the discount factor
-sR (Ssep ) _ 1 > 1
q ,fl - (2qSsep - 1)(1- fl) - .
such that for 8 ~ -sR (qSsep, fl), R at least weakly prefers choosing {cf* ,gf* , b2}
to choosing {cf*, gr* , b2} even if the latter induces voters to believe it is S
and the former course of action reveals its identity. This critical value has
the following properties:
2
2 < O;(2qSsep - 1) (1- fl)
1
---------,::'2 > O;
(2qSsep - 1) (1 - fl)
-R S 1
- 00; lim 8 (q sep, fl) = --;
qksep-+I 1- fl
1 ;lim -sR (qSsep, fl) = 00.
2qSsep - 1 IL-+I
Proof: See Appendix B.
In sum, the lower the probability that the challenger is of type R and the
greater the electoral advantage of S (i.e., the higher is qSsep),20 the lower the
20To be more precise, the electoral advantage that S has is qSsep _ qRsep = qSsep -
(1- qSsep) = 2qSsep -1, which is increasing in qSsep• Because the cut-off rate is decreasing
in the electoral advantage, it is decreasing in the probability that S is re-elected if its
identity is revealed.
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critical value of the discount factor, that is, the lower the weight that must
be placed on future outcomes if S is to be able to separate out by choosing
its first-best policies.
Corollary 1:
When none of the types has an electoral advantage, the first-best policies
become dominant strategies for both types, i.e., { {cf.*,gf_*, b2} , { cf*, gf*, b2} }
is the only equilibrium.
Proof: The critical value goes to infinity as qSsep ---+ !.
In the special case where qSsep = != qRsep, none of the types has an
electoral advantage if their types are known by the electorate." Obviously,
there is then no incentive for any type of government to deviate from its
first-best policies in order to reveal its identity; nor is there any incentive
for a government to deviate from its first-best policies with an eye to hiding
its true type. In other words, the first-best policies are dominant strategies
for both types. Therefore, voters should upon seeing R's first-best policies
realise that the incumbent is of type R, and they should believe that they
are facing an S-incumbent if first-period policies equal those preferred by
S. Whatever voters believe if they for some reason observe a set of policies
different from these two, S and R will play {cf_*, gf_*, b2} and {cf*, gf* , b2}
respectively.
In the more interesting cases where qSsep =J !{::}qRsep =J !'which we will
be studying in the rest of the paper, we have
Corollary 2:
AB the probability that the challenger is of type R goes to one, the first-
best policies become dominant strategies for both types, i.e.,
{ { cf_*, gf_*, b2} , { cf* ,gf* , b2} }
is the only equilibrium.
Proof: The cut-off rate goes to infinity as /-L ---+ 1.
ABthe probability of the challenger being of the same type as oneself goes
to one, a first-period government of type i becomes certain that next period
policies are determined by a government with preferences identical to its own
whether it loses or wins the election (c.f. (10): 7rR (q, 1) = 7rs (q, O) = 1). This
also makes choosing its first-best policies a dominant strategy. Therefore, if
this happens to R, S is free to choose its first-best policies too. Of course, this
is a "limit result" in the sense that the game ceases to be a signalling game if
the probability of the government being of type R goes to one, because then
21This would happen in the unlikely case where A (aM) = A (aH) = ~.
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the probability of the government being of type S goes to zero; i.e., there is
no uncertainty about the government's identity. However, if we had assumed
that the voters ex ante believed that a newly elected government in period t
was of type R with probability J.Lt E (0,1), the result would continue to hold
with respect to J.L2. That is, as J.L2 approached zero (one), implying that the
probability that the challenger is of type R goes to one (zero), the first-best
policies of S (R) would become its dominant strategy. The driving force
behind this result is of course the assumption that governments are purely
policy-motivated and not at all interested in political power per se. Hence,
the result would not hold if this assumption was relaxed.
Remark 1:
When qSsep < 1, 8R (qSsep, J.L) > 1. That is, as long as the type with an
electoral advantage is not guaranteed to win the election if its type is revealed
to voters, more weight must be put on the outcomes of the second period
if the simple separating equilibrium where both types choose their first-best
policies is to be upset. With a positive rate of time preference, this can only
happen if period 2 is longer than period 1. This situation arises because of
the simple fact that the gain to R from being in power in period 2 instead of
Sis thesame as the loss from choosing the optimal policies of S in period 1.
However, the gain is uncertain. Mimicking S increases the probability that
R's preferences determine period 2 policies. But as long as .qSsep < 1, the
gain is not guaranteed even if R successfully fools the voters. The challenger
might win, and the challenger might have the same kind of preferences as
S. On the other hand, the challenger might be identical to R. This weakens
its incentives to mimic S even if this act ensures an electoral victory; being
purely office-motivated, R does not mind if an identical challenger wins the
election instead of himself.P
For some parameter values, there might exist pooling equilibria. That is,
there might be Perfect Bayesian Equilibria in which both types of government
choose the same policies in period 1, making the incumbent indistinguishable
22Hence, if there are "gains from being in office" over and above the gain from being able
to determine policies, the incentives to mimick would be greater. And the greater these
gains, or the greater the weight attatched to these relative to the policy objectives, the
lower the critical value of the discount factor ensuring the existence of a simple separating
equilibrium. In Appendix E I prove that there is a critical value of the" gains from being
in office", K, such that for K, S; 'K, the results derived here go through, and show that K is
increasing in the weight attached to ideology and in the probability that the type with an
electoral advantage wins the election.
20
from the challenger in the eyes of the voter. However, these equilibria do not
survive the elimination of weakly dominant strategies for R. Because R is
at the most indifferent between separating out and mimicking B even if the
latter course of action successfully fool voters into thinking it is B, choosing
{ cf* ,gf* , b2} is at least weakly dominated for R as lang as s ::;"8R (qSsep, J1,) •{cf* , gf* , b2} is of course not dominated for B since wS (qSsep, J1,) is the highest
level of utility that is attainable for it given voter preferences. Thus, we have
Proposition 2
For s < "8R (qSsep, J1,), there is a unique pure-strategy Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium of the policy game in non-dominated strategies in which both
types choose their first-best policies.
Corollary 3
There are no mixed-strategy equilibria.
The conclusion is thus strong: it is indeed only political will that matters
for reform choice.
5.2 To Reform or not to ReformWhen in Dire Straits
AB mentioned in the introduction, the governments of many developing coun-
tries had difficulties obtaining private credit in the decade of the debt crisis.
On the face of it, it seems likely that this could upset an equilibrium of the
type described in the last section, because a government constrained in its
actions can not get as high a level of utility from its "second-best" policies
as it can from its "first-best" policies, and, generally, it will be lower. This
could presumably tempt a -government with an electoral disadvantage into
mimicking the other type of government because the cost of doing so in terms
of moving away from its optimal period 1 policies is lower.
However, the results of the last section immediately suggest that this in-
tuition is wrong. The political conflict is over the distribution of resources
between public and private consumption. Both types want the same in-
tertemporal distribution of resources, so restricting this distribution to some
inoptimallevel does not change the bottom line: It is not optimal to forsake
the opportunity to determine the distribution between private and public
consumption in period 1 in exchange for an increase in the probability that
one's own kind of preferences determine the allocation in period 2.
In fact, the result is even stronger than this, because, as shown in the ap-
pendix, it generalises to the case where the two types of government in general
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want different intertemporal distributions of resources. These differences in
"first-best" policies are derived from the underlying primary dimension of
political conflict, and are thus of second-order importance. Therefore, unless
future outcomes are accorded disproportionate weight, no government wants
to exchange the certainty of having an "optimal" ratio of private to public
consumption today for an increase in the likelihood that tomorrow's ratio is
"optimal" .
6 Summary, Extensions, and Concluding Re-
marks
In this paper, it has been shown that, under a wide range of circumstances,
whether or not policy reforms are chosen by governments depends only on
the preferences of these governments. Thus, somewhat surprisingly, a strong
conclusion is that the political power of the government does not matter, at
least not when power is interpreted as electoral strength. In light of this, the
emphasis presently placed on ownership by IFIs and bilateral donors seems
warranted.
There are of course severallimitations of the present analysis. However,
given the conclusions of the empiricalliterature cited in sub-section 3.2, I do
not believe that the specific representation of political power lies behind the
weak showing of the power hypothesis here. I would also argue against any
claims as to the irrelevance of the democratic framework for the analysis.
Admittedly, many developing countries are still "democratic infants", but
it is not clear that this would bias the conclusions derived here in one way
or the other. Moreover, the recent democratic wave in low-income countries
implies that a democratic framework is becoming even more relevant to the
study of reform choices in these countries.
In my view, there are three important limitations of the model used here:
i) the exogeneity of the economy; ii) the one-to-one correspondence between
political preferences and reforms; and iii) the equation of policy choice and
policy implementation. The untenability of the latter standard assumption
was discussed in section 2, so here it suffices to note that it is not obvious
that distinguishing between the adoption of reforms and their implementation
will change the conclusions derived here. That "vested" interests probably
are more likely to succeed in trying to prevent the implementation of reforms
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than their adoption would not seem to imply that reform governments should
not pursue them (except possibly for the futility of the task).23
I therefore conclude by way of commenting on i) and ti) in the reverse or-
der. In the model, I assume that "first-best" policies followdirectly from pref-
erences. Therefore, a reform is simply the difference between the "first-best"
policies of what is defined to be "reform" and "status-quo" governments. It
is clearly possible to derive conditions under which even "status-quo" gov-
ernments would choose reforms in the sense of changing their policies, say
with exogenous changes in the state of the economy. I do not think that
this would add much to the current subject. Moreover, the more interesting
aspects of the impact of more complex environments on policy reforms have
already been analysed. In section 2, I mentioned the work of Cukierman
and Tommasi (1998a,b), in which optimal policies depend on the state of
the world regardless of ideology. However, governments are more likely to
succeed in convincing the electorate of the need for reform when their basic
policy preferences are more in line. A reform could thus be adopted simply
because a new government which is closer ideologically to the mainstream of
the electorate comes to power; conversely, the status-quo could be perpetu-
ated because voters remain unconvinced about the need for reform. In an-
other important paper, Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) investigates a different
aspect of uncertain links between policies and outcomes, namely, uncertain
individual-specific benefits from reform. That is, if individuals are uncertain
whether they will benefit from a reform, the support for such reforms might
be lower than if the distribution of benefits was known. This holds even if
it is known that in the aggregate, expected net benefits are positive. This
gives rise to a status quo bias: there are reforms that would have commanded
a majority of votes ex post (after the outcome has materialised) which will
never be adopted because of the ex ante individual-specific uncertainty.
In sum, I think the main way to go is to add more economic structure
to the model by making income endogenous. The most important change
would be to allow for investment in fixed capital in the economy in question
- as noted in section 2, the credibility of reforms is intimately linked with
23The reason why in my opinion it seems more reasonable to expect "vested" interests
to succeed at the implementation stage than at the choice stage, is that collective action
problems are likely to be much smaller at the former stage. This is because there will be
both fewer competitors and fewer individuals who must be "persuaded" in implementation,
since the groups can focus on the agency charged with implementing the specific partes) of
the reforms in which they are interested. I intend to pursue this matter in future research.
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investment since investment is the key to raising growth. However, prelimi-
nary analysis indicate that if investment by the private sector is added to the
current model, it becomes very complex; optimal debt policies would depend
on investment because investment distributes resources across time, while in-
vestment would depend on debt policies because the public debt determines
the period 2 tax rate, and so on. Most likely, therefore, one would have to
simplify in other dimensions, say, by excluding public debt. It would also be
interesting to consider carefully the link between policies, investment, and
another source of external financing: foreign aid. In a well-known paper, Ro-
drik (1989) concludes that a donor which conditions his assistance on reforms
might "force" a reform government to choose more extreme policies than it
would otherwise have chosen. The reason is that a government which does
not want reforms is then more inclined to temporarily hide its true stripes in
order to collect the aid. If it does so, the possibility of reform reversal arises,
with adverse consequences for private investment. However, in that paper,
the giving of aid is not modelled, and, as mentioned in the introduction, the
problems connected with conditionality have proved to be very real. There-
fore, studying the strategic interaction of donors and recipients is necessary
if one is to derive reasonable conclusions. A first stab at such an analysis is
made by Hagen (1999b), but that model too should be extended to allow for
endogenous private economic activity.
It remains to be seen whether such extensions would affect the main
conclusion of this paper, namely, that in both "good" and "bad" times, it
takes political will to reform existing policies.
7 Appendix A
7.1 Policy Choice as a Decision Problem
7.1.1 Optimal Period 2 Policies
A type j period 2 government wants to choose the tax rate and public con-
sumption to maximise
(A1)Uj (C2' 92) = aj lnc,+ (1- aj) ln92
subject to the constraints
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(A3)r2Y = 92 + (1+ r) b2·
Combining the constraints and inserting the result in (AI), we have a
maximisation problem in one variable only. If this variable is 92, the result
is the following first-order condition:
(A4) 8Ui (~*, 9~*) =
892
ai l-ai----,.-. + . = O,
4>2(b2) - rA* 9~*
from which the optimal period 2 level of public consumption is derived.
The resulting private consumption level is found either by substituting the
solution to (A4) into the public budget constraint to find the optimal tax
rate and using the result to deduce private consumption; or by plugging the
result directly into the overall resource constraint of the economy. Carrying
out these steps leads to the following optimal policies and corresponding
private consumption:
(A5a)~* (b2) - (1- ai) 4>2 (b2) ;
(A5b)~* (b2) - 1- ai [4>2 ~b2)] ;
(A5c)~* (b2) - ai4>2 (b2) .
The second derivative of the objective function is
82Ui (~*,9~*) [ai 1- ai](A6) 2 = - 2 + 2 < o.
8 (92) (4)2(b2) - 92) (92)
Hence, the second-order condition for an optimum is fulfilled. Note that as
the objective function is globally concave, we have found a unique optimum.
All the variables in (A5) are functions of the level of resources available
in period 2 and thus of the public debt carried over to that period. As
a4>;~b:!) = _ (1 + r), it is easily seen that the comparative statics are
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The indirect utility of a type i period 1 government when a type j period
2 government chooses policy is
(A8)V; (b2;j) _ ti: (G{*,g~*) = ailnaicI>2 (b2) + (1- ai) In (1- aj) cI>2(b2)
- ai Inaj + (1 - ai) In (1 - aj) + IncI>2(b2)
- 'TJij + IncI>2(b2) ; i, j = R, S.
Note that since aR =1= as and the optimal policy choice for each type is a
unique, it follows that 'TJRR > 'TJRS and 'TJss > 'TJSR. In other words, for all b2
such that cI>2(b2) > 0, ~R (b2; R) > ~R (b2; S) and ~s (b2; S) > ~s (b2; R).
Because a higher debt level means that there is less to spend on private
and public consumption in period 2, the derivative of (A8) with respect to
is negative:
This is just another way of stating that the marginal utility of income is
positive in each possible future state (åa'l;~~~~)> O;i, j = R, S ). Also note
that first-period governments Rand S evaluate increases in bz identically.
7.1.2 Expected Period 2 Utility
The expected period 2 utility of a type i period 1 government is
(AlO)Wi (b2; q, p,) - qV; (b2; i) + (1 - q) [P,l1 (b2; R) + (1 - p,) vd (b2; S)]
{
[q + (1 - q) p,] ~R (b2; R) + (1 - q) (1 - p,) ~R (b2; S) ,i = R;
- [q + (1 - q) (1 - p,)] ~s (b2; S) + (1 - q) p,~s (b2; R) ,i = S.
Define the probability that the preferences of a period 1 government of
type i is decisive in period 2 as
i { q + (1 - q) p" i= R;
(All)7r (q,p,) = q + (1- q) (1- p,), i = S.
We can then rewrite (A2.1) as
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(AlO)'Wi (b2; q, JL) - 7ri (q, JL) vd (b2; i) + [1 - 7ri (q, JL)] vd (b2; m)
- {7ri (q, JL) 17ii + [1 - 7ri (q, JL)] 17im} + In«P2 (b2)
- E~ (17; q, JL) + In«P2 (b2) ; i, m = R, S; i =I- m
where E is the expectations operator. AB for the effect of changes in q
and JL on expected utility, first note that
(A12a) a7ri~:, JL) _
(A12b) a7ri (q, JL) _
aJL
{
l - JL > O, i = R;
JL> O,i = S
{
1- q > ° i= R·
- (1 -=-q) '_::;O, i ' S
That is, an increase in the probability of winning the election always in-
creases the probability that the preferences of the first period government
are decisive in period 2 as well (remember that we assume that JL E (0,1)).
If a government of type i wins the election, it is certain that its preferences
will determine period 2 policies. While this probability is positive even if it
loses the election, it is smaller. Therefore, a type i government gains from
becoming more certain to continue in power. Naturally, while an increase in
the probability that the period 2 government is of type R increases the prob-
ability that the preferences of a first period government of type R are decisive
in period 2, it decreases this probability for a type S period 1 government.
Figure AI: properties of 7ri (q, JL) with respect to q
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We have sign [7rR (q, Il) - 7rs (q, Il)] = sign (Il- !). Hence, as long as
Il "# !'7rR (q, Il) "# 7rs (q, Il)' Also note that 7rR (1, Il) = 7rR (q, 1) = 7rs (q, O)=
7rs (1, Il) = 1. Some examples are given in figures Al and A2.
Figure A2: properties of 7ri (q, Il)with respect to Il
>From (AlO)',
(A13)åW
i
(b2; q, Il) = åE~ (ry; q, Il) = ii _ im > O: . = R S '"#
å7ri (q, Il) å7ri (q, Il) ry ry ,1" m ,,1, m.
That is, an increase in the probability that your type of preferences de-
termines period 2 policies increases your expected utility. Hence, the signs
of the derivatives of expected utility with respect to q and Il are the same as
the signs of the derivatives of 7ri (q, Il) with respect to these parameters.
It follows from (Ag) and (AIO)! that
i ( ) åvd (b2;i) [1 i ( )] åVd (b2;m)
- 7r q, Il åb
2
+ - 7r q, Il åb
2
(1+ r). .
- - ~2 (b
2
) < O;z,m = R,S,z"# m.
This derivative is the (negative of) the marginal cost of public debt in
terms of reduced period 2 private and public consumption, measured in units
of period 2 utility. It is, of course, proportional to the marginal expected
utility of resources in period 2, with the opposite sign.
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7.1.3 Period 1 Policies
The decision problem for a type i first period government given a probability
of re-election q is
subject to
(A15) (1 - Tl) y = Cl
and
(A16)TlY + b2 = gl + (1+ r) bl'
Combining the constraints and substituting the result into the objective
function, we are left with a maximisation problem in two variables, say gl
and b2:
The first-order conditions are
aui (<Pl (b;*) - gi*,gl*)
agl
(i 1-ai
<Pl (b~*) - gl* + gl* = O;
_ au; (<Pl (b;*) - gl*, gl*) + £5awi (b;*; q, /-l)
ab2 ab2
_ ai _ £5 (1 + r) = O
<Pl (b~*) - gl* <P2 (b~*) .
In combination with the resource constraints this yields
(A18a)b~* (1) ( y )- '1"+8 Ur
-(l!£5) [y - (1+ r) bl];
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(A18b)gl* - (1- ai) ~l (b~*) ;
(A18c)7i* 1- [ai~~ (b~*)l ;-
(A18d)ci* - ai~l (bt*) .
Note that the optimal debt level does not contain any parameters specific
to i. Thus, b~* = b~*= b2. Define \li = I!O' \li can interpreted as the optimal
share of total consumable resources that is spent in period 1 and similarly,
1- \li is the part that incumbent governments of both types optimally spends
in period 2 (measured in present value terms), e.f. 4?~t:)= (1 - \lI)~:
(A19a)~1 (b~*)
(A19b)~2 (b~*)
Combining this with (A18), we have
(A18a)'b;* - \lI~ - [y - (1+ r) bl] ;
(A18b)'gi* - (1 - ai) \lI~;
(A18C)'7i* [ai\ll~l'- 1- -- ,
y
(A18d)'ci* - ai\ll~.
Note that the optimal solutions do not depend on the probability that i's
preferences determine period 2 policies.
The second derivatives of the objective function are
- - [('1'1 (bl~;-gi')' +~l.ti]< O;
_ _ [ ai + 8 (1 + r) ] < O.
(~t(b~*) - gl*)2 (~2 (b~*))2 ,
- [('1'1 (b;.~i_ gl')'] > O.
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IMoreover (suppressing arguments of functions for notational economy),
Thus, we see that the second-order conditions all hold at the optimum.
In fact, the objective functions is globally concave, and so we have found a
unique optimum.
Suppose now that the government's end-of-period debt cannot exceed B.
Adding the constraint b2 ~ B to the above maximisation problem obviously
does not change the optimum if b2 ~ B. If b2 > B, the constraint is strictly
binding at the optimum. Thus, b2 = B. It is easily seen that the constraint
does not change the functional relationship between optimal period 1 private
and public consumption and the amount of resources available in this period.
Hence, the optimallevels of these variables are nowei = aicI>l (B) and 91 =
(1 - ai) cI>1 (B).
7.1.4 Properties of the Two-Period Utility Functions
The two-period "indirect" expected utility of i is the maximum value function
wi(q,/-L) = ni(ct*,9t*,b~*;q,/-L). By definition, wi(q,/-L) 2: ni (Cl,9l,b2;q,/-L),
"i/ { Cl, 91, b2}. In fact, because the optimal choices are unique, the inequality is
strict except at the optimum. The following lemma follows straightforwardly
from previous results:
Lemma Al:
Wi (q', /-L') > Wi (q", /-L") {:} 7ri (q', /-L') > 7ri (q", /-L") ,i = R, S.
Proof· We have 8w~(q,.u) = 8EMf/jq,J.I) = 'TIii - 'TIim > O i = R S· i _J_ m c f. 81r'(q,J.I) 81r'(q,J.I) ././ , "I ..
(A13). Q.E.D.
In words, Lemma Al says that i's total expected "indirect" utility is
increasing in the probability that its preferences are decisive for period 2
policies. Accordingly, the derivatives of Wi (q, /-L)with respect to q and /-Lhave
the same sign as the derivatives of 7ri (q, /-L) with respect to these variables .
.If the government is credit-constrained, we can define a maximum-value
function z:vi (q, /-L,B) = ni (ct*, 9i*, B; q, /-L). Sinceni (Cl, 91, b2; q, /-L) is a-strictly
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concave function of b2, r;j (q, p" B) ~ Wi (q, p,), with equality only at B = b2.
Lemma Al obviously applies in this case too.
7.1.5 Voter Behaviour
Voters can choose between voting for the incumbent government or voting
for the challenger. They make their choice after observing the incumbent
government's policies. These policies affect the voters' expected period 2
utilities through the debt level, which determines the amount of resources
left over for period 2 private and public consumption, and, possibly, the
voters' beliefs about which type of government the incumbent is. Denote the
ex post probability that the incumbent government is of type R by p. Voter
h then expects to get a period 2 utility of
(A22)pV;h (b2; R) + (1 - p) V; (b2; S)
if the incumbent is re-elected. If the challenger wins the election, voter h
expects to get
It is assumed that all voters participate in the election. Because there
is a continuum of voters, no voter can affect the probability that the in-
cumbent government is re-elected. All voters therefore vote sincerely for
the alternative that promises the highest level of period 2 utility given their
beliefs, which are identical. In other words, all voters compare (A22) and
(A23) and vote for the incumbent if (A22) > (A23) and for the challenger if
(A22) < (A23). If these are equal, we may assume without loss of generality
that all voters toss a fair coin to determine their ballot decision. This is what
all voters will do in a pooling equilibrium because then p = p" and hence
(A22) = (A23) for all voters. Thus, in a pooling equilibrium, the probability
of the incumbent government being re-elected is equal to !.
If p =I- p" it is possible to find a set of voters H with a weight aH on the
utility of private consumption such that a) all voters for which ah < aH vote
for the incumbent if it is believed that this government is more likely to be of
type S than the challenger and vote for the challenger if it is the other way
around; and b) all voters for which ah > aH vote for the incumbent if it is
believed that the incumbent is more likely to be type R than the challenger
is and vote for the challenger if the converse is true. This set of indifferent
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Ivoters, which will have mass zero, have preferences such that (A22) = (A23).
When p =J 1-£, this is equivalent to ~H (b2; R) = ~H (b2; S), c.f. (A24):
H In (1 - aS) -In (1- aR)
(A25)a = .[lnaR -lnaS] + [ln(1 - aS) -ln (1 - aR)]
Obviously, as we assume O< as < aR < 1, aH E (0,1). We now proceed
to demonstrate that aH E (aS, aR). First note that for ah = aR, we must
have ~h (b2;R) > ~h (b2;S) while for ah = as it must be the case that
~h (b2; R) < ~h (b2; S). Moreover,
Therefore, there must exist a unique aH E (aS, aR) such that V2h(b2; R) =
~h (b2; S), c.f. figure A3. All voters who value private consumption more
than this prefer the incumbent to the challenger if p > 1-£ and the challenger
to the incumbent if p < 1-£. On the other hand, all voters who attaches a
weight to the utility of private consumption which is smaller than aH prefer
the incumbent to the challenger if p < 1-£ and the challenger to the incumbent
if p> 1-£.
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V·(h,;R)-V·(h,;S)
Figure A3: preferences of group of indifferent voters
An incumbent government of type i will be re-elected if more than half
of the electorate prefers it to the challenger. More than half the electorate
prefers the incumbent if the median of the distribution of voter preferences,
aM, lies on the same side of aH as do ai. Since the position of the median is
uncertain, the probability of more than half the electorate preferring i to the
challenger is non-degenerate. Using the results just derived, we thus have
(A27) isep = { prob (aH < aM) = 1- A (aH) ,i = R;q - prob (aM ~ aH) = A (aH) ,i = S.
Finally, note that as preferences are homothetic, aH does not depend on
the level of resources available in period 2. Thus, it is independent of whether
the government is credit-constrained or not.
8 Appendix B
8.1 Existence of Simple Separating Equilibria
In the following, I will label the type trying to separate out as type k and
denote the potential mimicker by type l. To prove existence, it suffices to
prove that there exists a point such that
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(Bla)!1k (Ct,9t,b2;qksep,J.£) > Wk (qlsep,J.£);
(Blb)fi (Ct,91,b2;qkSep,J.£) < Wi (qlsep,J.£).
That is, we need only prove that there exists period 1 policies such that if
voters believe that the government is of type k if and only if these policies are
chosen and believe that the government is of type l otherwise, then k prefers
choosing them to choosing any other set of policies (which would all lead to
it being mistaken for l) and l prefers to pick {c~*,9i*,b;} instead of this set
of policies (and it prefers {q*, 9i*,b;} to any other set of policies since this
is the best that it can do for a given probability of re-election).
The simplest case arises if there are parameter values such that a govern-
ment of type k can separate itself from l by choosing its "first-best" policies.
I will call this simple separating equilibria. The beliefs specified in the main
text are then obviously a special case of the beliefs specified here.
A trivial case where both types will choose there "first-best" policies is
when qksep = qlsep =~. Obviously in this case l does not have an incentive
to mimic k and k does not have an incentive to actively separate out, so the
only equilibrium is the one where both types play their "first-best" policies.
In the more interesting cases where qksep > ~ > qlsep, I will express the
conditions where this equilibrium survives in terms of a cut-off rate for the
discount factor which has the property that for discount factors less than
or equal to this value, l will at least weakly prefer not to mimic k when
k plays {9t*, bH. It is of course found by equating ni (9t*, b;; qksep, J.£) and
Wi (qlsep, J.£). This yields:
(B2)?/ (kSep ) _ 1q , J.£ - 7r1 (qksep, J.£) - 7r1 (qlsep, J.£) .
Note that ?/ (qksep, J.£) is independent of the degree of political polarisa-
tion, i.e., the difference in preferences between k and l. This is because the
gain from mimicking is proportional to the gain from having one's own pref-
erences determine period 2 policies and the loss from mimicking is equal to
this gain in this type of equilibrium. In period 2, any type of government
chooses its first-best policies, and therefore the gain from one's own pref-
erences being decisive is equal to the difference in utility between the two
first-best policies. In a simple separating equilibrium, k chooses its first-best
policies, and so must l if it is to fool the voters.
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Furthermore, note that -gl (qksep, Il) is independent of the intertemporal
distribution of resources. This is due to the strong separability of the indirect
utility functions: Wi (q, Il) = ",ii + In \lI4>+ Ei (",; q, Il) + In (1 + r) (1 - \li) 4>
and ijj (q,ll) = ",ii + In4>l (B) + Ei (",;q,ll) + In4>2(B). Therefore, what
follows applies whether the government is credit-constrained or not.
The properties of this cut-off rate are best studied case by case. When
qSsep > ~> qRsep, k = S and l = R. The cut-off rate is then
(B3)-gR (Ssep ) _ 1q ,Il - (2qSsep - 1)(1 - Il)'
We have
2
- 2 < O;(2qSsep - 1) (1- Il)
lim -gR (qSsep, Il) _
1'-+0
1
- 2 > O;(2qSsep - 1) (1 - Il)
_ 00; lim -gR (qSsep, Il) = _1_;
qksep-+1 1- Il
1 ; lim -gR (qSsep, Il) = 00.
2qSsep - 1 1'-+1
The cut-off rate is declining in the probability that a government of type
S wins the election because an increase in this probability makes it more
tempting for a type R government to mimic a type S government. It is
increasing in Il, the probability that a challenger is of type R. An increase
in this probability makes it more likely that an R-government determines
period 2 policies even if today's R-government loses the election, and as the
incentive a type R first-period government has to mimic S stems from the
"improvement" in period 2 policies that can be achieved by having an R-
government in charge in the next period instead of an S-government, it is
lower the higher Il is. This is underlined by the fact that the cut-off rate
goes to infinity as Il approaches unity since if a first-period R-government is
certain that the challenger has the same preferences as itself, it would have
a dominant strategy of choosing first-period policies {cf*, gf*, b2}. That the
cut-off rate goes to infinity as the probabilities of each type of government
winning the election is ~ is just a confirmation of the claim made abo~e that
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there are no incentives for any type to deviate from its first-best policies in
that case.
When q8sep < !< qRsep, k = R and l = S. The cut-off rate is then
(B5)8
8
(qRsep, IL) = (2qRse: _ 1) IL'
Its properties are
2----~>O·
(2qRsep - 1)2 IL '
1-:---::------:----::-> O'(2qRsep - 1) IL2 '
(B6c) lim 88 (qRsep, IL) - 00; lim 88 (qRsep, IL) = .!.;
qRsep-->~ qRsep-+l IL
lim 88 (qRsep Il.) _ 00; lim 88 (qRsep, 11.) = 1 .
JL-->O ' r: JL-+l r: 2qRsep - 1
This cut-off rate is of course increasing in the probability that a govern-
ment of type S wins the election as an increase in this probability makes
it less imperative for an S government to hide its type. It is decreasing
in IL because an increase in this probability makes it less likely that an S-
government determines period 2 policies even if today's S-government loses
the election. It then makes winning the election more important for a first-
period S-government. Once again, the impact of variations in the probability
that the challenger is of the same type as the incumbent government is re-
flected in the fact that the cut-off rate goes to infinity as this probability
goes to unity. When it is an S government which has the weakest electoral
position, this happens when IL approaches zero because then 1-IL approaches
unity. In such a case, an incumbent S-government would have a dominant
strategy of choosing first period policies {cf*, gf* , b2} . Once more, we see
that the same applies for equal probabilities of winning the election for the
two types.
The results derived in this section are summarised in the following propo-
sition:
Proposition Bl:
. 3.81 (qksep, IL) > O such that 'V8 :::;81 (qksep, IL), simple separating equilibria
exist; while 'V8 > 81 (qksep, IL), simple separating equilibria do not exi~t.
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8.2 Removing Dominated Strategies for l
For some parameter configurations, pooling equilibria might exist for 8 ::;
{/ (qksep, 1.£) . However, all of these rely on l playing a dominated strategy,
namely {et*,gf*,b2}. Since any policy pair that satisfies (Bla) and (BIb)
gives l at the most no more than it gets by choosing {r;*,gi* , b2} and accepting
that its type is revealed, any strategy that requires l to play these is at least
weakly dominated by playing {ei* , gi* , b2}. If these strategies are removed for
l, k is free to choose between the best of the potential separating equilibrium
policies and the pooling equilibrium policies. I shall demonstrate that it
will choose its "first-best" policies. Hence, the only pure-strategy Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium in non-dominated strategies is the unique separating
equilibrium.
By Proposition Bl, ni (et*, g~*, b2; qksep, 1.£) ::; wi (qISep, 1.£) in the separat-
ing equilibrium. That is, the maximum pay-off that l can get from playing
{ et* ,g~*, b2} is never greater than the lowest pay-off it can get from play-
ing {r;*, gi* , b2}· This is the definition of a (weakly) dominated strategy.
On the other hand, for k, the maximum utility from playing {e~*, gf* , b2}
is wk (qksep, 1.£), which is also the highest attainable level of utility for it
given voter preferences (c.f. Lemma Al). So, for k, {e~*, gf*, bH is not
dominated by any other combination of policies. Therefore, upon observing
{ e~*, gf* , b2}, voters should infer that the government is of type k. k is then
free to choose this policy instead of the purported pooling equilibrium policies
if it so wishes. The maximum utility that k can get in a pooling equilibrium
is wk G,I.£) = nk (e~*,g~*,b2;~,I.£)· It can be shown that {e~*,g~*,bH is
not a pooling equilibrium until 8 = 2{/ (qksep,l.£) (since the gain to l from
getting a probability of re-election of ~ instead of qlsep is only half the gain
from having qksep instead of qlsep). It follows that a pooling equilibrium
policy {cf, gf, bf} gives k a level of utility nk (cf, gf, bf; ~, 1.£) < wk G, 1.£) •
Moreover, by Lemma Al, wk (qksep,l.£) > wk G,I.£). Hence, the purported
equilibrium cannot be sustained.
Corollary 3 in the main text follows from this result as it demonstrates
that l plays {et* ,g~*, b2} with probability zero and k plays {e~*, g~*, b2} with
probabilityone. In fact, it can be shown that the current framework rules out
all non-trivial mixed strategy equilibria, even for 8 > "81 (qksep, 1.£), because
the probability of winning the election is not a continuous function of the
beliefs of voters.
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The proof for the case when the government is credit-constrained is along
the same lines, with B, wl (q, 1-£), and wk (q, 1-£) replacing b2, wi (q, 1-£), and
wk (q, 1-£), respectively.
9 Appendix D: More General Preference Struc-
tures
Suppose that voters and governments have the following utility functions
(Dl)Uh (Ct, gt) = a (~~: + (1 - a)«:
where ah E (0,1) and a > Obut a =f 1. The preference structure used in
the main text is the limit of (Dl) as a --+ 1. Since these preferences imply
that in general bf* (q, 1-£) =f b~* (q, 1-£), I assume 8 = l~r to focus on strategic
political incentives to have different amounts of resources in the two periods.
Moreover, assuming r ~ O implies that we have a situation comparable to
8 ~ '81 (qkSep, 1-£) above.
9.1 Period 2 Policies
A type j period 2 government maximises uj (C2, g2) = aj (C~r~O"+(1 - aj) (g~r~O"
subject to the budget constraints of the private and public sectors. It can be
shown that the solution to this optimisation problem is ~* (b2) = ')'j<I>2 (b2)
and g~*(b2) = (1 - ')'j) <I>2 (b2), where ')'j = .}Oi)1;. 1. In turn, substi-
(03)0"+(1-03)0"
tuting ~* (b2) into the budget constraint of the representative consumer, the
optimal tax: rate follows: 7{* (b2) = 1 - ['Yi~;(~)] .24 It is straightforward
to verify that ')'R ~ ')'S ¢:} aR ~ aS. Therefore, g:* (b2) < gf* (b2) and
c:* (b2) > c~*(b2).
9.2 Voter Preferences
The preferences specified in (Dl) are homothetic, and the nature of the
preferences of the set of indifferent voters is thus unchanged by the alteration
24It should be noted that the objective function is strictly concave globally. Thus, we
have found a unique optimum.
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of the utility functions:
which is independent of <P2 (b2). The procedure used above can be applied
to demonstrate that aH E (aS, aR) .
9.3 Period 1 Policies Given 7ri (q, Jl)
Defining the indirect utility function ~i (b2; j) = U' (~* (b2) ,9~* (b2)) and the
expected indirect utility of i Wi (b2; q, J.L)= 7ri (q, J.L)Vd (b2; i)+[l - 7ri (q, J.L)]Vd (b2; m)
in the same way as above and combining the period 1 budget constraints,
maximisation of ni (Cl, 91, b2; q, J.L)= tr (Cl, 91) + 6'Wi (b2; q, J.L) results in the
following first-order conditions."
(D3a) - ai (<Pl (b2) - 91)-U + (1- ai) (91)-U - O;
(D3b)ai (<Pl (b2) - 91)-U - 6' (1 + r) 8W
i
(b2; q, J.L) - O.
. 8<P2
It is easily seen that the optimal levels of private and public consump-
tion have the same form as in period 2: ci* (b2) = li<PI (b2) and 91*(b2) =
(1 - Ii) <PI (b2). However, b2 is nowendogenous. Making use of the fact that
the objective functions are homothetic, we can write Vd (b2; j) = 'fJii [4>2(:~~1-0" .
Therefore, 8W'J~;q'lL) = [7ri (q, J.L)'fJii + [1 - 7ri (q, J.L)] 'fJim] [<P2 (b2)rU, i,m =
R, S; i =I m. Substituting ci* (b2) into (D3b), we get the optimal ratio of
resources in period 2 to resources in period 1:
. . l
(D4)<P2(b~*) = [E'('fJ;q,J.L)]" = i( )<Pl (b2*) 'fJii <p q, J.L ,
where Ei ('fJ; q, J.L)= [7ri (q, J.L)'fJii + [1 - 7ri (q, J.L)] 'fJim]. From (D4), the op-
timal debt follows:
(D5)b~* (q, J.L)= Wi (q, J.L)<P - [y"":' (1 + r) bl] .
25It can be shown that the objective function is globally concave, and hence, that the
optimal choices axe unique.
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Wi (q,l-£) = (1+r}1_f;i(q,/-L) can be interpreted as the optimal share of re-
sources to spend in period 1 according to the preferences of i given q and 1-£,
c.f. CPI (b~*)= Wi (q, 1-£) cp and CP2 (b~*)= (1 + r) [1 - Wi (q, 1-£)] CP. We see that
8b~·(q,/-L} = 8b~~(q,/-L} 8w~(q,/-L} 8'fi(q,/-L} 8Ei~'1jq,/-L} The first of these partial deriva-
{hr'(q,/-L} 8w'(q,/-L} 8cp'(q,/-L} 8E'('1jq,/-L} {hr'(q,/-L} •
tives is clearly positive, the second is negative, and the third can be seen to
8bi*( } 8Ei(. }be positive. Hence sign 2. q,/-L = -sign ,'1,q,/-L. We have
'{hr'(q,/-L} {hr'(q,/-L}
(D6)8Ei~'fJ;q,l-£) ='fJii_'fJim{ >0,0"<1;
87rt (q, 1-£) < 0, O" > 1.
The signs follow from the fact that the objective function is of the form
U (Ct, gt) = (1~eT) [a (Ct) l-eT + (1 - a) (gt) I-eT]. When O" < 1, the optimal
combination of Ct and gt from the perspective of a government of a certain
type maximises [a (Ct)I-eT + (1 - a) (gt) I-eT] . Hence, "Iii> "lim. But when
O" > 1, the optimal allocation minimises [a (Ct)I-eT + (1 - a) (gt) I-eT] . There-
fore, "Iii < "lim. It follows that
(D7) 8b~~(q, 1-£) { < 0, O" < 1;
87rt(q,l-£) > 0,0" > 1.
It is easily seen that for 7ri (q, 1-£) = 1, <pi (q, 1-£) = 1. This is due to the fact
that I have assumed 8 = I~r in order to remove any economic incentive to
have CPI =f CP2. It followsthat for 7ri (q, 1-£) < 1, <pi (q, 1-£) < 1when O" < 1. That
is, relative to the case where 7ri (q, 1-£) = 1, there is overaccumulation of public
debt. Conversely, when O" > 1, <pi (q, 1-£) > 1 for 7ri (q, 1-£) < 1. Hence, political
uncertainty leads to underaccumulation of public debt. These results can also
be derived by noting that the marginal utility of future funds, 8W~~;q'/-L}, is
increasing (decreasing) in 7ri (q, 1-£) when O" < 1 (O" > 1).
9.4 Proof of the Existence of the Simple Separating
Equilibrium
Define the maximum-value function Wi (q, 1-£) = ni (ci* (q, 1-£) , gi* (q, 1-£) , b~*(q, 1-£) ; q, 1-£).
By definition, Wi (q, 1-£) ~ ni (c}, gl, b2; q, I-£),'V {c}, gl, b2}. In fact, as the opti-
mum is unique, the inequality is strict except at {ei* (q, 1-£) ,gi* (q, 1-£) , b~*(q, 1-£) }.
In particular, Wi (q, 1-£) > ni ("iCPI (br* (q, 1-£)) , (1 - "i) CPI (br* (q, 1-£)) ,br* (q, 1-£) ; q, 1-£),
i =f m.
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Let k denote the type with an electoral advantage and let I denote the
other type. I will demonstrate that
ni ('l<l>l (b~* (qksep, JL)) , (1 - 'l) <1>1 (b~* (lsep, JL)) ,b~* (qkSep, JL) ; qlsep, JL)
> ni (c~* (q, JL) ,g~* (q, JL) ,b~* (qkSep, JL) ;e=. JL) .
That is, I will demonstrate that l is better off choosing its optimal allo-
cation of resources on private and public consumption given the debt level
b~* (qksep, JL), even if this results in the low probability of re-election qlsep and
it could have increased its probability of re-election to qksep by "completely"
mimicking k. Since I will be even better off when its probability of re-election
is qlsep if it chooses b~* (qlsep, JL), l will not mimic k.
fini . ( ) .. [~ (b2)]1-0"Using the de itions ~t b2; j = ",tl \--0- ,we have
ni ('rI <I> 1 (b~* (qksep, JL)) , (1 - ,.y') <1>1 (b~* (qksep, JL)) ,b~* (qksep, JL) ;e=. JL)
~ ni (c~* (q, JL) ,g~* (q, JL) ,b~* (qksep, JL) ;e=, JL)
(
li Ik) [<1>1 (b~* (qksep,JL))] l-u
{::} "'-'" 1-0"
[<I> (bk* (qksep JL))] l-u~ 8 [7r1 (qksep, JL) - 7r1 (qlsep, JL)] (",ll - ",Ik) 2 2 1_ 0"'
{::} 1 2: 8 [7r1 (qksep JL) _ 7r1 (qlsep JL)] [<1>2 (b~* (qksep, JL) ) ] l-u
< ' '<I>l(b~*(qksep,JL))
_ 8 [7rl (qksep, JL) - 7r1 (q'sep, JL)] [rpk (qksep, JL)r-u .
The last equivalence follows by making use of the fact that sign (",il - ",ik) =
-sign (1 - 0"). We have already noted that for O" < 1 (O" > 1), rpi (q,JL) ~ 1
(rpi (q, JL) ~ 1). Hence, [rpk (qksep, JL)] l-u ~ 1. The assumptions 8 = 1~r and
r ~ Oensure that 8 ~ 1. Finally, 7rl (qksep, JL) - 7ri (qlsep, JL) < 1 because there
is always a strictly positive probability that the challenger is of type l, and
thus that period 2 policies are chosen according to l'e preferences even if it
is not re-elected. Therefore, suppressing (some) functional arguments,
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I9.5 Proof of the Existence of the Simple Separating
Equilibrium when Governments are Credit-Constrained
I define the credit constraint relative to the separating equilibrium policies
of i, which are also its first-best policies given the probability of re-election
it gets when its type is revealed to the voters. That is, when type i is
credit-constrained, b;* (qise:p, 1-£) > B, where B is the maximum debt level
allowed. Thus, for a given probability of re-election equal to e=. the credit-
constraint is binding at the optimum, and so b; = B. Since optimal alloca-
tions of resources on private and public consumption always lie along the ray
{'Yi<Pl (b2) ,(1 - 'Yi) <PI (b2)}, ei (B) = 'Yi<Pl (B) and 9i (B) = (1 - 'Yi) <PI (B).
Define the maximum value function D' (q, 1-£, B) = ni (ei (B) ,9i (B) ,B; q, 1-£).
Note that for B < b;* (qise:p, 1-£), aw'(q~;'I-',B) > D since the credit constraint
is binding and ni (ei (B) ,9i (B) , B; qisep, 1-£) is a strictly concave function
of B with a unique optimum at B = b;* (qisep, 1-£). Therefore, B' < Bli ::;
b;* (qisep, 1-£) {::} ~ (qisep, 1-£, B') < ~ (qiSe:p, 1-£, Bli).
Suppose l is credit-constrained but not k: B E [b~* (qksep, 1-£) , b~* (qlsep, 1-£) ).
Because aw'(q~;'I-',B) > Don [b~* (qkSep,l-£) ,b~* (qlsep,I-£)), arg min D' (lsep,I-£,B) =
BE [b~· (qksep ,I-') ,b~· ( qlsep ,I-') )
b~* (qksep, 1-£). I now demonstrate that
wl (qlse:p, 1-£, b~* (qkse:p, 1-£)) > nl (c~* (qksep, 1-£) ,g~* (qkse:p, 1-£) , b~* (qksep, 1-£) ; qksep, 1-£) .
As wl (qlsep, 1-£, B) 2:: ~ (qlsep, 1-£, b~* (qksep, 1-£)), tiB E [b~* (qksep, 1-£) , v: (qlsep, 1-£) ) ,
the proof is then complete.
We have
r;j (qlsep, 1-£, b~* (qkse:p, 1-£))
- nl (ei (b~* (lsep,I-£)) ,91 (b~* (qksep,I-£)) ,b~* (qksep,l-£) ;qlsep,l-£)
>
< nl (c~* (qkse
p, 1-£) ,g~* (qksep, 1-£) , b~* (qkSe:p, 1-£) ; e=, 1-£)
["'" (bk* (ksep ))] l-u{::} (rll _ 1Jlk) '*'1 2 q , 1-£
l-a
~ 8 [7fl (qkSe:p, 1-£) _ 7fl (qlsep, 1-£)] (1Jll _ 1Jlk) [<1>2(b~* ~q:e:, 1-£) ) ] l-u
{::} 1~ 8 [7fl (qksep,l-£) _7fl (qlsep,I-£)] [<l (qkSep,I-£)] l-u .
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It can be seen that this is exactly the same evaluation that was made in the
last sub-section. Thus, 1 > 8 [7rl (qksep, J-L) - 7rl (qlsep, J-L)] [cpk (qksep, J-L)jl-U .
Suppose now that k is credit-constrained but not l: B E [b~* (qlsep, J-L ,b~* (qksep, J-L)).
Then k chooses {')'k<Pl (B), (1- ')'k) <PI (B) ,B} as its "second-best" poli-
cies.26 We have ø' (qlsep,J-L) 2: nl (')'l<P1 (b2), (1- ')'l) <PI (b2) ,b2;qlsep,J-L), 'Vb2,
so it suffices to prove that
Following the same procedure as above, the critical condition is
Since B E [b~* (qlsep, J-L) ,b~* (qksep, J-L)), cpk (qksep, J-L) < :~~!~< cpl (qlsep, J-L).
Furthermore, b~* (qlsep, J-L) < b~* (qksep, J-L) {::} cpk (qksep, J-L) < cpl (qlsep, J-L), and
when a < 1 (a > 1), cl (q, J-L) ~ 1 (cpi (q, J-L) 2: 1) 'Vq, with equality iff
q = 1. Hence, we have cpk (qksep, J-L) < :~~!~< cpl (qlsep, J-L) < 1 when a < 1
and 1 ~ cpk (qkSep, J-L) < :~~!~< cpl (qlsep, J-L) when a > 1. It follows that
1 > 8 [7rl (qksep, J-L) - 7rl (qlSep, J-L)] [:~~!~r-u, and we are done.
When both types are credit-constrained, B < Min {b~* (qlsep, J-L) ,b~* (qksep, J-L)}.
In the proposed separating equilibrium, the policies are
It is immediate from the proof of the last paragraph that wl (qlsep, J-L,B) >
nl ("Yk<P1 (B) , (1 - ')'k) <PI (B) ,B; qksep, J-L), which proves that l will not mimic
k in this case either.
Moreover, in parallel to the case considered in the main text, {c~*, gf*, B}
is dominated for l (here: strictly) but not for k.
26Strictly speaking, of course, the government does not determine c directly, but uses
the tax rate to achieve the optimal level of this variable. However, since the objective
functions are defined over c and g, I focus on c and not on T.
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10 Appendix E: Politicians with Mixed Mo-
tives
Suppose that governments are not purely office-motivated, but also value a
"gain from being in office", 1'\" which could be related to the power, prestige,
·or other perks of office. That is, suppose the objective function of a type i
government in power in period t is
When i is out of office, I'\, = O. I assume that X and I'\, are the same for
both i = S and i = R. I prove that the results derived above generalise to
the case O < X < 1 provided that I'\, is not "too high" (in a sense specified
below). Purely office-motivated politicians (X = O) would render the model
meaningless as they would do anything to get in office. Since voters only care
about policies, they would not get any information from purely "populistic"
first-period policies. The case X = 1 is of course the one considered so far.
I prove the results for the case Ui (Gt,gt) = ai(C~~~(7 + (1- at) (g~~~(7.
Since Ui (Gt, gt) = ai lnc,+ (1 - at) lngt is a special case of these preferences,
the results holds in that set-up too. I still assume 8 = l!r and r 2: O.
It is immediate that, as I'\, is a constant, optimal policies are not af-
fected. Maximisation of XUi (C2, g2) + (1 - X) I'\, and ni (Cl, gl, b2; q, Il-, 1'\,) =
XUi (Cl, gl)+(l - X) 1'\,+8{7ri (q, Il-) V~ (b2; i) + [1 - 7ri (q, Il-)] V~ (b2;m) + q (1 - X) I'\,}
lead to the same optimal policies as maximisation of Ui (C2, g2) and ni (Cl, gl, b2; q, Il-) =
Ui (Cl,gl)+8 {7ri (q, Il-) V;i (b2; i) + [1 - 7ri (q, Il-)] V;i (~; mn. However, for X <
1, I'\, > Oclearly affects the incentives that l has to mimic k.
The maximum-value function for a given probability of re-election is now
Wi (q, u; 1'\,).We have
Result El
For X < 1 and qksep > l > qlsep ::ml E (O 00) s t ni (ck* gk* bk*. qksep Il. "Jf}) -2 , ,. . 1 , 1 , 2 , , ,.-, -
Wi (qlsep, u;Kl).
Proof:
ni (ck* gh bk*. qksep Il. 1'\,) _ wi (qlsep II 1'\,)1 , 1 , 2 ,. , ,.-, , ,.-,
- X { [vi (k) + 8El (vi (b~*) ;e=, Il-)] - [vi (l) + 8El (Vi (b~*) ; qlsep, Il-)]}
+8 (qksep - qlsep) (1 - X) 1'\"
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where vi (i) = Ul (ei*, g1*) and El (Vi (b2) ; q,Jl) = '!rl (q, Jl) Vi (b2; l) +
[1 - ~ (q, Jl)] vi (b2; k). We already know that this expression is negative for
K, = o. The derivative of it with respect to K, is
(El) å [nl (ct*, gt*, b~*;qksed:, K,) - w
l (qlsep, Jl, K,)] = 8 (qksep -lsep) (1 - X) .
This derivative is strictly positive as long as X < 1 and qksep > ~> q'sep•
Since [Vi (k) + 8El (Vi (b~*);qksep, Jl)] - [Vi (l) + 8E' (Vi (b~*); q'sep, Jl) l is a
finite number, :m' E (0,00) such that nl (ct*, gf*, b~*;e=,u,R') = wl ((/sep, Jl, Rl).
It is immediate from this result that if none of the types has an electoral
advantage, mixed motives does not increase the incentives for one type to
mimic the other. But if one of the types is favoured by voters, the mimicking
incentives of the type which is at a disadvantage in the electoral game are
increased. Result El demonstrates that provided that the gain from being in
office is not too great, these incentives are not strong enough to destroy the
separating equilibrium in which both types play their "first-best" policies.
By simple comparative statics, it can be shown that : > Oand a:tep >
O.
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Chapter 4
Aspects of the Political Economy of Foreign Aid *
July, 1999
Abstract
The interaction of external financing with economic reforms in de-
veloping countries has been at the forefront of the policy debate for
the last 15-20 years. In this paper, a simple model in which an aid
donor faces either a reform-minded recipient country government or
one defending the status quo is constructed to investigate the impact
of aid on political and economic outcomes. The main contributions
of this paper are i) to show that while commitment versus discretion
is irrelevant to the outcome of the aid game studied here, the recipi-
ent government's ability to tax transfers to the private sector is very
important; li) to provide a definition of aid fungibility when both the
donor and the recipient act strategically; iii) to point out that very
large sums seems to be needed if donors are to have any influence
over outcomes; and iv) to demonstrate that the effect of foreign aid
on the political equilibrium in democratic recipient countries can be
counterproductive from the point of view of the donor.
1 Introduction
In the literature on economic development, the 1980s has been dubbed "the
lost decade". It was the decade of the debt crisis, when many developing
countries saw their ability to borrow internationally severely restricted, real
interest rates rose, and arrears on debt payments mounted. Equally notable
*I would like to thank Kjetil Bjorvatn, Karl Rolf Pedersen, Gaute Torsvik, and Bertil
Tungodden for useful comments on a previous draft, without implicating any responsibility
on their part for the contents of this version.
1
was the trend in economic policies world-wide. In rich and poor countries
alike, reforms aimed at increasing the role of markets and reducing the role
of the state were initiated. In the former, problems connected with financing
ambitious welfare state programmes in the aftermath of the oil price shocks
of the 1970s, which caused a significant increase in unemployment, prompted
a reassessment of which tasks the government should carry out. In the latter,
the above-mentioned financing problems in many cases forced governments
into adjustment mode. However, the economic difficulties were rarely of a
purely external nature. Many developing countries had clearly followed un-
sustainable macroeconomic policies, while at the same time over-extending
the role of the state. This was only reluctantly conceded by some of these
governments, and others refused to mend their ways even in the face of exter-
nal financing problems. The resulting economic crises, though, forced even
some of the hardliners to turn to the international financial institutions (IFIs)
and bilateral donors as substitutes for the private funds that were no longer
forthcoming. These actors, however, were generally of the opinion that re-
forming economic policies was necessary, and this opinion was bolstered as
the decade proceeded, resulting in increasingly insistent demands for reforms.
Project-based funding was replaced by policy-based funding. The reluctance
to reform on the part of governments receiving public bilateral and multilat-
eral funding resulted in a proliferation of conditions attached to both grants
and loans. Conditionality became in vogue.
The track record of conditionality in terms of instigating comprehensive
and lasting reforms of economic policies is far from impressing. This has lead
some observers to advocate the more consensual approach of local "owner-
ship" of reforms, i.e., that reforms should not be forced through by foreigners
and should only be supported if the political will to reform is present domes-
tically. All along, critical voices have contended that the reforms advocated
by the international community will cause political and social instability in
low-income countries and that the result could be that reforms are never fully
implemented or are reversed because even pro-reforms government willlack
the political power to implement and sustain them. In Hagen (1999), I have
investigated the relative influence of political "will" - ideology - and politi-
cal "power" - support of the electorate - in fostering or preventing economic
reforms in democratic low-income countries. Therein, I have also analysed
whether lack of access to international credit markets influences the reform
choices of governments. Here, I consider how external assistance affects the
extent of reforms in a recipient country, a pertinent subject given the ob-
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servation of widespread donor "fatigue". I also study the impact of aid on
the domestic political equilibrium, a highly relevant topic in the light of the
debate about reform ownership.
2 The Model
The population of the recipient country (which is also the electorate) is nor-
malised to 1. The level of (aggregate and average) income is assumed to be
fixed at y > O,which is equally divided amongst the inhabitants.
The government taxes private income in order to supply a public con-
sumption good, g, to the population. A unit of public income is assumed to
generate a unit of g.l The government can be of two types. It either wants a
relatively high level of public consumption or a relatively low level of public
consumption. The former type of government will be labeled S for status
quo, since the status quo in many developing countries before the onset of
the reform period of the last 15-20 years was a balance between state and
market that was tilted rather heavily in the direction of the former.f The
other type of government will be called a reform government, denoted by
superscript R, as the essence of most of the reforms that have been proposed
by the international community has been to tip the scales at a level implying
a greater role for the private sector. 3
A government of type j determines its optimal tax rate by maximising
1Thus, taxation is assumed to be non-distortionary. This is unrealistic, of course, but
for our purposes, nothing is lost by abstracting from the well-known efficiency losses of
taxation.
2This statement must be interpreted in relation to the level of economic development
in these countries. Rich countries have much larger public sectors than poor countries,
but are better equipped to finance them, c.f. the fiscal crises that have been a persistent
feature in many developing countries over the last few decades. The size of the public
sector in the current low-income countries is also greater on average than the size of the
public sectors of the current high-income countries when these were at a similar stage of
economic development.
3For example, Killick (1998) notes with respect to the IMF that "the Fund's move
into 'structural' conditionality has had three thrusts: L to increase the role of markets
and private enterprises relative to the public sector, and to improve incentive structures;
2. to improve the efficiencyof the public sector; and 3. to mobilize additional domestic
resources." (p.I) ,
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where c (g) is private (public) consumption. As should be clear from the
above, I assume that 1 > f3R > f3s > O.
In the absence of aid, the total income of the economy is y. The private
and public budget constraints are therefore simply
(2a)(1- r) y - c;
(2b)ry - g.
7 is the tax rate, and it is easily demonstrated that the optimallevel from
the perspective of a type j government is
(3)7* (j) = 1- f3j.
The result is that private and public consumption becomes
(4a)c* (j) - (1 - 7i*) Y = f3iy;
(4b)g* (j) - ri*y = (1 - f3i) y.
We see that cS* < ~* and gS* > gR*. That is, there is greater private
and less public consumption under a status quo government, as should be
expected.
These outcomes and the underlying optimal tax rate constitute the "fall-
back" position. of the economy should the government and the donors fail
to corne to agreement on the terms of the aid. If an agreement can be
reached, it follows from (4a) and (4b) that a government of type j aims for
the outcome c* (j) = f3i (y +A) and g* (j) = (1 - f3i) (y + A), where A is
the total amount of aid available.
The donor has the same kind of objective function as possible recipient
country governments. It is assumed to be even more reform-minded than a
type R government. This seems the natural assumption to make, given the
conditionality debacle that has characterised North-South relations since the
onset of the debt crisis. Specifically, I assume f3D > f3R.4
4The case øD = øR is not of great interest, for obvious reasons. The case øR >
øD > ØS, which could have interesting implications for domestic politics in the recipient
country, is left for future research. If, for some reason, øD < ØS, the outcomes would be
mirror-images of the ones presented below. '
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The donor has a fixed budget of size A (measured in the same currency
as recipient country variables). The" unconstrained" optimum of the donor
is thus at c*(D) = ,BD (y +A) and g* (D) = (1 - ,BD) (y + A), since the
total income of the economywith aid is y + A. However, the giving of aid
is not unconstrained. First of all, a donor cannot tax a recipient in any
way. Secondly, a recipient country government can refuse to accept foreign
assistance if it is made worse off by it. Because the donor and the recipient
governments do not concur in the optimal distribution of resources, it is
conceivable that the donor's offer would entail such a "bad" distribution of
resources from the perspective of the recipient government that the extra
income does not compensate for it.
I will assume that the donor can split its budget between aid given to the
private sector, ac, and aid given to the government, ag•5 These must thus
both be non-negative, and the sum cannot exceed the donor's total budget.
While most bilateral aid is state-to-state, some is givendirectly to the private
sector, partly through private humanitarian organisations. In any case, it is
interesting to see if these two types of aid makes any difference,particularly
in the face of the widespread notion that aid is fungible. If aid is completely
fungible, this implies that in whicheverway it is given and irrespective of any
conditions attached to it, it ends up as "free funds" for the government, which
therefore can use it for whatever purpose it wants. If aid is not completely
fungible, then some of it must be spent on the purpose(s) envisaged by the
donor."
As we shall see, the view that aid is fungible is in general not correct,
and if the donor's budget is large enough, fungibility is zero. However, for
practical purposes, it seems to be the case that aid is fungible to some extent.
For "intermediate" levels of the donor's budget, aid is partially fungible.
Aid is perfectly fungible only if either a) the government can tax any aid
given to the private sector or b) it cannot tax ac, but the donor's total
5Aid given to the private sector can either be direct transfers or come in the form of
investments that generate income for individuals in that sector. Since domestic income is
exogenous in the current set-up, it is modelled in the first way here.
6The concept is used in several different ways in the literature. The definition here is
essentially that of Pedersen (1997), who states that aid is fungible if it is possible for the
recipient to divert resources away from the activity the donor seeks to finance. As pointed
out by him, the possibility of diversion is but a necessary condition for actual diversion;
in order to divert, the recipient must also wish to do so. I discuss fungibility in relation
to the model used here in more depth below.
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budget is "small". Thus, the details of the tax system, or the government's
administrative capacity in a wider sense, might make a great difference with
respect to the effects of aid on the final allocation of resources in the economy.
We shall consider the two extreme cases in which a) the government can tax
ac in the same way as it taxes domestic incomes and b) it cannot tax ac at
all.
In a game-theoretic perspective, the order in which the donor and the
recipient make their moves must be expected to be important. In economic
policy games, it is in general an advantage to move first. By committing one's
policy, taking into account the consequences of one's choices on the optimal
response of the opponent, one can influence the outcome of the game in favour
of oneself. We shall therefore investigate both the case where the donor moves
last and the case where it moves first? In game-theoretic parlance, we shall
see what happens both when the donor is a Stackelberg-follower and when
it is a Stackelberg-Ieader. The former case will be examined first, as it is the
most realistic one. It is hard to think of mechanisms by which a bilateral
donor can "tie its own hands" unilaterally. Still, it is interesting to see how
the equilibrium strategies and the outcome in this case differs from the more
realistic one considered next.
3 The Donor as a Follower
3.1 Aid to the Private Sector Is Taxable
The timing is now as follows. First, the recipient country government chooses
its tax policy. Then the donor chooses its aid policy taking the tax rate as
given and disburses the optimal sums. Finally, taxes are collected and c
and 9 are consumed. To distinguish optimal actions and outcomes from
those resulting from reversing the order in which the donor and the recipient
move, I use the superscript F.
7The former case has been analysed in a donor-recipient context by Pedersen (1995),
Svensson (1995) and Bruun (1998). Pedersen (1995) has also analysed the latter. Bruun
(1998) studies an altruistic donor which is to divide its budget between two recipient
countries in which the governments only care about aggregate consumption. Svensson
(1995) also analyses competition for aid between recipient countries, but assumes that the
donor only cares about the consumption of the poor, a feature he shares with Pedersen
(1995).
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When that tax rate is applied to both private domestic income and aid
given to the private sector, it is easy to show that aid is perfectly fungible.
If the recipient country government sets the tax rate"
(5)7F (j) = 1- {3j (y + A) ,
y+ac
-the outcome will dearly be
(6a)2" - {3j (y + A) = c* (j) ;
(6b)gF - (1- (3j) (y + A) = g* (j) .
That is, the government achieves its "first-best" combination of private
and public consumption given a total income level of (y + A).
This is so because the donor will be facing the budget constraints c =
(1 - 7F o» (y + ac) and 9 = 7F (j) (y + ac) + ago In whichever way the
donor divides A into ac and ag, c = (3j (;:~) (y + ac) = {3j (y + A) and
9 = (y + ac) - {3j (;:~) (y + ac) + ag = (y + ac) - {3j (y + A) + A - ac =
(1 - (3j) (y + A). Therefore, the donor's actions cannot be uniquely pinned
down; any {ac, ag} = {ac, A - ac}, ac E [0,A], is a best response to (5). The
optimal strategy of the government is unique given its type, however, and the
outcome is described by (6) regardless of what the donor's actual response
is.
Note that the donor influences policies with aid. 7F (j) :s; 1 - {3j since
ac ~ A. But even if the tax rate is lowered compared to the situation without
foreign assistance, the outcome - the share of total resources going to c and
9 - is fully determined by the government. Moreover, the change in policy is
just the optimal response of the government to the fact that aid is fungible.
3.2 Aid to the Private Sector Is Not Taxable
The case where the government cannot tax aid given to the private sector is
more complicated, and thus, in its own way, more interesting. It is perhaps
unrealistic to assume that ac cannot be taxed at all. And there is clearly
SHere and in the next section, I use a hat to denote actions and outcomes when aid to
the private sector is taxable. '
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no reason within the confines of the model why this should be so. However,
tax systems in many developing countries are highly rudimentary and tax
administration is notoriously lax, with corruption, tax avoidance, and tax
evasion constituting very real constraints on the government's ability to raise
revenues. While this presumably applies equally well to income from both
domestic and foreign sources, our focus is on the consequences of aid, so
here we assume that 1" applies to y but not to ac, while admitting that the
intermediate case of both being imperfectly taxable is the most realistic,"
On the face of it, the donor faces a quite complex optimisation problem
once the government has determined the tax rate. The donor must choose
its aid policy respecting its own budget constraint, the non-negativity con-
straints on ac and ag, as well as the constraint that the utility of the govern-
ment must be as high with aid as without aid in order to induce it to accept
the offer. However, it turns out that in the sub-game perfect equilibrium
of the aid game, the government will always be strictly better off accepting
aid (see the appendix). Hence, this constraint will not be binding along the
equilibrium path, which we shall focus on here.
Ignoring the constraint on the government 's utility, the Lagrange function
the donor will be maximising for each given 1" and A is AD = UD (c, g) +
A (A - ac - ag). The first-order conditions are
åAD
(7a) åA -
(7b)åA
D
_
åac
(7c)åA
D
_
åag
The conflict between the donor and the government is over the relative
shares of c and 9 in total income y + A. If the government allowed the donor
"a free hand", (A7a - c) would have an interior solution and the outcome
would be c = {3D (y + A) = c* (D) and 9 = (1 - f3D) (y +A) = g* (D).
9It can be shown that all the results generalise to the intermediate case when 'Y > f3D
and 1] < f3s, where y (1]) is the fraction of ac (y) which is not taxable. Moreover, the
results hold if the government uses lump-sum taxation and in a purely budgetary model
(i.e., where the government, like the donor, has a given budget to allocate to the two
goods). '
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Figure 1: exploiting the non-negativity constraints on aid
The donor wants more private consumption and less public consumption
than the government, so the task facing the government is to set the tax
rate so that the donor cannot reduce public consumption without violating
the non-negativity constraint on ago For some levels of the aid budget, the
government can in fact attain its "first-best" allocation by choosing rP (j) =
~ (1- (3i) (A + y).l0 This ploy works until the donor's budget is so large
that the government hits a constraint of its own, namely, r ~ 1 (see figure
1).11 From rP (j) = ~(1 - (3i) (A + y), it is easily calculated that the critical
level of the donor's budget is Aj = (l~~i)y.
Thereafter, the government can secure a minimum level of public con-
sumption, 9 = y, by keeping r = 1. The donor will still be spending all of its
budget on ac, so any increase in the donor's budget will end up as private con-
sumption until the donor's budget is so large that it optimally spends at least
IOFor notational simplicity, we denote this specific value of rF (j) by r" (j), in analogy
with (3), since it is the tax rate that the government would have chosen if private domestic
income was y +A, but A was not taxable.
ll>From Figure 1, it can be seen that the constraint on the government's utility will not
be binding along the equilibrium path. By choosing {C',y/} (by way of the tax rate), the
government is worse off without aid compared to {,Bjy, (1 - ,Bj) y}. But since choosing
{c', g'} makes {c", g'} = {,Bj (y +A) , (1 - ,Bj) (y +A)} the donor's optimal choice (by
way of its optimal aid policy), the government is better off in equilibrium.
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cExpansion path
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Figure 2: outcomes when donor moves after government
yon public consumption (that is, -until A is so high that (1 - (3D) (y + A) =
y). From then on, the donor will have complete control, in the sense that
the outcome is as good as it gets for it: CF = (3D (y + A) = c* (D) and
gF = (1 - (3D) (y + A) = g* (D). This outcome is generated by the "first-
best" aidpolicy {(3D (A + y) - (1- r) y, (1- (3D) (A + y) - ry} = {a~,a;}.
Figure 2 illustrates the outcome (the bold line segments) as a function of A.
As we have seen, the critical level of the aid budget at which the donor
starts to have some influence is Aj = C~~)y, which is a function the
R 8 -R -8preferences of the government. Since (3 > (3 ,A > A . That is, when a
status quo government is in power the donor starts to have influence at lower
budget levels than when a reform government is in power. This is due to
the fact that the status quo government ideally wants a higher level of public
consumption than a reform government. It therefore hits the constraint r ~ 1
before a reform government does.
The donor has complete control when its budget exceeds A = (l~:D) y.
Depending on its the preferences, this might entail unrealistically large bud-
gets, sizeable budgets for development assistance to the country in question,
or small sums. We shall discuss this matter latter. For now, it suffices to
point out that since (3D > (3R, A > AR, which confirms that the donor must
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have more resources in order to achieve complete control than it must have
to have some influence.
Note that in this case, when determined by the equilibrium concept,
rF (j) 2:: 1- (3; with a strict inequality for all positive levels of aid. That
is, the donor influences policies, as is the case when ac is taxable, but in a
direction which is the exact opposite of what it would have liked to see. This
holds for both types of governments, which optimally tax harder when aid is
given than when it is not. Of course, at the end of the day, it is the outcome
that matters, not the policy, but in light of the debate on conditionality
vs. ownership, it is interesting to see that even a reform government would
optimally act contrary to the donor's wishes.
Summing up, the optimal actions of the donor along the equilibrium path
are
{
{O,O},A=O;
(8) {a~,a:} = {A,O},A E (O, A] ;
{a~,a;} ,A> A.
The best response of the government is (along the equilibrium path)12
(
r* (j) , A E [O, Aj] ;
(9)rF (j) = 1, A E (Aj, A] ; _
any r E [0,1], A> A.
Finally, the outcome as a function of the donor's budget and the govern-
ment's type is in equilibrium
(
{c* (j) ,g* (j)} , ~ _:: [O, Aj] ;
(10) {CF,gF} = {A,y} ,A E (Al, A] ; _
{c* (D) ,g* (D)} ,A > A.
3.3 The Issue of Fungibility
It is difficult to define fungibility in a precise way. In the literature, the
example that is ordinarily used to illustrate the concept is a situation where
12The assumption that T ;::: O is innocuous. The alternative specification for .A > A -
any T ::; 1- does not change the outcome.
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a donor wants to support a specific activity in the recipient country through
an earmarked grant. Aid is then said to be fungible if expenditures on that
activity do not rise by the full arnount of the grant. But this is a naive
representation of the donor, particularly if fungibility is indeed an important
problem.P In the present model, the donor acts strategically, taking into
account the possibility of diversion of resources by the recipient.'! Therefore,
it optimally adjusts its aid policy in order to achieve as much as possible.
It follows that in the current context, fungibility is better defined in terms
of influence over the final allocation. That is, aid is perfectly fungible if the
donor has no influence on the outcome, partially fungible if it has some, and
not fungible if the donor is in complete controlover the outcome.
An alternative view would be that foreign development assistance is not
-j
fungible at all when the government cannot tax ac• For A ::::;A , the donor
allocates its total budget to private consumption. While the government
controls the final allocation, c = (1 - T) Y + A 2: A in this range (since
T ::::;1). For A > Aj, the donor has some limited influence on the final
allocation. It still chooses ac = A, and since c = A, no part of the donation
is spent on g. Finally, when the donor is in complete control, aid is clearly not
fungible. But this position will not do; the donor acts in this way precisely
because it realises that aid is fungible (partially or completely) for A ::::;A.
Hence, I suggest that in aid garnes, fungibility should be defined in terms
of the extent of the influence that the donor has over the final allocation. A
simple though arbitrary measure of donor influence in the current model is
( )tl.({ FF}) d({cF,gF},{c*(j),g*(j)})
11 c , 9 = d ({ c: (D) ,g* (D)} , {c* (j) ,g* (j)})'
where d (v, w) is the Euclidean distance between the points v and w.
13Seee.g. Feyzioglu, Swaroop, and Zhu (1998). Even in this apparantly simple setting,
however, there are some loose ends. These authors for some reason assume that the
recipient must spend at least the size of the grant on the activity supported by the donor.
Presumably this is because the donor will "punish" the recipient if it spends less than this
amount. But then why does not the donor punish the recipient if it diverts part of the
grant to other activities? Given the problem of punishing straying recipients, there is an
untold story here that needs elaboration.
14That there is no crowding-out of-domestic spending here even when aid is perfectly
fungible (e.f. c = Ii (y + A), while in the absence of aid, c = /Jiy; i.e., domestic spending
is constant at (3jy) is an artifact of the particular form chosen for the utility functions,
which yields linear expansion paths.
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Thus, !:::..({cF, gF}) measures the distance between the outcome and the gov-
ernment's "first-best" allocation as a proportion of the distance between the
"first-best" allocations of the donor and the government. The measure there-
fore requires {c* (D) ,g* (Dn =I {c* (j) ,g* (jn, but, as noted by Devarajan,
Rajkumar, and Swaroop (1999), "[T]he question of what aid ultimately fi-
nances is interesting only if the preferences of the donor are different from
those of the recipient" .
It is easily seen that!:::.. ({c* (j) ,g* (jn) = Oand zx ({c* (D) ,g* (Dn) = 1.
This confirms that the donor has no influence for A < Aj, and is in complete
control once A > A. It is straigthforward to verify that !:::..( {CF, gF}) is
an increasing function ::_f A on [Aj, A], with !:::..( {CF, gF}) = O at Aj and
s: ({.r ,gF}) = 1 at A. Thus, the donor has some influence when A E
(Aj, A), and its influence over the final allocation increases with its budget
until it is in complete control, as previously shown.
4 The Donor as the Leader
I now change the order in which the donor and the recipient make their
moves. Thus, I assume that the donor moves before the recipient. It should
be clear that if ae is taxable in the same way as y, development assistance is
for all practical purposes still completely fungible." The budget constraints
facing the government after the donor has chosen its aid policy are c =
(1 - 7) (y + ae) and 9 = 7 (y + ae) + ago There is no way the donor can
manipulate these through ae and ag to prevent the government from achieving
its optimal distribution of y +A into c and 9 by way of 7 that would improve
the outcome from its point of view.!" We shall therefore concentrate on
15An analogous result has been derived by Pedersen (1995) for the case he labels "the
donor as a passive Stackelberg leader". His" active Stackelberg leader" is assumed to
be able to write binding contracts with the government in a recipient country. It can
thus keep the government at its "participation constraint", i.e., the level of "utility" it will
have in the absence of aid. However, in practice, such contracts are not legally enforceable.
There are no international courts in which redress for breach of contract can be sought.
Therefore, the approach chosen here, which assumes that no legal means are available to
alter the outcome relative to the subgame-perfect equilibrium, seems more realistic.
16The qualification relates to the possibility that we must have r 2: O,i.e., subsidiation is
not allowed. The donor could set ag = A. Then 9 2: A if r 2: O. If A 2: (1 - f3D) {y + A),
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the case where ac cannot be taxed. Whenever it is necessary, I will use the
superscript L to distinguish strategies and outcomes from those derived in
the last section.
It is straightforward to calculate that at an interior solution, the govern-
ment would choose the following tax rate as a function of ac and ag:
Now the donor must try to exploit the constraint 7 ::; 1. This it can do
if its budget is large enough. 7L (j) ::; 1 {::}a; ::; C~~j)(y + ag), so even
utilising its resources maximally (setting ac = A and ag = O), the donor will
not be able to influence the outcome until A > C~~j)y = Ai. For budgets
lower than this, aid is completely fungible, and the government achieves its
"first-best" outcome. For A ~ Ai, the donor finances private consumption
and the government finances public consumption until the maximum level of
public consumption that the government can secure (y) is the optimal one
from the donor's perspective. This occurs at a level of the aid budget equal
to A = (l~;D) y. Thus, the degree of fungibility exhibits the same pattern
as in the situation where the donor moved last.
In sum, the optimal actions of the government along the equilibrium path
are
The donor's best response is (along the equilibrium path)
the government ideally wants a lower level of g, but is constrained by the impossibility
of setting a negative tax rate. ac cannot be used in the same way, since any fraction
of it can be turned into 9 through T. Of course, the donor does not want to force the
government into this corner, because the outcome would be even more 9 than at the
government's "first-best" allocation, which still has more 9 than the donor wants. The
donor is powerless to influence the outcome in the dersired direction in this case as well,
so according to the definition used here, aid is completely fungible.
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(14){a~,a~}=
{O,O},A=Oj
{ac, A - ac} , A jE (0, Aj] j
{A, O} ,A E (~, A] j
{a~,a;} ,A > A.
The equilibrium outcome produced is the same as when the donor is a
follower
{
{c* (j) ,g* on ,~~ [0, Aj] j
(15){cL,gL}= {A,y},AE (A3, A] j_
{c* (D) ,g* (D)}, A> A.
-j =We see that both A and A are unchanged from the case where the donor
moved last. This is perhaps surprising prima facie, but it turns out that
the two cases are mirror-images of each other. When the donor moves last,
the government is able to exploit the non-negativity constraint on ay until it
cannot increase the level of public consumption in the absence of aid, that
is, until T = 1. Hence, the government corners the donor by making a; = A
its optimal choice. From then on, even by setting T = 1, the government
is powerless to stop the donor from turning any increase in its budget into
more c. Here, the donor is not able to prevent an interior solution to the
government's optimisation problem if its budget is small. But once its total
budget is large enough for the extreme aid policy ac = A to make an impact,
it will exploit the government's incomplete ability to tax total private sector
income. ac = A will make an impact when the government ideally wants
a level of c which is lower than this (given total income y + A). Thus, the
government gets pinned down at T = 1 by the donor.
The conflict between donor and recipient is over how to split the pie.
Lacking the powers to tax, the donor must exploit any weaknesses on the
part of the government. The government's weakness is that it has incomplete
controlover private sector income. The donor can use this to its advantage
when it has enough resources to make c inoptimally high from the perspective
of the government even when all domestic income is taxed away. However, it
is not in complete control until it wants to increase 9 from the level at which
the government has fixed it. Conversely, the government takes advantage
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of the donor's inability to tax when it moves first. This works as long as
it can secure more 9 through its own resources than is optimal from the
donor's point of view. For low levels of A, it can attain its "first-best"
allocation through this strategy. For medium levels of the donor's budget,
the government can secure a minimum level of 9 by spending all domestic
income on this good. It becomes powerless to affect the outcome once the
donor wants 9 > y. So the underlying logic of the conflict is that, if possible,
both the donor and the recipient exploit the incomplete control of the other
party over the pie to increase the share allocated to the good it prefers the
most relatively speaking. Since their preferences are thus in effect strictly
opposed, each of them are drawn to the extreme positions that the other
party uses against them when it has a first-mover advantage.
5 Domestic Political Equilibrium and Aid
Let us now assume that the government is chosen through democratic elec-
tions. That is, before the aid game starts, there is an election in which
voters voter for either R or 8. This choice is determined by comparing the
outcomes with the two governments in power, given the level of the donor's
aid budget.'?
Table 1: outcomes under different types of government
Afj R 8
la,Asl {c* (R) ,g* (Rn {c* (8) .s' (8n
(AS,ARI {c* (R) ,g* (Rn {A,y}
(AR,AI {A,y} {A,y}
>A {c* (D) .s" (Dn {c* (D) ,g* (Dn
Since the outcomes do not depend on the order m which the donor and
the government moves, the following applies to both cases analysed above.
Voters have utility functions which are analogous to the objective func-
tions of the government and the donor. We can, for each of the four categories
of aid levels in the table, find the preferences of the voter who is indifferent
between the two types of government. It is immediate from Table 1 that for
17Because aid is completely fungible when the government can tax whatever amount is
given to the private sector, the outcome only depends on the government's type. Hence,
I ignore these cases here. '
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A > AR, all voters are indifferent between R and S because the outcome is
the same regardless of the choice of government. This is so even if the elec-
tion would produce a clear-cut winner in the absence of foreign aid. With
no aid forthcoming, the indifferent voter(s) I has a weight on the utility of
private consumption equal tol8
16 I _ In (1 - ,BS) - In(1 - ,BR)
( ),B - [In,BR -In,BS] + [In (1 - ,BS) -In (1 - ,BR)]'
It can be shown that ,BI E (,BS, ,BR). If the preferences of the median
voter are such that ,BM < ,BI, S wins the election." On the other hand, for
,BM > ,BI, R wins the election. Only in the unlikely case ,BM = ,BI would the
outcome of the election be indeterminate in the absence of aid. If the median
voter resolves his indifference by flipping a fair coin, a donor might contribute
to turning a certain victory for a reform government into a mere 50-50 chance
of winning! The giving of aid, however, can even turn the domestic political
equilibrium upside down when A E [AS, AR] .
To see this, we must find the indifferent voter for those levels of the aid
budget. When A = AS,,BI is still given by (16), since in this borderline case,
S achieves its optimal allocation at a tax rate of unity. For A > AS, the
calculation is complicated by the fact that it is no longer only the ideology
of the two alternatives that matter. S is nowat a corner solution, and the
level of aid therefore plays a role. The problem is best solved by defining a
"virtual" opponent to R, that is, a government with preferences such that the
outcomes produced under an S-government equal its "first-best" outcomes.
,BI can then be calculated in analogy with (16).
The weight the "virtual: opponent attaches to the utility of private con-
sumption, ,B, must satisfy ,B (y + A) = A, or
(17){3 (A) = AA'y+
18øl is found by calculating the ø for which the utility from electing R is equal to the
utility from electing S. See Appendix A of Hagen (1999) for the details.
19The conditions ensuring that the median voter is decisive are clearly satisfied here (in
particular, preferences are single-peaked) even though he cannot choose his most preferred
tax rate. The median voter model is unrealistic for national elections, three notable
features of which are a fixed set of alternatives (parties or candidates with party labels),
uncertainty about voter preferences, and voter uncertainty about what policy will result
from the election of a particular alternative. Only the first is present here, but there is no
point in introducing the last two features in the current model, which has only one period.
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- -S B;B(A)Clearly, (j (A) E (0,1) as required (since A 2 A > O). Moreover, BA >
O. The more aid is given in this range, the higher is private consumption
(public consumption is constant). Thus, to make the outcome a "first-best"
outcome for the "virtual" opponent when foreign assistance goes up, it must
attach a greater weight to private consumption. Furthermore, as ø (AS) =
(js, ø (AR) = {jR, and {jR > (jS, ø (A) E [{jS, {jR].
{jl is now a function of the aid budget:
In (1 - ø (A)) - In (1 - (jR)
(18){j1 (A) = .
[ln{jR -In{j (A)] + [In (1- (j (A)) = ln (1- (jR)]
In the appendix, it is demonstrated that a,B~1A) > O, with li~ {jl (A) =
A-+AR
{jR. That is, the identity of the indifferent voter is moved "to the right" as
the aid budget goes up, and in the limit (in this range of aid budgets), even
a voter with a weight on the utility of private consumption equal to {jR is
indifferent between the two types of government! The latter is due to the
fact that in the borderline case of A = AR, the outcome is {A, y} regardless
of which government is in power.
What is happening is that as the aid budget increases, the outcomes
under the two types of governments are converging, c.f. Figure 3. In the
end, the outcomes are the same, and the label of the government does not
matter for outcome-oriented voters. The country is effectively under foreign
administration, and domestic politics therefore is devoid of any real content.
If {jM E ({jl (AS) ,(jl (AR) ), a reform government would have won in
the absence of aid. {jl (AS) is equal to {jl as given by (16), which in turn lies
between {js and {jR. Therefore, if {jM > {jl (AS), a reform government would
have been preferred to a status quo government by a majority of the voters
if no aid was forthcoming. But with aid, there clearly exists an aid budget
A' E (AS, AR) such that {jM = (jl (A') (since (jl (AR) = {jR, {jM < {jR,
flflI{.4\ ( -R)and ~ > O). Hence, for A E A' , A ,a reform government will now
certainly lose the election!
Such an outcome would clearly make the donor worse off. Even ,though
it has some influence with a status quo government compared to none with
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Figure 3: convergence of outcomes under R- and S-Governments
a reform government, outcomes are still better under the latter from the
donor's point of view. In Figure 3, it is easily seen that for any aid budget
in the region [AS, AR), the point on R's expansion path, which will be the
outcome if it is in power, is closer to the corresponding point on the donor's
expansion path than {A, y} is.
While this need not happen, it is clear that if aid decisively affects the
domestic political equilibrium, it is in this direction. If øM < øl (AS), a
-R -Rreform government loses the election \iA < A . From A on, it has a 50%
chance of winning. IføM > øl (AR), a reform government wins the election
until A = AR. For higher levels of the aid budget, its probability of winning
drops from 1 to 0,5. Finally, as just noted, if øM E (Øl (AS) .a' (AR) ), R
wins as long as A < A', see its chances of winning reduced to 0,5 at A', and
vanish for A E (AI, AR). From then on, its electoral standing recovers to a
50% chance of winning.
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6 How Realistic Is Donor Influence?
We have seen that whether the donor has no, limited, or complete controlover
the outcome of the aid game depends on the size of its total budget relative to
two critical values, Aj and A. Both are functions of the preferences of one of
the players, specifically, the government and the donor, respectively. Looking
at the latter first, A = C~:D) y, the value of which is increasing in f3D. For
small enough values of f3D, the resource requirement for complete control does
not look daunting. If f3D = 0,2, for example, A = 0,25y. However, the size
of the budget is only small for what is presumably unrealistic specifications
of the donor's preferences. It seems reasonable to suggest that the pressures
put on recipient countries in the last couple of decades are for state sectors
well below 50% of the economy. Thus, f3D > ~ is realistic, implying that
the donor must have a budget greater than the pre-aid level of income of
the country in question. According to the World Development Report 1997,
for example, Mozambique received aid equivalent to 101% of its GNP in
1994, and the corresponding number for Rwanda was 95,9%.20 However,
these are clear outliers in the sample, and there is no reason to believe that
the picture is very different in other years. Moreover, these numbers are
for total aid given to the country, so single donors (whether bilateral or
multilateral) would clearly see the requirement for complete influence exceed
their resources. If we interpret the donor as the international community, it
is thus possible to come up with country examples where the sums are so
great that development assistance might be expected to determine recipient
country resource allocation according to the current model. Though, these
are exceptional, and as we are about to see, the expectation is probably still
not realistic.
What then of the critical level of aid needed to have some influence?
Numbers for the size of the public sector in developing countries are hard
to come by. A recent study by Commander, Davoodi, and Lee (1997) pro-
vides data for public consumption as a share of GDP that can be used for
20If aid influences the level of income, these are not the kind of numbers we really
want. Many empirical studies have investigated the relationship between aid and economic
growth, but I do not know of any studying how aid affects level of incomes (presumably
this is due to the fact that aid is primarily given to relatively poor 'countries). The
unconditional relationship between aid and growth seems weak. In any case, we are
looking for a hypothetical counterfactual (aid/income in the absence of aid), and so for
purposes of illustration numbers like these will have to do.
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illustrative purposes. Taking their data for government consumption in 1987
US-dollars (aid budgets are not measured in terms of purchasing power par-
ity), the average for the developing countries in their sample was 14,7% in
1974-83. If we take this as the status quo, and add some for other com-
ponents of the government's budget, we might take 1 - ØS to be about 0,3
in an average developing country. Using these numbers, AS = 2,33y. So
even with governments wanting a large public sector, which presumably also
had great problems financing their expenditure plans in the aftermath of
the debt crisis, the donor community would have a hard time buying any
influence whatsoever.
Granted, in a more disaggregated model, it seems reasonable to expect
that the requirement for being influential for specific goods or sectors would
be less daunting. Still, the conclusion that aid ceases to be fungible if the
sum is large enough is supported by the empirical study of Boone (1996).
He finds that" [i]n small countries, or countries where the aid/GNP ratio is
extremely large (over 15% of GNP) [...] aid does lead to higher investment."
This contrasts with his general conclusion, namely, "[t]he marginal propensity
to consume from aid is insignificantly different from one and the marginal
propensity to invest is insignificantly different from zero." In this perspective,
donor fatigue is to be expected.
7 Is Donor Influence Desirable?
Given the current emphasis on the ownership, the implication of the "back-of-
the-envelope" calculations of the last section might not be negative. And the
conclusion fits well with the generally negative reviews of the effectiveness
of conditionality in inducing policy reform. According to Killick (1998),
for instance." "Our country survey attested to the frequency with which
differences of interest [between !FIs and governments in recipient countries]
occurred and the negative effects of these on conditionality implementation.
Itwas precisely because of the strength of these considerations that we could
show in Chapter 4 the large importance of 'ownership' as a determinant of
implementation, and why the evidence in Chapter 6 showed domestic political
forces normally carry the day in decisions about economic policy." (pp. 171-
2.1Other notable studies on conditionality (in relation to both aid and multilateral lend-
ing) include Mosley, Harrigan, and Toye (1991) (on the World Bank), Killick (1,995) (on
the IMF), and World Bank (1998) (on aid in general).
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72, quotes in original) We have not explicitly modelled conditionality, for
exactly the reason that it cannot be expected to work well given the lack of
legal means by which enforcement of the conditions could be made credible.
It is clearly possible to design" contracts" which would hold the governments
to their participation constraints, but there are no courts in which to enforce
these, and one is thus left with the carrot and stick of giving or withholding
financial assistance.P Whether such threats and promises are credible, and
if credible, sufficient, to instigate reform in recipient countries must thus be
examined.
I have examined the credibility issue by using an equilibrium concept
that rules out empty threats and promises. For instance, when the donor
moves last, we have seen that it will spend its total budget, even though
it could have withheld funds if their contribution to the finaloutcome was
negative given the tax rate chosen by the government. It is never optimal
for the donor to do so, but this just goes to show that statements like "we
will reduce our disbursements of aid by x% if you do not choose a tax rate
of z" are not credible.P The constraints on donor behaviour implied by the
concept of sub-game perfectness put a question mark on the results derived
in a well-known paper by Rodrik (1989). He studies the impact of aid on
trade reforms assuming that a donor makes a one-time offer of aid contingent
on reforms and finds that this may lead a government which is not in favour
of reform to pretend otherwise in order to cash in before reversing their trade
policy stance. The possibility of reform reversal has a negative impact on
domestic investment. However, the problem is founded on the unrealistic
assumption that aid can be made contingent on the actions of the recipient
country government. Thus, whether they hold up in a more realistic model
remains to be seen.
I have also shown that the funds required to influence resource alloca-
tion are sizeable compared to real aid flows. True, the reform we consider is
very stylised, amounting to a reduction in the average tax rate compared to
the status quo. Still, a non-trivial pattern of the impact of aid on policies
emerged. Researchers such as Burnside and Dollar (1997) has found that,
220n the design of formal aid contracts, see e.g. Pedersen (1995a,b) and Svensson
(1995). Killick (1998) provides "meat to the formal bone" by discussing the principal-agent
approach to multilateral lending based on an extensive review of the empirical literature
and new country case studies from South-east Asia and Latin-America.
230f course, a model in which the aid budget is endogenous is even better equipped to
deal with the credibility issue. This must await future research. '
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empirically, aid seems to have had little impact on economic policies in recip-
ient countries.f Based on the model developed here, this is to be expected
from an average of countries, since the link from aid to policies will depend
on e.g. the details of the tax system. While the model is admittedly simple,
its implications thus sits well with the well-documented lack of success of
conditionality.
According to the model, this is perhaps all the better, even for the donor,
at least in democratic recipient countries. We have seen that the level of
development assistance might affect whether the median voter of a recipient
country prefers a reform government to one wedded to the status quo. In
fact, if the donor's actions decisively affects the domestic equilibrium, i.e.,
changes the probability that one of the political alternatives wins from 1 to O
(or vice versa), it is to the disadvantage of a reform government! In light of
the finding of Dollar and Svensson (1998) - that democratic governments tend
to be more successful reformers - it is therefore tempting to advise donors
(and public lenders) not to leverage their resources in order to achieve a level
of aid at which influence can be had, and to concur with the conclusion of
these authors: "[T]he role of adjustment lending is to identify reformers not
to create them." (pA)25
8 Final Comments
The conclusion in the last paragraph does not necessarily imply that the task
of donors becomes simpler, only that they should stop throwing good money
after bad. In the model used here, neither aid nor policies affects the size of
the domestic pie (aid increases the total pie 1:1). The size of the domestic
pie is given, and both aid and tax policy only affect the allocation of the
sum of domestic and foreign resources available to the country in question to
private and public consumption. In reality, of course, both matter. A strong
24Admittedly, much can be said about the construction of their" policy index" , consist-
ing of measures of inflation, budget surplus, and trade openness, even beyond the obvious
that strictly speaking none of the components are policy variables.
25Dollar and Svensson (1998) consider a range of political variables such as regime type
and degree of political instability, as well as input variables under the control of the World
Bank (e.g. amount of resources allocated to loan preparation and supervision). They
find that the former predicts reform success (as defined by the Operations Evaluation
Department of the Bank) in a sample of adjustment loans made by the World Bank, while
there is no connection between the latter and outcomes. '
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conclusion of the extensive empirical literature on policies and growth, for
example, is that good policies foster economic growth. And some evidence is
starting to accumulate to the effect that while the unconditional relationship
between aid and growth is weak, aid works when policies are sound. Thus,
the next step should be to allow for links from policies to the income level
(or the growth of income). Foreign development assistance will then have
an impact whether it affects domestic policies or not (the former should be
expected, though).26
It follows from the above that development assistance will be most valu-
able if it is directed towards countries in which the government pursues, or
intends to pursue, policies that increase the level of income or its growth rate
and reduce income inequality and poverty. I have assumed that everybody
has the same share of income, but this is, alas, not a realistic description of
actual developing countries. Income distributions are highly skewed in favour
of the upper deciles (or worse), so the task facing donors is not only to pick
governments which will increase the aggregate or average income of their poor
country, but to single out those which are willing to distribute the resources
of their societies more equitably too. This is no mean task. Setting precon-
ditions for loans already has a long tradition with the multilateral lending
institutions, but to repeat myself once again, this has not had much of an
impact on reform success. Preconditions are meant as a screening device to
help "good" governments separate from bad ones. However, the practice has
not solved the adverse selection problem in which status quo governments
pose as reformers in order to cash in on "conditional" foreign financing.F
This they can do because there is a great difference between adopting re-
26Such an extension would make possible an investigation of two competing hypotheses
about the impact of aid on the decision to reform; i) that the decision hinges on foreign
assistance to help smooth the transition to a new equilibrium, and ii) that crises are
the midwifes of reform, and that concessional financing will thus induce governments to
postpone the hard choices. A formal model of the benefits of crises for reforms is provided
by Drazen and Grilli (1993), based on the work by Alesina and Drazen (1991) on the
delay of fiscal stabilisations. Casella and Eichengreen (1994) have studied the effects of
aid in that framework, and conclude that these depend crucially on the timing of both
announcements and disbursements.
27This is an adverse selection problem because it seems reasonable to assume that differ-
ent types of governments have different intentions with respect to fulfilling the requirements
of conditionality. In addition, there will usually be a moral hazard problem regardless of
the intentions of the government, because the benefits and/or costs of carrying out reforms
might vary with the state of the economy or polity.
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forms on paper and actually implementing them, and the punishment for
non-implementation has been weak, due to e.g. the disbursement imperative
of the multilateral financial institutions (or the "Samaritan's Dilemma" of
bilateral donors piggy-backing on the conditionality of the multilateralsj.i"
To this, it might be added that governments change, particularly in low-
income countries, which are more unstable politically than high-income coun-
tries. Sometimes, and more regularly in recent years, this is by democratic
means. It is therefore not only the intentions of the current government that
must be probed, the path of likely governments must be estimated. This re-
quires a greater understanding of the political economy of recipient countries
- e.g. how interests are organised, the ideology of the main parties, and the
electoral system - in order to be able to predict the impact of reforms on the
distribution of income among politically influential groups, the support of
political parties, and, ultimately, on the domestic political equilibrium which
determines whether reforms will be adopted, implemented, and sustained.
But the picture is not all gloom and doom. There are many examples of
surprise reformers (see e.g. Cukierman and Tommasi 1998a,b). Policy choice
is a function of not only political preferences, but of beliefs about the links
between policies and outcomes. Beliefs might change even when ideologies do
not, whether on the basis of accumulated experience or through persuasion.
So even if money cannot buy reformers, careful analysis of where to put one's
bets might in combination with a policy dialogue based on long-standing
relationships enable donors to make a difference.P
In conclusion, the main contributions of this paper are
* to show that while commitment versus discretion is irrelevant to the
outcome of aid games of the type studied here, the recipient government's
ability to tax transfers to the private sector (or administrative capacity more
generally) is very important;
* to provide a definition of fungibility when both the donor and the
281 use quotes on the "Samaritan's Dilemma" because most bilateral donors are not
(pure) Samaritans. See for example Alesina and Dollar (1998) for an empirical investiga-
tion of bilateral donors' motivations for giving aid.
29That information transmission is most efficient when preferences are similar, is well-
known from "cheap-talk" games. A similar mechanism is what lies behind the results of
Cukierman and Tommasi (1998a,b), who demonstrates that sometimes, it takes a Nixon
to go to China; i.e., that one's own kind is best placed to convince one of the need for bold
action given the state of the world. This is because someone with similar preferences will
not try to take advantage of one's incomplete knowledge of decision-relevant information
.the way a political adversary might.
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recipient acts strategically;
* to show that very large sums are needed if donors are to have any
influence over outcomes;
* and to investigate the effect of foreign aid on the political equilibrium
in democratic recipient countries.
As already noted, there is plenty of room for expanding on this simple
model, something I hope to do in the future.
9 Appendix
9.1 Subgame-Perfect Strategies of Donor and Recipi-
ent When ac Cannot be Taxed
As noted in the main text, for all practical purposes, the strategies of the
donor and the recipient are the same regardless of which one of them moves
first. Therefore, we shall only derive these strategies for the case where the
donor moves last. The proof will be somewhat informal.
Define o» = Ui ({3iy, (1 - (3i) y), and note that this is the level of utility
achieved by a government of type j in the absence of aid given that it chooses
its utility-maximizing tax rate 1 - {3i.
The optimisation problem of the donor is
Max UD (e,g)
ac,ag
subject to c = (1 - r) y+ac, 9 = ry+ag, ac+ag ~ A, and Ui (c, g) ~ ti»,
with r predetermined by the government. The Lagrange function for this
problem is thus AD = UD (e,g) + A (A - ac - ag) + J-l [Uj (c, g) - Ui*]. The
first-order conditions are
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Define ..4by Uj ({3D (y + ..4) , (1 - (3D) (y + ..4)) = ti». This is the level
of the aid budget at which the "participation constraint" of the government
is not binding at the outcome produced by the donor's "first-best" policy
{{3D (A + y) - (1 - r) y, (1- (3D) (A + y) - ry} = {a~ (r; A), a; (r; A)}. As
{3D =f {3j, j = R, S, ..4> Osince a strictly positive amount of resources is
necessary to compensate the government for the "inoptimal" distribution of
consumption sought by the donor.
Consider first the case A ~ A , that is, the case where the participation
constraint of the government is not strictly binding at {a~ (r; A) ,a; (r; A) }.
Then the participation constraint is clearly not binding for any other tax:
rate (than 1- (3j) the government might choose. Thus J-£ = O,and the donor
need only worry about the non-negativity constraints on ac and ag. We shall
concentrate on the latter, as this is the one which is of importance for the
equilibrium outcome. As (1 - (3D) (y + A) > O, 30 < r' :::;1 such that
r'y = (1 - (3D) (y +A), 'VA :::;A = C~;D)y. Thus, for r :::;r', the non-
negativity constraint on ag is not strictly binding at {a~ (r; A) ,a; (r; A) }.
By choosing this policy, the donor achieves its "first-best" outcome, so it is
clearly optimal. For r > r', the non-negativity constraint on ag is strictly
binding at {a~ (r; A) ,a; (r; A)}, and the donor therefore optimally chooses
ag = Oand ac = A.
When A < ..4 , there is a range of tax: rates [r/l, rj*], r/l > r', such
that the participation constraint of the government is strictly binding at
{a~(r; A) ,a; (r; A)}. However, since indifference curves are convex and
{3D > {3j, j = R, S, it is obviously the case that the non-negativity constraint
on ag is binding at the aid policy that satisfies the participation constraint.
Therefore, the donor cannot settle for satisfying the participation constraint,
and will still choose {A, O}for r > r', It follows that we have J-£ = Oat the
donor's optimum in this case as well.
For A > A, ~r' :::;1. Therefore, neither the participation constraint nor
the non-negativity constraint on ag is strictly binding at {a~ (r; A) ,a; (r; A) }.
The donor is therefore free to choose this policy regardless_of r.
Finally, to complete the proof, we must show that A > A. Since i» (.,.)is
strictly increasing in both arguments, A> ..4{::}Uj ({3D (y +A) , (1 - (3D) (y + A)) >
uj ({3D (y + ..4) , (1 - (3D) (y + ..4)) = ti», where the equality follows from
the definition of..4. The proof is then immediate from comparing rP* and
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u; ((3D (Y +A) ,(1- (3D) (Y + A)); notingthat as 1> (3D > (3;, (3D (Y + A) =
C~;D) Y > (3;y and (1 - (3D) (Y + A) = y> (1 - (3;) y.
In sum, the best response of the donor given its budget and the tax rate,
{a~(Ti A), a: (Ti A)}, is30
AfT [O,T'] > T'
° {O,O} {O,O}(O,AI {a~ (TjA) ,a; (TjA)} {F,O}
>A {a~ (T; A), a; (T; A)} {a~ (Ti A), a;(Tj A)}
The government knows {a~(Tj A) ,a: (Tj A) } when it chooses its tax pol-
icy. If there is no aid, we know that the tax rate 1 - (3; is its optimal
choi S· aUi(pD(A+y),(l-pD)(A+Y») ° d aui(pD(A+y),(l-pD)(A+Y») °
oice, mce Be < an ag >
at {(3D (A + y) , (1 - (3D) (A + y)}, it is in the government's interest to in-
crease 9 and decrease c relative to this point. Its "first-best" tax rate
given a level of income in the private sector (A + y) (of which A is not
taxable), ~ (1 - (3;) (A + y) = T* (j), ensures that the final allocation is
{(3; (A + y), (1 - (3;) (A + y)} 'VA~ Aj = C~~3) y. This claim is proved by
noting that, as (3D > (3;, T* (j) = ~(1- (3;) (A + y) > ~(1- (3D) (A + y) =
T' . Hence, the donor gets stuck at its corner solution, unable to affect the
outcome. As it can attain its "first-best" outcome by choosing T* (j), this
tax rate is obviously the optimal choice of the government. T* (j) ~ 1 {:}A ~
=ri (fli) =riA = ~ y. Thus, for A > A , the government cannot attain its "first-
best" allocation for an income level equal to (A + y) because of its inability
to tax a., T = 1 is then clearly optimal for A ~ A, as any reduction in the
tax rate would lead to more c and less g, and thus move the outcome further
away from the government's "first-best allocation" given the sum of domes-
tic income and aid. When A > A, the government is powerless to affect the
30This is not a complete description of the sub-game perfect equilibrium strategy of
the donor since we have not investigated its optimal response if for some reason the non-
negativity constraint on ac is binding. It can be shown that for certain levels of the donor's
budget, there exists a r'" < r' such that for r < r'", the non-negativity constraint on ac
is strictly binding. Faced with such tax rates, the donor will choose {O,A}. Such tax rates
would thus result in an outcome with more c and less 9 than the donor wants. Since the
government wants less c and more 9 than the donor, instigating such sub-games is clearly
not optimal for the government. Hence, for the sake of brevity we ignore them. '
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outcome, because the donor now wants 9 > y. The optimal strategy of the
government is therefore as given by (9) in the main text (if negative values
of T are disallowed, but this is of no importance for the equilibrium), and the
outcome follows straightforwardly from the strategies of the two players.
9.2 Political Equilibrium
[-S -R]The "virtual" opponent of R when A EA, A is defined as the type of
government that would have optimally chosen the outcome generated un-
der an S-government. Since private consumption is equal to A with an
S-government in power, the preferences of the "virtual" opponent can be de-
- - -s-
rived from {3 (y + A) = A¢:}{3 (A) = Y~A. As A > 0, (3 (A) E (0,1). More-
BP(A) - (-S) S - (-R) R Rover, BA = (yJA)2 > O. Thus, as {3 A = {3 ,{3 A = {3 , and {3 >
{3s, (3 (A) E [{3s,{3R]. {31(A) is then found from Ul ({3R(A + y) , (1 - (3R) (A + y)) =
Ul ((3 (A) (A + y) , (1 - (3 (A)) (A + y)), i.e., it is the weight placed on the
utility of private consumption by the voter( s) who is (are) indifferent between
electing Rand S (represented by its "virtual" sister party). It is straight-
forward to verify that {31(A) is given by (17) in the main text; and, using
the procedure in Appendix A of Hagen (1999), that {31(A) E ((3 (A) ,(3R),
VA E [AS,AR). The derivative of (18) with respect to A is
1
(A3) lilER {31(A) = lilER 1 Hl = {3R.
A....A A ....A i3 +H
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Chapter 5
Local-Level Politics and Policy Implementation"
October 7, 1999
Abstract
In low-income countries, the greatest volume of political activity is
found at the implementation stage of the policy process. This is due to
both the centralised nature of policy-making and the presence of political
powers at the local or regional level ("strongmen"). Thus, one should look
for possible explanations of the widespread discrepancies between govern-
mental plans and output in these countries at the implementation stage. I
study the interaction among low-levelbureaucrats, central government of-
ficials, and strongmen assuming the latter to be better informed about the
choices of officialscharged with policy implementation than the political
principals are. Implementation gaps are shown to be complex functions
of the preferences of the players and their costs of taking action.
1 Introduction
The New Political Economy (NPE) is one of the fastest growing sub-fields of
economics. The main thrust of the research agenda in NPE has been aimed at
explaining the choice of economicpolicy. While important in its own right, this
approach entails an implicit assumption that the choice of a policy determines
what policy is actually pursued. Such an assumption is not wholly innocuous,
however. In most cases, policies are indeed chosen by politicians.! Still, politi-
cians do not implement the policies chosen. That is left to another group of
actors, namely, bureaucrats. And at least since the influential early work of
'This is a substantially rewritten version of a paper entitled "Bureaucrats, strongmen,
and politicians in a policy implementation game". I am indebted to Kjetil Bjorvatn, Bernt
Christian Bruun, Øyvind Norli, Karl Roll Pedersen, Jostein Tvedt, and, in particular, Gaute
Torsvik for helpful discussions during the process of writing this paper. I have also benefited
from the very thorough comments of Khan Shesadri on a previous version, as well as the
remarks of seminar participants at the NFU-conference 1996 and the Annual Conference of
the European Economic Association 1996. The usual caveat applies. Work on this paper was
begun when I was visiting the Department of Economics at Boston University. I would like
to thank the faculty and staff at the department, in particular Professor Kotlikoff, for their
hospitality. The research reported here has been financed by the Norwegian Research Council.
lThe qualifier most is used because politicians sometimes delegate policy-making powers
to bureaucrats. For example, in industrialised countries regulatory policy is often delegated
to bureaucratic agencies.
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Niskanen (1971), it has been accepted that bureaucrats might not be of the
Weberian ideal type. They might have their own goals, and these could differ
from those of their political principals. Therefore, policy choice does not neces-
sarily determine what policy is implemented. This will depend on the incentives
given to the bureaucrats and the control exercised by the politicians, a point
elaborated on in the next section.
Assuming that bureaucrats are "perfect" implementors is of course a way of
focusing on the choice of economic policy. This approach might tell us much
about the effectsofdifferent political institutions and ideologieson policy choice.
Such an approximation might also lead to a better understanding of the influ-
ence of interest groups in the industrialised countries. However,as pointed out
by Grindle and Thomas (1991), in poor countries the pressures from affected
groups emanate mainly after a policy has been adopted. That is, "vested inter-
ests" tend to focus on the implementation phase of the policy process. There
are several reasons why there is such a differencebetween high- and low-income
countries. In the latter, the policy process is relatively centralised and often
confined to discussions among a small group of persons at the apex of the polit-
ical structure. This holds even when the regime is nominally democratic, since
both political parties and formal interest groups tend to be relatively weak. The
lack of organisational power on the part of societal interests is both a cause and
a consequence of the fact that people do have influence at the implementation
stage. The societal structures of many poor countries, where most individuals
are involved in strong informal networks such as family, clan, tribe, or patron-
client relationships, create an environment where people expect that they can
achieve exemptions from rules and regulations through personalised exchanges
with government officials. This need not imply outright corruption, i.e., the
explicit exchange of money or "gifts" for favours, although this certainly is a
widespread phenomenon; frequently it involves the exchange of favours, with
a favour today creating an obligation on the part of the receiver, often sanc-
tioned by other members of the relevant network, to reciprocate in the future.
Hence, government officialsin the field do not distribute the resources at their
disposal or exercise their regulatory powers according to formal rules emanating
from the top of the bureaucracy or the central government. Instead they are
guided by a complex web of past obligations, present "demand", and potential
future reciprocity. In combination with weak structures of bureaucratic control,
compounded by reciprocity games within the bureaucracy, this is surelyone of
the most important reasons why there is such a large gap between planned and
actual policy in the so-called Third World.
Another important feature of the implementation environment in many low-
income countries is the presence of politically powerful figures at the local or
regional level: large landowners, industrial magnates, and ethnic or religious
leaders are obvious examples. Sometimes they are the patrons of local-level
public employees. On other occasions, they are informallawmakers, explicitly or
. implicitly laying down the rules of the game by virtue of their economic,political,
or social power. Frequently, then, they have an impact on how governmental
policies are carried out within their spheres of influence. This impact might be
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magnified in circumstances where the potential for political instability is great,
because then national-level politicians and bureaucrats might find that they
need the stabilising influenceof these local "strongmen'tP
My aim in writing this paper is to provide a preliminary investigation of the
policy implementation process in low-incomecountries. Specifically,the analysis
will be aiming at indicating answers to questions such as: What determines
the extent of the deviation between the chosen policy and the one actually
implemented? Is a hands-on approach by policy-makers required in order to
minimise the gap between actual and chosen policies, or can a hands-off policy
be sufficient to keep implementation gaps within reasonable bounds? When
do vested interests have influenceover bureaucrats charged with implementing
policies?
The next section briefly reviews the literature on political control of the
bureaucracy. I then look at the implications of certain idiosyncratic features
of the policy process in poor countries - specifically,the presence of local-level
political powers and the politicians' desire for a stable polity - for the tasks
laid upon low-levelbureaucrats. Section four is devoted to setting up the basic
model. In the following two sections the results generated by two different
versions of that model are derived. The last section contains a summary of the
results as well as a discussion of possible extensions and generalisations.
2 On the Political Control of the Bureaucracy
The formal literature on bureaucracy starts with Niskanen's (1971) seminal
work on monopoly bureaus. Niskanen assumed that bureaucrats have an in-
formational advantage in terms of their own activities relative to their political
principals, specifically,about the costs of producing various activity levels. This
advantage stems from their expertise in the substantive areas in which their bu-
reaus are employed. He also assumed that a bureau is the sole provider of the
services sought by the political principals and that the bureaucrats have goals
different from those of the principals, such as power and prestige. Assuming
that the size of the bureau's budget is an adequate representation of many of
these goals and that the bureaucrats can make "take it or leave it" offers to
the politicians, Niskanen predicted that a bureau would be able to maximise
its budget subject to the budget covering the production costs of the bureau's
services. In the process, all the surplus from the production of services would
accrue to the bureaucrats.
Niskanen's contribution has spawned a small literature of its own on the
consequences of agenda setting power.3 On the other hand, other researchers
have questioned several of Niskanen's assumptions, in particular those relating
to the institutional structure of the budget process. For example, Miller and
2This is the term used by Migdal (1988) in his study of the strength of the state relative
to society in low-income countries.
aFor a summary, see Rosenthal (1990). Agenda setting is of course in many contexts other
than the one considered here, for instance, in legislative voting models. '
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Moe (1983) assert that the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats is
one of bilateral monopoly, and that it might be the politicians who make the
bureaucrats offers and not the other way around. As these authors show, the
results are then generally not as favourable to the bureaucrats as they are in
Niskanen's world.
Still, work done in this area after Niskanen has generally retained two of
his assumptions, namely, that there is an informational asymmetry between bu-
reaucrats and politicians (working in the former group's favour) and that the
two groups of agents might not have identical objectives. Bureaucrats are ex-
perts in their field of work while politicians rarely have the luxury of spending
time and resources to specialise in specificpolicy issues. Even when they acquire
some such knowledgeas a by-product of their work, such as when they sit on
legislativecommittees charged with controlling a certain type of policy, the bu-
reaucrats are likelyto possess information about the details of their operations
that the politicians do not. I have already mentioned that the costs of providing
their services might be private knowledge to the bureaucrats. Other examples
include the consequencesof alternative policies in terms of likely outcomes and
costs of implementation, the progress in implementing the choicesof the politi-
cians, and even what alternative courses are feasible. When combined with
the fact that, realistically, bureaucrats will have preferences that differ from the
politicians - whether these are economic (the bureaucrats' desire for the greatest
possible consumption and leisure) or political (power and different ideologies)
- some rather undesirable consequences from the viewpoint of the politicians
might result, such as shirking, corruption, or distortions of both policy choice
and implementation. In fact, in the extreme, the result might be technocratic
rule, with the bureaucrats making policy and not the politicians.
Though, the principals are not powerless vis-a-vis their agents, even when
the informational asymmetry or preference differential is great. This is not
the place for a full discussion of the possible ways in which politicians might
structure their interaction with the bureaucrats.! Instead I will concentrate on
two modes of oversight that politicians might choose: "Police Patrol" (PP) and
"Fire-Alarm" (FA).
The terms PPs and FAs were coined by McCubbins and Schwartz (1984).
PPs are more centralised, direct, and active than FAs. The politicians might
set up structures such as legislative oversight committees and hold hearings,
commission outside studies, and request reports from the bureaucrats. In an
FA system on the other hand, the politicians rely on interested third parties to
inform them when bureaucrats violate their mandate. Consequently, they will
provide for mechanisms which enable citizens and interest groups to monitor
bureaucratic decisions, such as rules of notification, and for political, adminis-
trative, or judicial means of punishing bureaucrats that "stray from the path"
that the politicians have set up for them. From the perspective of the politi-
cians, an FA system has the advantage of being relatively cost effective. The
costs of monitoring bureaucrats and perhaps also the costs of punishing them
'On this, see e.g. McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast (1987, 1989).
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for deviations are borne by other agents or institutions: courts, interest groups,
and citizens. These cost savings the politicians can spend on constituency ser-
vices, initiating or passing legislation, or whatever other activities contribute to
the fulfillment of their goals. Note that it does not matter whether politicians
are purelyoffice motivated, purely driven by ideology, or some mixture of the
two extremes: the point is that the time, staff, and monetary resources spent
on monitoring in a pp system have alternative uses, and an FA system allows
politicians to channel resources into these alternative activities.
On the other band, FA systems have a drawback relative to pp systems. To
the extent that a pp system is effective, it fully reveals the private information
of the bureaucrats, albeit for only small sections of the bureaucracy at a time.
Since an FA system endows interested parties with the power to "blow the
whistle", report, and comment, it opens the possibility for the misuse of such
power, i.e., the use ofthese powers by FAs to consciously mislead the politicians
in the hope of tilting the outcome in their favour. Hence, the politicians are
involved in two principal-agent relationships, and the cost effectiveness of an FA
system must be weighed against the likelihood and consequences of dissembling
FAs.5
The motivation of the literature on PPs and FAs is the design of the in-
stitutional structure of public administration. However, at least so far, the
analysis has concentrated on the positive properties of various institutional fea-
tures which are observed empirically. That is, the models focus on the outcomes
of games between politicians, bureaucrats, and perhaps interest groups or courts
within given institutional frameworks, not on the optimal design of these struc-
tures and proceæes." The model presented below is in the tradition of analysing
behaviour given a framework which seems empirically reasonable. It is related
to the work of Lupia and McCubbins (1994a,b) and Epstein and O'Halloran
(1995). The former investigate the possibilities of political principals learning
the hidden knowledge of their bureaucratic agents in PP, FA, and mixed sys-
tems (i.e., systems that incorporate features from both ideal types). However,
SThere are a couple of potential problems here though. If politicians are to some degree
swayed by electoral incentives and voters and members of interest groups are rational, one
would have to be a little more careful in explaining why shifting the costs of bureaucratic con-
trol from themselves onto individual citizens and pressure groups constitutes an improvement
for the politicians. It might be that this division of labour is more efficient for politicians,
voters, and interest groups combined since the latter two are directly affected by the pol-
icy implemented while the politicians would have to expend resources to acquire information
about the actions of the bureaucrats. But to answer this question one must confront head-on
the collective action problems of those who are supposed to "work" as FAs. However, because
I am not concerned with the choice of institutional structures and do not study the behaviour
of groups, these caveats do not apply to the argument made in this paper.
6To be precise, there has been little formal analysis of the optimal choice of administrative
processes and structures. Epstein and O'Halloran (1994) is a notable exception. McCubbins,
Noll, and Weingast (1987, 1989) rationalise existing features of democratic public institutions
as reflecting optimal design efforts by elected officials (on the 'basis of the US framework), but
do not provide a formal model to underpin their claims. Of course, this does not invalidate
their analysis, but the generality of the claims as well as how the nature of the trade-offs
involved vary with conflicts of interests and costs of monitoring, enforcement, and policy
deviations cannot be ascertained without taking the relevant factors explicitly into account.
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in contrast to them, I allow the bureaucrats to be active players in the game.
Epstein and O'Halloran construct a model of FA oversight by interest groups.
They generate results which resemble some of mine even though the actions of
interest groups are cheap talk, while the FA in my approach engage in costly
signalling.
The foeus of the model presented in this paper focuses on the more infor-
mal aspects of an oversight system. While the discussion of the two modes of
oversight is often couched in terms of the different institutional structures they
imply, casual empiricism makes it clear that in any political system agents with
political clout will be able to "comment" on policy if they wish to, regardless
of whether politicians have put up structures that institutionalise the forum in
which such comments are made. For example, demonstrations and riots are
examples of quite strong comments on policies made outside of formal chan-
nels. It follows that one does not have to confine the discussion to legislative
oversight. Hence, the political principals do not have to be legislators. They do
not even have to be politicians strictly defined. The point is that the actions of
third parties might convey information to any principal charged with overseeing
a bureaucracy - whether an agency head, a minister, or a legislative committee
- regardless of whether FA features are incorporated into a formal system of
oversight. In fact, in developing countries, which is the area of interest to us, it
is more likely than not that there is no institutionalisation of FA mechanisms.
Still, vocal actors who are politically important will be able to get their message
through to policy makers if they so wish. Of course, this does not mean that
the principal(s) will necessarily heed these calls for investigations and change.
This will depend on factors like the costliness of action for the various actors
and the degree to which their interests coincide.
Finally, note that the model that follows focuses on the bureaucrats' role
as implementors of policy and not on their agenda setting role. In both the
approach of Lupia and McCubbins and that of Epstein and O'Halloran, the
bureaucrats can be viewed as having the possibility to make policy because
they have proposal powers." This, however, will only be ofinterest in relation to
top-level bureaucrats. Here we investigate the behaviour of government officials
in the field to see what might be deduced about potential deviations between
policy as determined by politicians and the final output of the government.
It follows that we do not share the literature's focus on the consequences for
institutional choice, although one would hope that further down the road such
implications can be drawn. Instead I concentrate on the positive properties of
a stylised - though hopefully not too unrealistic - bureaucratic system located
7In sum, there are two main areas where differences arise among the three approaches.
First of all, the costs that the FA incurs if he acts matters here. In Lupia and McCubbins
(1994b), it does so only through a potential penalty for lying, while the cheap talk approach
chosen by Epstein and O'Halloran (1995) implies that there is neither a direct nor an indirect
cost of action. Secondly, Lupia and McCubbins assume that it is costly for the bureaucrat
to make a proposal (but, as noted above, he is not an active player in their model). Epstein
and O'Halloran, on the other hand, suppose that it is costless. Since I investigate policy
implementation, I assume that there are punishments for deviating from the policy choice of
the politicians only if the bureaucrat is caught.
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in a low-income country.
3 The Policy Implementation Process in Low-
Income Countries
What policy is pursued in a country is determined in a multistage process from
initiation via policy choice to implementation. In this section, I will discuss
some features common to many societies in Latin America, Africa, and Asia
which imply that it is particularly important to investigate the implementation
processes in these countries if one is to be able to predict which policy will
actually result. As mentioned in section 1, the implementation stage seems to be
a relatively neglected part of the policy process in the formalliterature on policy-
making. However, it seems that in poor countries, there is more political activity
at this stage than in high-income countries, where most influence attempts are
made at the agenda setting or policy choice stages of the policy process. In the
words of Grindle and Thomas (1991, page 66):
"Large segments of the population in developing countries are
not represented in discussions of policy. In fact, much of the par-
ticipation in policy discussions that occurs in more open democratic
countries is replaced in developing countries by more particularistic
or clientelistic participation of low-status groups during policy im-
plementation. Citizens and groups excluded from the closed decision
making that occurs within ministries or executive councils in capital
cities have much greater capacity to approach implementing officials
who control day-to-day allocation of resources with demands, pe-
titions, bribes, or other forms of pressures. This tends to increase
the extent to which processes of poliey implementation are highly
political in developing countries."
In many poor countries, another societal feature acts to reinforce the impor-
tance of the implementation stage for the finaloutcome, namely, the fragmenta-
tion of social control. Often, the rules of the game are not simply the laws and
regulations established by the central government. In fact, in some areas, these
rules might be totally subjugated to those laid down by local or regionalleaders
such as tribal chieftains, religious leaders, and large landowners. I will use the
term strongmen to refer to these agents. Their domination over the "common-
ers" within their area can be based on religious or traditional authority, more
mundane powers such as controlover land, credit, and jobs, or a mixture of
both. An example of the more instrumental type is patron-client relationships.
These are asymmetric personal relationships of repeated exchange in which the
patron provides each client with mainly economic resources in return for polit-
ical or economic labour services.f Because of the voluntary and instrumental
8For elaborations on this definition and the character of patron-client relationships, the
reader might consult the articles in Schmidt, Guasti, Lande, and Scott (1977). Formal inves-
tigations of rural power relationships include Bssu (1986) and Naqvi and WemhBner (1995).
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nature of the relationship, the patron has to be able to provide the clients with
resources on a fairly regular basis. Any competing sources of land, loans, jobs,
and the like threaten the hold that the patron has over his clients. The state is
of course an example of such an alternative provider of resources. Therefore, a
patron will be inclined to attempt to control the distribution of governmental
resources either directly by seeking to become a local-level state employee or in-
directly by placing "his" men in important positions or bribing or intimidating
central government appointees into accommodating his demands. Thus, when
strongmen have power at the local level, there will be pressure towards tilting
the distribution of state resources and the implementation of central government
policies in favour of them.
Central government decision makers might not look too adversely upon such
local or regional compromises. The reason is that they might find it in their
interest to placate the strongmen in return for the latter using their social control
to prevent political challenges to the central government from arising and to
bolster support for it (at least nominally). In many low-income countries, there
are potentially explosive forces such as great inequalities of income and wealth
and ethnic and regional differences. These forces make the regimes fragile,
and they might therefore place great stress on preventing any disruptive events
from occurring. For example, riots and demonstrations might inform opposition
groups that there is widespread dissatisfaction with the regime and hence induce
them to step up their efforts to undermine the current rulers." In a democracy,
elections might be swayed by such events when they are widely seen as conveying
private information about the government, e.g., its (inlcompetence.l'' It follows
that governments seeking to stay in power are willing to pay a certain price to
the people in control of the masses at the local level.ll
There are of course other potential sources of pressure on implementation
officials such as local or regional politicians or bureaucrats from other central
government agencies. Many governmental policies will affect the standing of
politicians below the national level and they will therefore seek to influence
implementation in their favour, for instance, by securing as many "pork bar-
rel" projects as possible for their districts. On the other hand, the political
clout of low-level politicians might facilitate the implementors' jobs. Likewise,
bureaucrats from other central government agencies might control resources or
be responsible for policies that have consequences for the effects of the policies
that implementors manage. The various sources of pressure on implementation
officials are depicted in figure 1.
In this paper, I will concentrate on the "Triangle of Accommodation" cre-
ated by implementors, strongmen, and central government officials.12 It will be
9See Bates and Weingast (n.d.). The work of Lohmann (1993) could be adapted to the
present context to produce such effects.
lOFor a similar argument with respect to public opinion polls, see Cukierman (1991). Of
course, mass political action could also influence elections by signalling other types of private
information, e.f. Lohmann (1994).
uC.f. Migdal (1988).
12This term is due to Migdal (1988), who focuses on the purely local triangle made up 'by
implementors, local politicians, and strongmen.
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Central government officials
(politicians or bureaucrats)
Local or regional politicians
(governors, mayors) and
aAents of other state bureaus
Local or regional societal
interests (strongmen, business
organisations)
Local-level implementors
Figure 1: triangles of accomodation
assumed that the central government officials, whether these are politicians (e.g.
ministers) or bureaucrats (e.g. department heads), are concerned with both the
implementation of a certain policy and the need to avoid public conflict over the
policies. This in turn is reflected in the tasks laid upon the implementors, who
are supposed to be as diligent as possible without creating a "scandal",l3 The
bureaucrats are motivated by career concerns - including power and status - and
will fulfil their tasks in a manner which maximises the expected present value
of the net benefits from their career trajectory. The strongmen have an interest
in the policy being pursued and might be willing to use their social control to
create public disturbances if this contributes to a more favourable policy out-
come from their perspective. In sum, the focus is on potential political sources
of deviations in policy implementation. The choice of this focus does not imply
that other channels of influence such as corruption or intimidation of bureau-
crats are considered unimportant. On the contrary, they are certainly part of
a complete explanation of why plans are not fully implemented. However, the
empiricalliterature implies that political explanations should also be considered
and this paper takes a first step in that direction.
4 The Model
Three agents are assumed to be involved in the policy implementation process:
a bureaucrat (B), a strongman (8), and a politician (P). B is a low level bu-
reaucrat charged with implementing a policy desired by P in the field. In the
13For example, in a case study of a Mexican federal agency, Grindle (1977) notes that
the demands made upon local-level bureaucrats from above were twofold: "(1) to implement
centrally determined policies, and (2) to solve local level problems without public scandal."
(p.129) ,
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geographical district B is administering, S has a high degree of controlover
"commoners". This control he might attempt to use to influence B's choice,
because B's future career is determined not only by his implementation efforts;
p also wants B and his peers around the country to fulfil their tasks without
generating harmful controversy. However, P cannot costlessly monitor what B
does. Instead he relies on FA. More specifically, if there are protests or com-
plaints about the implemented policy, P evaluates whether it will be worthwhile
to spend resources to find out what B has done. I assume that if P chooses to
monitor, the policy is implemented as planned. Hence, the decision to monitor
or not is equivalent to deciding whether to pay a "fee", the costs of monitoring,
to be certain that the "ideal" policy is implemented.
S cannot play his role as an FA for free. Even with a high degree of social
control, S must bear the expenses of organising the protests of his "subjects" .14
Therefore, he might decide that bringing the case to P's attention is not worth-
while, in which case the policy will be what B has chosen to implement.
All actors have a policy ideal, denoted by xi .15 The ideal point of P is
assumed to be the policy that has been chosen, i.e., xp is to be implemented by
B.16 The utility of the actors depends on the deviation of the actual policy, y,
from their ideal point:
(l)ui (y) = -lY - xii·
The set of all possible policy choices is a compact interval on the real line.
Specifically, x1,xs'xp,z,y E W = [!Q,w] C !R+P
In addition to the loss from deviations of the policyoutcome from his most
preferred alternative, B suffers a utility cost if S decides to stage "riots" in
response to B's implementation choice, z, This loss, denoted by ø, is meant to
represent the damage done to B's career as a consequence of failing to "handle
the situation", as well as the penalty imposed for deviations from the policy
14For example, if S is a large landowner, he has to bear the costs of driving his tenants into
town to demonstrate and at the same time forego the output that they could have produced
during the protests.
15The reason why B is assumed to have an ideal point is that I want to capture the fact
that he might either have policy preferences himself or be "someone else's man". For instance,
the strongman might have been able to ensure the appointment of one of his proteges. Or
the local governor might succeed in pressuring national-level politicians into putting one of
his confidants in charge of policy implementation in his district. Political appointments to
bureaucratic positions are widespread in poor countries. Grindle (1977) provides some exam-
ples from Mexico. See Geddes (1994) for evidence of this practice in other Latin American
countries.
16The reason why P's choice is not explicitly model is that, realistically, it would depend
on factors not considered here. Even assuming that the only type of consideration entering
his calculus was the reactions of strongmen, any country has many of these, and so P would
have to take into account the reactions of all of his implementors and the strongmen they
face. Such an analysis is beyond the scope of this paper (but see the comments in the final
section).
17W C lR+ is only a convenient normalisation which simplifies the exposition without af-
fecting the generality of the results. '
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choice of p.l8 <P is assumed to be strictly positive, finite, and constant. The
latter implies that it does not depend on the magnitude of protests - riots,
demonstrations, petitions, and the like - organised by S. The marginal cost to
S of using his social control, K, is also assumed to be strictly positive, finite,
and constant. The assumptions of constant losses to B from protests within his
jurisdiction and constant marginal costs of staging these for S are not only made
for the sake of computational simplicity. It is difficult to have a definite notion
of the shape of these cost functions. For instance, realistically, a strongman has
many different ways of protesting, and these could have different cost functions.
In the absence of any specific priors as to the relation between these costs and
the level of p, I opt for the simplest possible representation so as to facilitate the
exposition of the basic forces at work in this three-player game. Furthermore,
assuming risk-neutrality is the more conservative choice in such a situation.
Finally, P pays a fixed fee c - to be interpreted as the opportunity cost of the
time and monetary resources spent by P in figuring out what has transpired - if
he decides to monitor what has happened in B's district. All player's objective
functions are additively separable in policy and non-policy elements, with the
latter entering linearly.lQ
All parameters except xB are common knowledge. I assume for the moment
that P does not know B's ideal point. However, I will note what difference it
would make to the results if this restriction was eased. Observe that it does not
matter whether S knows xB or not. He moves after B and observes z. Therefore,
he cannot influence the choice of z strategically and he does not have to form
an opinion of what z is based on common knowledge information. However, as
mentioned above, P is assumed not to observe directly what B's choice is. In
order to make an informed choice of a strategy, he thus have to form beliefs over
the location of z in !R, and whether or not he knows xB will affect these beliefs.
An example of a situation approximating the one described here would be
where a local-level bureaucrat is entrusted with allocating a fixed budget be-
tween two different projects. His superior instructs him to allocate a certain
proportion to each project. However, he might decide to implement a different
spending pattern. The reason for this is that his own benefits from the projects,
or those of his family, friends, or other relations, could differ from those of his
principal. Still, he has to take into account that the local strongman has his
18Strictly speaking, cf> should then be higher if P chooses to monitor than if he chooses not
to, because in the latter case a deviation is never detected. However, as will be come apparent,
what matters for the equilibrium is that there are costs for B associated with protests by S
which are not incurred in the absence of such unrest. Therefore, for the sake of notational
simplicity, I do not include a separate parameter denoting the costs of being caught deviating
in policy implementation.
19In the case of S, the latter assumption can be interpreted as saying that the resources
spent on protesting are small relative to his endowment, so that his utility of consumption
is only marginally affected. To avvoid unnecessary notation, I do not include a parameter
representing the endowment of S; but the assumptions W C Rand K. > O ensure that the
maximalievel of protest that S would be willing to stage is finite (see the next section), which
seems reasonable. Hence, so are the costs incurred. Moreover, I do not include the costs to P
of the protests, which presumably are the source of the implicit incentives given to B. These
are in any case immaterial here since P moves after S.
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Figure 2: timing of moves
opinions about the budgetary allocation too and could be willing to use his
considerable influenceover the local populace to stage social unrest that might
draw the bureaucratic superior's attention.
The timing of this sequential game is as follows. "Nature" first draws the
policy ideal of B according to the continuous density function f (xB) (with
cumulative distribution F (xB))' B then decides what his optimal implementa-
tion choice is. Upon observing z, S has the options of keeping silent (p = O)
or organising a certain magnitude of protests (some p > O). If he opts for the
former, the case is not brought to P's attention, so the game ends and payoffs
are awarded accordingly. However, if S chooses a positive level of protests P
must decide whether or not to incur c in order to monitor B. This choice must
be based upon the signal sent by S and the common knowledge parameters,
which P can use to update his prior probability distribution over the possible
values of z. If P monitors (M), he get his most preferred policy, xj,. If he does
not monitor (D), the game ends with z being the final outcome. Thus, there
is an implementation gap if y =j:. xj" and the size of this gap is lY - xj,l. The
timing is illustrated by the schematic game tree in figure 2 for the general case
where P has a move followingevery signal from S.
The reason why P is assumed not to be involved in the game if p = O
is that this is how an FA works - no alarm means no action. Furthermore,
casual empiricism seems to confirm that this is how the implementation process
generally works; if there is no "fuss", the top of the bureaucracy ignores what
goeson further down the hierarchy, particularly in the periphery. However,since
this strategy clearly makes possible collusion between low-levelbureaucrats in
the field and interested third parties, it would be interesting to see if this sort of
behaviour constitutes part of the equilibrium of a game between rational actors.
Therefore, in section 6, I consider the general case in which P might respond to
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the silence of S by checking on B if it is optimal to do so. But, first of all then,
the restricted case.
5 A Pure Private Fire-Alarm
The equilibrium concept that will be utilised in the analysis of this game is Per-
fect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). In a PBE, the players' strategies are optimal
given the equilibrium strategies of the other players and their beliefs. That is,
whenever a player is to make a move, he chooses the action that maximises his
utility given his beliefs about the history of the game so far and about how the
game will evolve depending on his move. Hence, by requiring behaviour to be
sequentially rational, empty "threats" or "promises" are ruled out. The beliefs
are updated using Bayes' Rule and the equilibrium strategies of the other play-
ers. Since beliefs are only defined along the equilibrium path in a PBE, I will
use the criterion of Universal Divinity (UD) due to Banks and Sobel (1987) to
refine beliefs following out-of-equilibrium actions when such refinements have
consequences for the equilibrium. Of course, beliefs are trivial for Band S.
They know all the parameters of the model. In addition, B can perfectly pre-
dict the consequences of his move for the equilibrium outcome. S observes B's
choice, and can predict with certainty what P will do as a function of his own
choice. On the other hand, P does not observe the initial move by B and he
does not know that player's ideal point. Thus, the interaction between Sand
p is a (sub-)game of incomplete information, while the part involving Band S
is a (sub-)game where the players have complete (and perfect) information.
As is common in this type of games, I start the analysis at the end. That is,
I will first analyse the signalling sub-game involving S and P and thereafter go
on to study B's choice of z. The endgame of incomplete information has some
peculiarities which sets it apart from a conventional signalling game. First of
all, S' real type, represented by his ideal point xs, is common knowledge here.
However, we can think of B's choice of z as determining the "type" of S in the
eyes of P. The value of z is the information of interest to P, like the type of
the sender is to the receiver in an ordinary signalling game, and S might have
incentives to conceal it or seek to reveal it. Secondly, though, in contrast with
the usual signalling game environment, the sender has the option of choosing
an action which precludes the receiver from playing the game. In other words,
there is a signal which if it is sent does not "reach" P; signals have to exceed a
threshold of strength (zero) before they are "detectable". This contrasts with
the usual signalling game set-up, and the next section, where "inaction" is just
another message that has to be taken into consideration when the receiver forms
his beliefs. Still, the game can be solved in the manner of signalling games, so
I will use the terminology of this class of games when it helps illuminating the
analysis.
Some preliminary results can be derived by studying S' maximal "willingness
to pay" in order to get P to monitor. Given z, there are only two possible
outcomes: z or xp. By taking the difference between the values of these two
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Figure 3: pffax (z)
alternatives according to S' objective function, we find the possible gain to him
from having P monitor B's decision. This is obviously the most he would be
willing to pay to get xp, the outcome when P chooses M. Since each unit of
protest costs 1'1" we can calculate the corresponding maximalIevel of protests he
would be willingto stage as a function of z. Denote this function by pffax (z).20
In the following,I will assume that Xs 2:: xp. The case Xs < xp is of course
completelyanalogous. pffax (z) can be shown to be of the followingform:21
Definition 1:
pffax (z) =Max {O, Iz-xsl-Jxp-xsl}.
This function is illustrated in figure 3.
Obviously, pffax (z) = O for z E [xp,2xs - xpJ. For z in this interval, S
prefers not to involveP because B's choice yields a better outcome than xp.
Though not completely correct technically, since Band S do not coordinate
their actions, I will hereafter speak of [xp,2xs - xpJ as the collusive interval
(CI).22 For these values of z, Band S have a common interest in keeping P
out of the game; or, more generally,to induce him to abstain from monitoring.
Note two important points. Firstly, we have made no restrictions on the
possible size of the protests that S can organise and we do not explicitly in-
corporate a budget constraint. Still, an upper bound on arises endogenously
as long as 1'1, > O. Secondly, even though S potentially has an infinite number
of "types" , an important dividing line separates these into only two categories:
20The sub-script O is used to distinguish the version of the function that is relevant here
from that of the next section, where S might be willing to stage a protest if this deceives
p into thinking that" all is well". Similarly, this sub-script is attached to optimal strategies
given the assumption that p = Oprecludes P from making a choice.
21When positive, p~""" (z) is derived from the identity -Ixj. - x;l- Itp == -Iz - x;l.
22In the main text, I mostly confine myself to the case 2xs - xj. < 1O. If 2xs - xj. ~1O,
then Cl is [xj.,1O].
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those that prefer xi> to B's choice and those which hold the opposite preference.
Hence, when z E [m, xi» U(2xs - xi>, wl, S and P have common interests, while
a z somewhere in the Cl means that they have conflicting interests.
Figure 3 immediately reveals that there can be no fully separating equilibria
- equilibria where for each possible value of z S chooses different levels of p
and hence fully reveal B's choice - in this model. This possibility is in general
precluded because for two values of z, Oand xs, S has a dominant strategy of
not protesting at all. For these two implementation choicesby B, S is indifferent
between z and xi>. Since these are the only possible policy outcomes, it is not
worthwhile for S to expend resources on protesting B's decision. Hence, we
have
Result 1:
There are no fully sepamting equilibria in the sub-game involving Sand P.
In fact, since under the assumptions made in this section choosing p = Ois
equivalent to getting z with certainty, for all z in Cl this is a dominant strategy,
as the non-positiveness of Plfax (z) in this interval demonstrates. Here S at the
minimum weakly prefers z to xi> and when he can get his preferred outcome
without cost, he has the best of all possible worlds.
Beforeweproceed, it is useful to introduce some notation for the strategies of
theplayers. Let ~(xB) be B'sstrategy, where c :W --+ W. The strategy of Swill
be denoted by r(z), r: W --+ !R+;and that of P by m(p), m:!R+ --+ {M,D}.
An asterisk will be used to denote optimal strategies.23
I will first briefly discuss the case Xs = xi> since it allows me to illustrate
certain features of the model, namely, the Principle of Accommodation, the
No Monitoring Zone, prohibitive monitoring costs, and completely informative
signalling in a simple way. Thereafter, the more interesting and more complex
case of Xs > xi> is discussed.
5.1 The Caseof Xs = xi>
When Xs = xi>, Cl = 0: there is no scope for collusion between Band S since
the policy preferences of S and P are identical. However, neither party cares
about the costs of action incurred by the other party. If monitoring is costless,
m* (p) = M Vpis clearly the only optimal strategy for P. When c= O,he might
as well check regardless of the signal sent by S. In turn, this makes r" (z) = O
Vz the equilibrium strategy of S. He has the same policy preferences as P, so he
has no incentive to keep him out of the game. Furthermore, given that P always
monitors, there is no point in expending resources on attracting his attention
to any deviations made by B.
The strategy of P leaves B little room for choice. If he chooses z = xB' he
will be detected and "punished". Since ø > O,the only optimal strategy of B
is therefore <;* (xB) = xi> VxB. That is, regardless of his policy preferences, B
fulfils his task in a true Weberian fashion.
23For the sake of notational simplicity, I do not make explicit the connection between the
equilibrium strategies of S and P and their ideal points; nor do I show that m* (p) is in fact
a function of ~* (z.B) too.
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Does this strong result extend to the case where monitoring is costly? As-
suming c > O, there are clearly values of z such that it would not pay for P to
monitor if z was known to him. The most extreme values of z for which this is
true are given by Iz - xj,1 = c. That is, they are such that the utility that gets
if he monitors, - Ixj, - xj, I - c = -c, is equal to the utility he gets from not
intervening, -Iz - xj,l. Thus, we have
Definition 2:
The No Monitoring Zone (NMZ) contains the values of z which are such
that if P had known that zEN MZ, he would at least weakly prefer not to
monitor. Given monitoring costs of c, NMZ = [xj, - c,xj, +c].
It followsfrom this definition that monitoring costs can be prohibitive. The
cost of monitoring is prohibitive if 8 would not monitor regardless of the value
of z:
Definition 3:
Monitoring costs are prohibitive if the N MZ spans the whole policy space;
NMZ ;2 W. The level of monitoring costs at which this occurs is c= Max {xj, - W,w - xj,}.
In any PBE, for r" (z) to be the optimal strategy for 8, it must be the case
that for any two z' and z''; the followingincentive constraints hold:24
(2a) -lY (m· (r· (z'»; z') - xsl- Kr· (z') 2 -lY (m· (r" (Zll»; z') - xsl- Kr" (Zll);
(2b) -lY (m· (r" (Zll» ;Zll) - xsl- Kr" (ø") > -lY (m· (r· (z'»; Zfl) - xsl- Kr" (z') .
That is, given S'« equilibrium monitoring strategy m" (p), 8 must (weakly)
prefer the action prescribed by r" (z) for the value of z chosen by B to the
action prescribed by r" (z) for any other value of z. It immediately followsthat
if m· (r· (z'» = m· (r· (Zll» = M, which implies that y(m" (r· (z'»; z') =
Y (m" (r" (Zll» ;Zll)= xj" we must have r" (z') = r' [z"}. That is, since 8 only
can take two possible actions, M or D, there can be at most one positive level
of protest in equilibrium. 8 will of course choose p =Oif z E Cl. Thus, he will
only protest if he prefers xj, to z and it is not too costly to induce 8 to monitor
(i.e., the requisite p does not exceed PoMax (z)). If there is more than one level
of p for which m: (r" (z» = M, the lowest such p is of course the preferred
alternative as it achieves the desired result at the least cost. Thus, the only
possible semi-separating equilibrium in the sub-game between 8 and P is one
with some types pooling at p = Oand the rest pooling at some p > O. For ease
of future reference, this is stated as Result 2:
Result 2:
If a strictly positive level of protests exists, it is unique. Hence,so is any
semi-separating equilibrium in the sub-game between 8 and P.
When Xs = xj" it is in fact fairly easy to derive the actual value of p. I will
do this with the aid of figure 4.25
24Banks (1991), page 18. Since I focus on pure-strategy equilibria, there is no uncertainty
about the relation between p and y.
25Note that p~"'" (xp - c) = p~"'" (xp + c) only when Xs = xp.
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p'
rlP,) . .Xp =Xs z(P') •Xp+C z(P")
Figure 4: the principle of accomodation
The important question iswhether p can take values like pli > p{faz (xp + c)
or p' < p{faz (xp + c). In both cases, the answer turns out to be no. The val-
ues of z for which S is willing to play pli if this act induces S to monitor are
[.Yl,~(p")) U (Z(p") ,w]. That is, pli ~ p{faz (z) Vz E [w,~(p")) U (z(p") ,w].
Since none of these lie strictly inside NM Z, it is at least weakly optimal
for S to monitor if he observes pli. However, the same can be said of all
p{faz (xp + c) < p ~ p", Therefore, it is reasonable to require m* (p) = M
Vp E [p{faz(xp+c),p"]. As p" is arbitrary, the same argument can be ex-
tended to all p > pftaz (xp + c).26 Since we know that S will choose the lowest
of these, it followsthat p ~ pftaz (xp + c).
Is p' a reasonable candidate then? If p = p', then all bureaucrats with
ideal points in [w,~(p')) U (Z(p') ,w] will be caught deviating if they choose
z = xB: S will organise protests and P will monitor. Thus, S will have the
worst possible policy outcome - y = xp - and he has to pay the "fine" <1>.
Clearly this is dominated by "compromising" , i.e., choosinga value of z such that
r" (z) = Ois optimal. This is the Principle of accommodation. It would seem
that the principle requires bureaucrats for which xB fl. ~ (p') ,z (p')] to move to
~(p') or Z(p'). However, on closer inspection, that much accommodation is not
necessary. The Principle of accommodation and UD in combination yields the
prediction p = p{faz (xp + c).
Consider a deviation to some p < p'. Given the postulated equilibrium, this
is an out-of-equilibrium message. The concept of UD requires P to believe that
a deviation from the equilibrium is made at the values of z for which S has the
26What P should believe upon observing p > M ax {pff ao: Ull) , pt! ..o: (w)} is not readily
apparant , What is obvious, however, is that this is of no consequence for the equilibrium, so I
proceed as if the strategy space of S is [O,Max {pff'''' Ull) ,pff"O: (w)} l. A similar short-cut
is made in the next section. '
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most to gain from such a deviation. In other words, he should believe that a
deviation is made at the values of z for which S requires the least "positive"
response from him in order to make such a deviation. Because we are looking for
an equilibrium in which S protests only if his preferences over z and xp coincide
with those of P, a positive response implies that P monitors. The values of z
for which S is most likely to make a specific deviation is thus those for which
he requires the least probability of P choosing to monitor after observing his
deviation. It can be shown (see the appendix) that the critical values for z are
the cut-off points separating the regions in which the strongman does protest
from those where he chooses not to. Intuitively, these are the values of z which
are furthest from his ideal point (in equilibrium), because B, if necessary, adapts
to his credible "threat" of protesting by moving to points where S is exactly
indifferent between protesting or not. Therefore, it is in these cases that he
has the most to gain from deviating. As a positive level of protest will not be
observed along the equilibrium path, to be part of S' equilibrium strategy, it
must be the case that if such a level of protest was observed by P, he should
entertain beliefs which induces him to monitor. This condition is not satisfied
for p < p'. In the postulated equilibrium, S has the greatest incentive to deviate
at s (p') and z (p'). These both lie strictly within the NM Z. Thus, the optimal
response of P to p < p' is D. This would make S stick to the equilibrium.
But since p' is arbitrary, we can repeat this argument until p = pfax (xp + c).
Then ~ (p') = xp - c and z (p') = xp + c. In other words, the set of z for
which it is optimal for S to keep quiet in equilibrium coincides with NMZ.
The signalling strategy of S is therefore completely informative in the following
sense: upon observing his signal, S is able to make the same decision as he
would have made if he had known the location of z for sure. Note well that this
results even though S does not care about the monitoring costs that S incurs.
In other words, S acts like an agent with incentives to notify his principal of
policy deviations but not of whether these deviations are so large as to warrant
the expenditure of c. Still, because of the incentives that the real agent of P, B,
has, the actions of Sand B in combination enable P to take a "fully informed"
decision.
5.2 The Case of Xs > xi>
When Xs > xp, in general completely informative signalling is no longer pos-
sible.27 Now C I is non-empty, and therefore there are values of z such that
S wants to keep P out of the game. Since here he is assumed to be able to
do so by choosing p = 0, the fire alarm will not sound in some cases where P
would have been better off by intervening. Assume for the moment that there
exist positive levels of complaints such that P's optimal choice is to monitor.
Continue to denote the lowest such p by p. If there are other levels of p for
which m: (p) = M, they are (at least weakly) dominated by p, so S will choose
27However, see the remark following Proposition 1 and the comments below on what would
happen if P knew xB' '
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the latter in equilibrium. I will now analyse the interaction between Band S
before returning to that between S and P.
We know that S has a dominant strategy when his interests coincide with
those ofB, namely, "make no fuss". But what will he do when his interests are
aligned with P's? By assumption, S gets xp if he plays p. He will hence choose
this level of protest if he prefers xp to z and it does not exceed his maximum
willingness to pay for his most preferred policyoutcome. Since this is also the
lowest level of p for which P will monitor, he will elect not to protest if he
prefers xp to z but cannot "afford" it. Therefore the equilibrium strategy of S
js28
(3) • ( ) - { p,z E [1Q,&(p» U (z(p) ,w];
ro z - 0, z E [& (p) ,z (p)].
Let us now investigate B's strategic problem. When his ideal point lies in
the interval for which the equilibrium strategy of S is not to complain, he can
set z equal to it without having to fear that his career will be hurt by either his
deviation in implementation or the protests of S. If his ideal point lies outside
of this interval, however, he will have to compromise. Should he choose it in
this situation, S will organise protests and P will monitor, so B will both see
his efforts at changing y from xp to xB nullified and incur the "punishment" ¢.
Clearly this is dominated by compromising. If B's ideal point lies in [1Q,&(p»,
the greatest possible compromise he will have to make in order to persuade S not
to protest is setting z = & (p). Then the policyoutcome is at worst marginally
better for B than it would have been if S did protest.29
In addition, B avoids ¢. Likewise, for xB E (z(p) ,w], the greatest possible
compromise required is z (p). Again, this policyoutcome is better than when S
does protest and B's career remains unscathed. It followsthat B's equilibrium
strategy is30
{
s (p) ,XB E [1Q,&(p»;
(4)~o(xB)= xB,xBE[&(p),z(p)];
z(p) ,XB E (z(p) ,m].
From (4) it followsthat there will never be any protests in equilibrium, so P
will never have the opportunity to decide whether to monitor or not. Of course,
this does not mean that we can ignore P. After all, S only has a credible threat
if p is willing to monitor for some levelsof z which S would be willing to choose
in order to attract P's attention. In other words, we must show under what
28I resolve the indifference of S at ~ (p) and z (P) by assuming that he does not protest. Of
course, nothing of substance will change if it is assumed that S chooses p when he is indifferent
between this action and p = O. ~ (P) and z (p) are defined formally in the appendix.
2gRemember that we assume that p > O exists, so ~ (p) < æp and z (p) > 2æs - æp always,
even if only marginally so.
30Strictly speaking, B'e equilibrium strategy is one of these three alternatives depending'on
the location of his ideal point.
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conditions, if any, p exists. To do so, wemust investigate P's beliefs upon seeing
various protests.
Denote P's density function over the position of z after observing p by
h· (z lp). The equilibrium concept utilised here requires P to use Bayes' Rule
and the equilibrium strategy of to form his opinion about the location of . Since
in equilibrium P is not brought into play, his beliefs followingp = O are imma-
terial. This means that in equilibrium, he can have any posterior belief about
the distribution of that satisfies the minimal constraint that the probabilities
sum to one, i.e., any probability distribution where h· (z 10) E [0,1] Vz is per-
'iii
missible as long as H* (w 10) = J h * (z 10) dz = 1. Arbitrarily, I fix it such that
m* (O) = D is "optimal". We might then describe the equilibrium strategy of
p in the followingrather general termsr'!
(5)m* ( ) = { M if Eh'(z!fJ) [uP. (z)] s -ej
o P D otheruiise.
That is, if the utility from monitoring, which is just minus the monitoring
costs, exceeds the expected utility of not monitoring, where the expectation is
based on h* (z lp), it is optimal for P to monitor. Otherwise, it is not.
Existence can be proved by establishing upper bounds on p, or equivalently,
e. Of course, if monitoring costs a prohibitive, P would never monitor. Thus,
an equilibrium for the whole game with a semi-separating equilibrium in the
sub-game involving S and P can only exist for O < e < c. Existence is then
ensured by picking a c ~ c, such that for all O < e < c, there exists p for which
må (p) = M regardless of h· (z lp).
Here, I demonstrate how this is done by way of two figures.32
Figure 5 illustrates a "two-sided" equilibrium, which exists for certain pa-
rameter values. I call it a two-sided equilibrium because in it S is willing to
protest for both some z < xp and some z > xp. As already noted, completely
informative signalling is in general not possible when XB =/: xp. That is, we
cannot have ~ (p) = xp - e and z (p) = xp + e. Secondly, we cannot have
~(p) > xp - e and z(p) < xp + ej both ~(p) and z(p) cannot lie in NMZ as
this would make it optimal for P to chooseD upon observing the postulated p.
Thirdly, XB > xp implies ~az (xp - e) > ~az (xp + e). Since in equilibrium
S will choose the least costly way of signalling, we are looking for two-sided
equilibria in which ~ (p) > xp - e and Z (p) > xp + ej i.e., p > på (xp + e).
But because p as a function of e cannot be explicitly derived, an upper bound
pfjaz (xp - e) is all that can be established. A sufficientcondition for the upper
bound on pto exist, is O < e < c= xp -wo
In a "one-sided" equilibrium, S only protests for some z < xp (given the
assumption XB > xp). A one-sided equilibrium might exist under two kinds of
circumstances. Either 2xB -xp > w, so that S strictly prefers all z > xp to Xpj
31The manner in which indifference is resolved does not affect the results qualitatively. '
32In connection with the analysis in the next section, I do this formally (see the appendix).
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Figure 5: example of two-sided equilibrium
.
Xs
Figure 6: example of one-sided equilibrium
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or c > w, so that even observing pr az (w) does not guarantee that P optimally
should choose M (w lies strictly within NM Z). The latter case, which is due
to very high monitoring costs, can be envisaged from figure 5. The former case,
in which the cause is the extreme policy preferences of S (or, equivalently, a
great divergence between the ideal policies of S and P), is illustrated in figure
6. In both cases, given the assumption Xs > xi>, the upper bound on p ispraz (xi> - C).33
These results are summarised in Proposition 1:34
Proposition 1:
O < c < c, where c is afunction of xi>, xs,~, and w is a sufficient condition
for the equilibrium described by (3), (4), and (5) to exist.
A interesting corollary to this proposition is that if B is a perfect Weberian
bureaucrat, i.e., if xB = xi>, B can fulfil both of the tasks laid on him by his
superior to perfection: the policy is implemented as planned and there are no
politically harmful effects from social unrest. The reason is that ro (xi» = OJ
S will not expend costly resources that cannot possibly make any difference to
the policyoutcome.
Corollary 1:
A Weberian bureaucmt will set z = xi> and thereby avoid protests by S.
It also follows from Proposition 1 that under the condition specified, there
is an implementation gap as long as B is not a Weberian bureaucrat:
Corollary 2:
There is an implementation gap for XB # xi>. For a given c, the imple-
mentation gap is increasing in xB for XB E [g (p) ,z (p)] :::> Cl. It is constant
at xi> - g(p) or z(p) - xi> for XB ft [&(p) ,z(p)], with z(p) - xi> being the
maximum size of the gap.
Remark:
One-sided equilibria are completely informative. This is because either a)
the polarisation in preferences between S and P is so great that the former
wants to keep the latter out of the game 'Vz > O or b) monitoring costs are so
high that P is so high as to that S does not want to play it for any z > xi>.
That is, there is either no incentive for S to try to mislead P into monitoring
when it is really not worthwhile for P to check or it is too costly to do so.
Note that if P knows xB' because he is P's appointee or P chose him on
the recommendation or under the pressure of someone with known policy pref-
erences, he will know z whenever the case is brought to his attention. This is
so because if B decides to run the risk of setting off the fire alarm, the optimal
deviation is to xB' Therefore, P will take care of the case whenever it is worth-
while for him to do so, i.e., whenever the improvement in the policyoutcome
exceeds the costs of monitoring. Then the slightest possible noise will be made
by S if z is such that P would intervene and S prefers xi> to z, So B would
have to compromise by going to xi> - c or xi> + c, the values of z which makes
33As can be seen from the figures, in both cases the assumption Xs > xp dictates that if
the existence of a one-sided equilibrium is to be guaranteed we must have .1!l < 2zp - W.
34As noted in connection with figure 6, Z (I') might not exist, in which case (4) must' be
adjusted accordingly.
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P indifferent between monitoring or not. That is, completely informative sig-
nalling would be possible. It is not clear that this requires a greater concession
from B, because under uncertainty, S can take advantage of the fact that even
if z lies within NM Z, the possibility of it lying on the outside might lead P to
monitor anyway.3S However, if c is interpreted as mostly consisting of the costs
of checking what has actually transpired, they will be approximately zero if P
knows xB' and so he would always intervene if he is allowed to do so. Then B
would be forced all the way to xp or 2xs - xp.
To complete the description of possible equilibria, Proposition 2 states the
sufficient condition for the existence of an equilibrium with pooling in the sub-
game between Sand P. Intuitively, for very high monitoring costs, P would
not intervene even if S protested B's choice strongly. Thus, there is no reason
for B to heed the Principle of accommodation.
Proposition 2:
c ~ cis sufficient for the following equilibrium to exist: i) <;"0 (xB) = XB VXBj
ii) ro (z) = O VZj iii) mO (p) = D Vp.
The assumption that playing p = Oprecludes P from participating in the
game is an important difference between the model explored in this section and
those ofboth Lupia and McCubbins (1994b) and Epstein and O'Halloran (1995).
These authors depict the FA as a party regularly participating in hearings on
policies (most likely because of their focus on institutional implications). For
example, the FA in the model of Lupia and McCubbins has to make a stand
and could wish to mislead the politician about which outcome it prefers, but
it might be dissuaded from dissembling by costs incurred if it is caught lying.
Here, the FA can make statements simply because it is an important political
actor with an interest in the policy. However, it does not have to, and so might
refrain from taking action if it is not worthwhile. Therefore, the private FA
involved here, S, might collude with the bureaucrat, but it will never dissemble
in the sense of sounding the alarm when it is not the case that Z :f:. xp. This
changes in the next section.
6 The Soundsof Silence
In the absence of further justification, the assumption that P is not allowed to
participate in the game if S does not protest is clearly untenable. Within the
confines of the present model, good reasons for restricting P in this way are
hard to find. Hence, we should investigate what P's optimal response to no
protest is. This turns out to be a non-trivial task.
This is best illustrated by starting out with the case of Xs = xp. If c = O,
then clearly m* (p) = M Vp. The subtle change from the last section is that
m* (O)= M now has real substance. As long as the policy ideals of S and P
coincide, however, this does not change the outcome. All types of bureaucrats
will heed the Principle of accommodation and xp is always the policyoutcome.
35As noted above, in a two-sided equilibrium ~ (p) > zp - c and z (Ii) > zp + c. Hence,
bureaucrats for which zB < ~ (p) would actually gain from P knowing their ideal points.
23
Positive costs of monitoring does not change the results of the last section
either. When Xs = xp, S had no reason to use the added power of p = O
assumed there; by extension, here he has no incentive to try to mislead P about
whether a deviation has been made by B or not. Of course, he still might want
to fool P into intervening when it is not worthwhile for him to do so. However,
the combination of the Principle of accommodation and UD implies that the
outcome is completely informative signalling.
The results start to change compared to the last section when Xs > xp.
First of all, assuming c = O, the power of S is decreased and the power of P
increased when the latter might intervene followingp = O. The optimal strategy
of P is still m* (p) =M Vp, but nowm* (O) = M implies that the outcome will
be xp. All types of bureaucrats will adapt to P's strategy by choosing z = xp.
This contrasts with the last section, when S could keep P out of the game and
would do so if z E Cl. Then all bureaucrats for which xB E Cl could choose
z = xB without having to fear for their careers. Thus, to the extent that such
bureaucrats are possible, the outcome improves for P.
When c > O but "small", things change markedly in that there is now no
pure-strategy equilibrium. The reason is simple. When c ~ O, P should "al-
most" always check what has happened in B's district. Once again, this obvi-
ates any incentives S might have for protesting B's choice, and the Principle
of accommodation still implies that the optimal strategy of B is ~* (xB) = xp
VXB in this case. However, when it is his turn to move, P should then realise
that z = xp. Since xp is in the interior of NMZ for all strictly positive c, it
thus would not pay for him to intervene. But if P abstains from monitoring,
~ (xB) = xp VXB is clearly not optimal. Hence, if an equilibrium exists for
low monitoring costs, it must be one in which some of the players use mixed
strategies. An analysis of such an equilibrium is beyond the scope of the present
paper. I would only like to point out that the incentives S has to protest are a
non-monotonous function of z, c.f. the "see-saw" pattern of pMaz (z) in figure
7. This indicates that the characterisation of optimal mixed strategies is likely
to be difficult (and proving existence even more so).
In the remainder of this section, I discuss the pure-strategy equilibria that
exist for p not "too" small and not "too" high. These involvethe same kind of
semi-separating equilibrium in the sub-game between S and P as those described
in the last section. Existence is proved in two steps. Firstly, sufficientconditions
on the level of c are established. Secondly, I prove that the followingnecessary
conditions are satisfied then. The Principle of accommodation implies that a
positive level of protest will not be observed along the equilibrium path. To
be part of the equilibrium strategy of S it must first of all be the case that if
such a level of protest was observed by P, his rational beliefs imply that the
optimal action is to monitor. In addition, S must be willing to play p, which he
could be at the cut-off points because these are by construction points for which
S is indifferent between staying on the equilibrium path by not protesting and
staging the equilibrium level of positive protest. Secondly, any deviations from
the unique equilibrium level of positive protest or zero should result in rational
beliefs by P that makes him respond in a way that supports the equilibrium.
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Figure 7: r#a.x (z)
Thirdly, of course, along the equilibrium path, P should choose not to monitor.
These conditions are stated formally in the appendix, where existence is proved.
Hence, under certain condition it is possible to extend the results of the last
section to the case where the response of P to P =Ois endogenous. That is, for
certain values of c, there exist equilibria in which some types of bureaucrats heed
the Principle of accommodation. This they do because for a range of values of z,
S can credibly threaten to protest, where credibly means that it would indeed .
be optimal for P to intervene upon observing a certain positive level of protest
and that incurring the cost required to induce P to monitor is optimal for S.
Finally, prohibitive monitoring costs are sufficient to guarantee that P will
never intervene. Therefore, S will not protest no matter the choice of z. Then
B can implement his ideal policy regardless of what that is.
7 Concluding Comments
In this paper, I have investigated a possible source of the widely observed dis-
crepancies between planned and implemented policies in low-incomecountries.
We have seen that bureaucrats might collude with local or regional political
powers so that actual policy is different from what the bureaucrats' superiors
intended. This can only happen when the policy preferences of the bureaucrats
are not the same as those of their principals. However, this is probably not
uncommon. Politicised hiring of government officials is widespread in the coun-
tries that make up the so-called Third World. If the bureaucrats have been hired
by their superiors, the latter have probably taken this into account and chosen
non-Weberian employees either because of the prodding of powerful persons or
because they gained in other ways. Giving someone a job in the bureaucracy on
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a person's request might create obligations on the part ofboth the requester and
the individual who is employed. This obligation can be put to use later by the
person controlling the hiring decision. Thus, it seems important to study how
such reciprocities affect governmental output. We have noted that P knowing
xB does not necessarily force greater concessions from B because S might have
been able to utilise P's uncertainty strategically. In addition, when new prin-
cipals arrive, they inherit non- Weberian bureaucrats and will face the situation
studied in most ofthis paper, where xB was assumed unknown to P.
One way to go from here is to investigate the issues discussed in the context
of specific policies. Land reform comes readily to mind, particularly since large
landowners definitely are "strongmen" in many poor countries. Another avenue
one could take to study these matters in more depth is to generalise the model,
for example, by allowing the principal to choose the policy with an eye to the
ensuing game. As mentioned above, one should then preferably include more
than one bureaucrat interacting with one strongman.
One of the motivations of the field officials as presented here is the need
to avoid controversy over implementation decisions. It is argued that this need
stems from the bureaucratic principals' aversion to such controversy, an aversion
which in turn is founded on the fragility of political regimes and careers in
poor countries. A more complete analysis would seek to include these effects.
However, as the most plausible arguments for the politicians' desire to avoid
social unrest rely on incomplete information, it is not a task easily done. It would
also require the behaviour of more agents to be modelled, in itself a complicating
factor. Though, it could be done in a very stylised fashion by considering a
two-period version of the above game where there is only a probability q of
the principal being in charge in the second period as well, with q = q (p),
q' (p) < O. Moreover, this could create incentives for action for S which are
different from the ones that we have sought to highlight here. For instance, he
might create controversy in the hope that the next principal's preferences will
be more agreeable to him.
The choice of bureaucratic control structures should be studied from a nor-
mative perspective, using the principal-agent methodology.i" In a previous ver-
sion of the paper, I studied the effects of low-level auditing, i.e., the possibility
of officials below P in the hierarchy discovering and rectifying transgressions by
B. This was done assuming that S could keep P out of the game by choosing
p = O, but that an imperfect audit was conducted regardless of the choice made
by S. The general conclusion was that FA and pp features of an oversight
system have the potential for reinforcing each other, since auditing implies that
deviations by B can be detected even if S played p = O. However, it was inter-
esting to see that for some implementation choices by B, auditing attenuated
the incentives that S has to protest strongly. This was due to assuming that
the probability of an audit was higher if protests occurred (but lower than 1 so
that auditing was always imperfect) . Since making the tiniest noise possible
set off this mechanism, i.e., this alternative was approximately costless, S could
36For some thoughts on this subject, see Tirole (1994).
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be content with this increase in the probability of getting xp. Then B could
possibly get away with less accommodation, i.e., greater deviations. Hence, the
details of the oversight system might be important to the outcomes.
An important point for institutional design is that a Weberian bureaucracy
is a "collective good" for political principals, be they current or future. As such,
it will tend to be undersupplied. The political instability of most low-income
countries aggravate this feature. Creating a new control structure requires time
and monetary resources to be spent on designing and building it. When the time
horizon of principals is short due to political turbulence, such an investment is
not likely to be profitable.3T While this is in a sense pessimistic conclusion
because all countries could do with efficient bureaucracies, it is perhaps not as
stark when one remembers that an efficient bureaucracy need not pursue nor-
matively desirable goals. Alas, it seems that the objectives of many politicians
in poor countries do not make for the purposeful pursuit on the part of bureau-
crats of a notion of the common good. Thus, a deviating bureaucrat might be
a true public servant.
8 Appendix
This appendix contains the proofs of the results for the case where P's response
to the silence of S is endogenous. Here I assume Xs > xp. I first define
pM az (z), & (p), and z (p). Secondly, I define a Universally Divine Equilibrium
(UDE) in the present context. Thereafter, I derive f3 (p, z), the probability of
monitoring by P whichmakes S indifferent between staying with the equilibrium
and playing p for a given value of z. Fourthly, I demonstrate that the critical
values of are extreme points in the sense of being the endpoints of the various
equilibrium intervals for which S plays p or zero. Having established this, I
state the equilibria existing under different parameter configurations. Where
the results are not immediate, the requisite proofs follow.
pM az (z) is defined by the identities
(CIa) -Ixp - xsl- ~pMaz (z) == -Iz - xsl,z E [IQ,xp) U (2xs - xp,w];
(Clb) -Ixp - xsl == -Iz - xsl- ~pMaz (z) , z E [xp,2xs - xpl.
That is, pM az (z) is the maximum protest that S would be willing to stage,
given z, in order to get his most preferred policy outcome, xp (CIa) or z (Clb).
Thus,
(C2) Maz (z) = { Iz-z;l:jze:zsl, z.E [IQ,xp) U (2xs - xp,w];P IZp-zsl-lz-zsl E [ ° 2 o_ol
K , z Xp, Xs Xp•
~ (p) and z (p) are inverse functions of pif az (z). Sincewe are looking for an
equilibrium in which S chooses p = Ofor z E Cl = [xp,2xs - xpl, ~ (p) ::;:xj,
37For a more thorough analysis of this problem, see Hagen (1999).
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and z (p) 2:: 2xs - xp. That is, ~ (p) is defined by p = t#az (s) for z E [!Q, xp]
and z(p) is defined by p = t#az (z) for z E [2xs - xp,wl. Hence,
(C3ah(p) = pMaz-l (s) = xp - KP,p E [o,pMaz (w)];
(C3b)z(p) = pMaz-l (z) = 2xs - xp + KP,p E [O,t#az (w)] .
That is, ~ (p) is the highest level of z in [!Q,xp] for which p is not dominated
by p = ° and z (p) is the lowest level of z in [2xs - xp, w] for which p is not a
dominated strategy.
To facilitate the discussion, a formal definition of the equilibrium concept is
included here:
Definition Cl:
A pure stmtegy universally divine equilibrium consists of stmtegies and beliefs
satisfying i)~" (xB) E arg max, VB (z; r" (z) .m" (p»; ii) r" (z) E argmaxp Vs (p; z,m* (p»;
iii) m* (p) E arg max; Eho(zlp) [Vp (aj ~o (XB) ,p)]; ivy if J 9 (z) dz > 0,
{zlro (z)=p}
then n: (z lp) = J g(z) g(z)dz; v) if J 9 (z) dz > O, then n: (z lp) > O
{.lrO(.)=p} {zlro(z)=p}
only if z E arg mint,8 (p, t).
Here Vi (-) is the complete objective function of player i, e.g., Vs (Pi z, m" (p» =
-lY (m" (p); z) - xsl- «p. 9 (z) = J f (xB) dxB, i.e., it is the be-
{zål<;o(zå)=z}
liefs of P over the location of z induced by ~o (xB) before he observes p. Upon
observing p, he updates his beliefs to li" (z lp) using r" (z) and Bayes' Rule
whenever possible. If he observes an out-of-equilibrium message, he uses UD to
update his beliefs. This implies that he believes that the deviation is made by
S for the values of z at which S requires the least probability of P responding
with M.
In the type of equilibrium we are looking for, S can keep quiet when z E CI
without P monitoring. It is obvious that he will not deviate by playing a positive
p for these values of z. Hence, we only have to check his incentives to deviate
from the posited equilibrium when he has the same preferences over z and xp
as do P. Also, we do not have to worry about deviations to some p higher than
(i. The only deviations that might threaten a candidate equilibrium where S is
to play p for certain values of z are p E (O,p). ,8 (p, z) is defined by the identity
(C4),8 (p, z) Ixp - xsl + [1 - ,8 (p, z)] Iz - xsl + Kp == Ixp - xsl +Kp.
Rearranging, we have
K«(i- p)
(C5),8 (p, z) = 1+ I ° ol I· ol'xp-xs - z-xs
Because we only look at deviations downwards (and K > O), the numerator
of the fraction on the right hand side is positive. The denominator is well-
defined since here we assume that c > O. Hence the potential cut-off points are
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different from xp. The denominator is negative because the types of S which
might deviate are those which prefer xp to z, Thus, ø (p, z) is less than one.
It is positive, however, because p will be some ptfax (z), so that the expression
could be reduced to Ø(p,z) = Ixp-x;(:_Plz-xsl > O. Furthermore,
(C6a)z < x* ¢:::::} Ø(p z) = 1+ ~(p- p).s , z-xp ,
aø(p,z) = - ~(p- p) < O'az ( * )2 ,z-xp
(C6b)z ~ x* ¢:::::} ø (p, z) = 1+ ~(p - p) js 2xs-xp- z
aø (p, z) = ~(p-p) >0.az (2xs - xp - z)2
As shown below, there are either one or two cut-off points. If there are two,
one will be above and one will be below. Since we are looking for the values of
z for which S needs the least inducement to deviate, we are interested in the
values of B's implementation choice which minimise ø (p, z). The derivatives
show that below xs, the probability of monitoring which makes Sindifferent
between staying with the equilibrium or deviating to p is minimised for the
z closest to xs, regardless of the value of p. This is the lower cut-off point.
Equivalently, above xs, S needs the least incentive to deviate when z equals the
higher cut-off point. These results are intuitive in the sense that the equilibrium
we are searching for will be such that S will be indifferent between playing p = O
or p at the cut-off points. For values of z below the lowest and above the highest
cut-off point, he would have been willing to stage even larger protests and hence
in a sense achieves an "information rent" by pooling on p. For the remaining zs
outside Cl, he ideally would have liked P to monitor, but since these lie closer
to his ideal point than does the cut-off points, the urge to deviate is less strong.
And, as noted above, for zs in Cl, he has the best of all possible worlds in the
type of equilibrium we are trying to establish.
Because B anticipates what will transpire between S and P, we know that
p will not be observed along the equilibrium path. What B does, if we stick
to the signalling game terminology, is to shrink the type space of S. But while
a positive level of protest is not observed along the equilibrium path, to be
part of the equilibrium strategy of S, and thereby inducing some types of B to
accommodate him, it must be the case that P, taking into account the strategies
of Band S, will in fact monitor upon observing p. Thus, we must treat p as a
deviation from the equilibrium path and make sure that it is optimal for P to
monitor if it is played.
This point can be seen more clearly by deriving P's probability distribution
over z prior to observing p. As noted above, 9 (t) == prob (z = tj ~* (xB) ,f (xB»'
i.e., 9 (t) is the probability that z is equal to t given the equilibrium strategy of
B and the probability distribution over his ideal points. Because B's optimal
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strategy is never to choose a z which would make S stage a positive level of
protest, the probability of observing p is zero in the equilibrium of the full game:
J 9 (z) dz = ° J dz =O. Hence, along the equilibrium path the
{zlr'(z)=p} {zlr'(z)=p}
posterior probability distribution over the location of z cannot be derived using
Bayes' Rule and the strategy of S.
To summarise, "climbing up" the game tree, we postulate that there is (at
least) one p >°that would make P monitor. Therefore, S will play it for certain
values of z, We then know that certain types of B will adhere to the Principle
of accommodation. Thus, "climbing down" the game tree again, S will not find
it worthwhile to play p. But in order for this to be an equilibrium, it must be
the case that had he played it, the values of z for which he would have done
so must be such that P would have monitored. Since B makes Sindifferent
between playing and zero at the cut-off point(s), the first requirement that p
has to satisfy is Eh'(zlp) [up (z)] ::;; -c. Secondly, it must be the case that, for S
to stay with p instead of choosing a lower and cheaper level of protest, P must
respond to such ps with a probability of monitoring sufficiently low to deter S
from deviating. Thirdly, of course, upon observing p = 0, it must be optimal
for P given his rational beliefs to refrain from checking what B has done.
Formally, for the case of two cut-off points, the requirements are
(C7a)c < h* (~(p) IpH~(p) - xpl + [1- h* (.~(p) Ip)]lz(p) - xpl j
(C7b)c > h* (~(p) lp) I~(p)- xpl + [1- h* (~(p) lp)]Iz(p) - xpl ,p E (O,p) j
F(p)
(C7c)c 2: h*(~(p)IO)I~(p)-xpl+ J Iz-xj.lh*(zIO)dz+h* (z(p) 10) Iz(p)-xj.l·
A(P)
Because the incentives to deviate downwards are greatest at the cut-off
points, h* (~(p) lp) = h* (~(p) lp) 'VpE (O,p). Hence, the equilibrium has sort
of a knife-edge property: (C7a) and (C7b) will both hold with equality. Thus,
P will be indifferent between monitoring or not upon observing p. This allows
him to randomise in a fashion that makes S stay with the equilibrium. Denote
the probability that P monitors by IL(p). An equilibrium requirement is thence
IL* (p) ::;;{3(p, z) 'Vp/\ 'Vz. We can at once set IL* (p) = 1 'Vp2: P and IL* (O)=°
without upsetting an equilibrium of the type that we are looking for, though of
course the cut-off points must be such that the latter is in fact optimal. Devia-
tions upward is of no concern since S will choose the least cost way of protesting
B's choice and the equilibrium will be such that it is in fact optimal for P to
monitor should he observe a p larger than p. Our concern is with deviations
to positive levels of protest lower than p. Inserting the expression for ~ (p) in
(C6a) and that for z(p) in (C6b), {3(p,z) can be written as
(C8){3 (p, z (p» = {3 (p, z (p» == {3(p) = g.- p
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It follows that setting /l. (p) = f3 (p) Vp E (0, p) will generate the right
incentives for S. However, so will setting /l. (p) = ° Vp E (0, p), and such a
choice will not affect the equilibrium. In other words, equilibrium outcomes are
isomorphic as long as /l. (p) E [0, i] Vp E (0, p), and therefore we might as well
stay with the pure strategy equilibrium.
In general, it is not possible to solve for p(c), the level of p which ensures
that (C7a-c) are satisfied for a specific value of c. Therefore I confine myself to
stating the values of c for which one- and two-sided equilibria surely exist; and
to proving that the necessary conditions (C7a-c) are satisfied then . .AB noted in
the main text, c can be neither too small nor too high. That is, it must be below
a certain maximum and above a certain minimum level. These bounds cannot
be explicitly derived, and I therefore state levels of c sufficient to guarantee an
equilibrium of the type we are looking for (denoted by c and f respectively).
Moreover, I split this interval into intervals where one- and two-sided equilibria
exist, as applicable.
If 2xs - xi:> 2:: w, Cl = [xi:>,w] (since Xs > xi:». Then only a one-sided
equilibrium of the type we are looking for can be guaranteed to exist. It is for
z < xi:> that S must be willing to play p and P willing to monitor if a semi-
separating equilibrium is to exist. Hence, °< f = w - xi:> < c < xi:> - w = c is
sufficient (and 1Q< 2xi:> - w necessary).38
In the case 2xs - xi:> < w, both types of equilibria might exist. Then,
c= Max {xi:> -1Q,W - xi:>} . .AB noted in the main text, completely informative
signalling is in general not possible when Xs =/; xi:>. That is, we cannot have both
& (p) = xi:> - c and z (p) = xi:> + c. Secondly, however, we cannot have & (p) >
xi:> - c and z (p) < xi:> +c; & (p) and z (p) cannot both lie in N MZ as this would
make it optimal for P to choose D upon observing the postulated p. Thirdly,
Xs > xi:> implies pMaz (xi:> - c) > pMaz (xi:> + c). Since in equilibrium S will
choose the least costly way of signalling, we are looking for two-sided equilibria
in which & (p) > xi:> - c and z (p) > xi:>+c. Xs > xi:> makes xi:> +c > 2xs - xi:>
the binding constraint downwards. That is, f = 2 (xs - xi:» < c $w - xi:> = c
is sufficient for such an equilibrium to exist. The last inequality follows from
the fact that for c> w - xi:>, only the existence of a one-sided equilibrium can
be guaranteed. In all cases, ~az (xi:> - c) is the upper bound on p.
It is straightforward to prove the existence of a one-sided equilibrium when
the sufficient conditions on c are satisfied. I therefore confine myself to prov-
ing the existence of a two-sided equilibrium, i.e., that (C7a-c) are satisfied for the
levels of cspecified. Clearly, thesolution will satisfyp E [pMaz (xi:> + c) ,pMaz (xi:> - c)].
Because [pMaz (xi:> + c) ,pMaz (xi:> - c)] = [C-2(Z:-Zp), ~], we are looking for
p = c-;._o., o E [0,2 (xs - xi:»J. Inserting this expression as well as those for & (p)
and z (p) into (C7a) and simplifying, we get
(C9)0= [l-h· (xp_c+olc~O)] 2(xs-xp) :=0(0).
38Note that in section 5 of the main text, f = O.
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Because h* (~(p) lp} is a continuous function of F (~ (p)) and F (z (p)), F (z)
is a continuous function of z Yz, and ~ (p) and z (p) are continuous functions of p
(and thus a), h* (~(p) lp) is a continuous function of a. Hence, so is 8 (a). More-
over, h* (-) E [0,1], and so () (a) has domain and range equal to [0,2 (xs - xj,)],
which is a compact subset of Euclidean space. Therefore, Brouwer's Theorem
applies and ()(a) has a fixed point a'. That the theorem does not guarantee
uniqueness is of no concern here, since S will obviously choose the lowest satis-
fying (C7a) and his incentives are well understood by P. AP. noted above, this
protest level also satisfies (C7b) with equality. Therefore, it only remains to
show that (C7c) holds here too. In fact, one can see that (C7a) holding with
equality implies the weak inequality in (C7c), because the left hand side of (C7c)
is a weighted average of numbers no larger than I~(p) - xj,1 and Iz(p) - xj,l.
Given that the existence of p is established, we can describe the beliefs of P
dictated by UD. First of all, if he does observe p, he should believe that z is lo-
cated at the cut-off points. The probability that it is located at the lower cut-off
point is then the accumulated probability that B has an ideal point in I.Y!., ~ (p)],
weighted by the inverse of the probability that xB E I.Y!., ~ (p)] U [z (p) ,w]. The
probability that it is located at the higher cut-off point is derived correspond-
. gl Th t i ......ided il'b . h* ( (~) I~) F(£(p» dIn y. a IS, In a rwo-si equ l num, ~ p p = t-[F(z(p»-F(!:(p»] an
h* (-(~) I~) l-F~(P)~ I ided 'l'b . -(~ d tz P P = l-[F('i(PF"-Fz(p»]' n a one-si equiu num, z p, oes no
exist. Hence, h* (~(p) lp) = 1. Secondly, if P observes p = 0, then he knows
that z E k(p),z(p)]. AP. ~*(xB) = xB YXB E (~(p),z(p», h*(zIO) = f(z)
Yz E (~(p), z(p», while h* (~(p) 10) = F(~ (p» and h* (z(p) 10) = 1-F(~(p».
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